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The dissertation examines the puzzle of the divergent post-communist discourses and rituals 
of collective memory in the Czech republic and Slovakia – in particular, the difference in (1) 
the two countries’ attitudes toward de-communization, (2) their interpretations of their 
common Czechoslovak past, and (3) the overall content and style of official memory 
discourses employed in the two countries after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993.  
Taking a comparative historical perspective, the dissertation traces the transformation of the 
Czech and Slovak historical narratives over time and finds the roots of the divergent Czech 
and Slovak post-communist paths in the legacies of the Czechoslovak communist and 
interwar regimes.  On a conceptual level, the dissertation presents a culturalist critique of the 
dominant institutionalist literature on democratization and an argument on how we might 
think of post-communist transitions outside of the strictly institutional framework.  It 
conceptualizes democratization as a dynamic and a highly contentious process of meaning 
creation in which various actors struggle to legitimize themselves and their visions of the 
present and the future by making references to the past and highlights the special role of 
political myths in this process.  Rather than a straightforward adoption of some ready-made 
institutions and processes, in other words, democratization is presented as an activity of 
  
sensemaking – of searching for useable pasts and new legitimizing mythologies.  The Czech 
and Slovak post-communist search for useable pasts represents neither an unprecede ted 
“return of history” nor some cynical sinister power play of elites acting on some well-
constituted interests but rather a new phase of an ongoing, dynamic project of id ntity and 
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Chapter 1: Post-Communist Transitions and Politics of the Past 
 
Introduction 
With the collapse of communism in 1989, pasts, presents and futures in East Central 
Europe became subject to an extraordinary metamorphosis.   Virtually overnight, Honeckers, 
Husáks and Kádárs of the Eastern bloc stepped down – some voluntarily, some les so; the 
despised Soviet tanks stationed for decades throughout the region as a form of “brotherly 
help” against the “enemies of socialism” finally left; thousands of gigantic statues of Marx, 
Lenin and other once-hallowed saints of the communist era were removed from central
squares and town centers; and the entire region was soon thrown into a remarkable st eet and 
plaza re-christening frenzy.  The despised, yet intimately familiar, world of symbols, truths 
and identities, which for more than four decades culturally defined East Central Europe, 
became suddenly obsolete.  And its inhabitants were unexpectedly confronted with a new and 
urgent need to re-think their worlds, envision new futures and re-build their relationship with 
the past.  In a manner quite unthinkable just a few months earlier, East Central Europeans 
suddenly found themselves desperately rummaging through their national histories, dusting 
off some of their previously silenced pasts, looking for historical analogies, inventing new 
traditions,1 dreaming up new “fantasies of salvation”,2 in some places, even reburying the 
dead and leading some commentators to hastily proclaim an unprecedented “return of 
history”.  
                                                
1 Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger, Eds. (1983). The Invented Tradition. Past and Present Publications. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
2 Tismaneanu, V. (1998). Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-




Revolutions of 1989, in other words, ushered in a phase of transition and uncertainty, 
throwing the former communist region, in fact the entire world system, into what professor 
Ken Jowitt memorably termed a “new world disorder” 3 – a peculiar state of uncertainty and 
flux in which most of the acquired meanings and central points of reference dissolved,  
boundaries and established identities with which people used to define themslves and others 
became uncertain and assumed pasts and futures were put at stake.  Along with the Wall, in 
short, crumbled not only the ECE political and economic systems but the entire moral, 
cultural, and psychological architecture of Eastern Europe.4  Gone was people’s sense of 
orientation, of knowing what was the right way to go, to act, to think.  The old regime’s 
official ideals and heroes became valueless for the new system.  And paradoxically, as Czech 
sociologist and a former dissident Jirina Siklova perceptively points ut, laughable became 
also the previous regime’s enemies and unofficial heroes as the fate of many Eastern 
European dissidents illustrates.  The system of social stratification was thoroughly 
transformed.  In addition, in several countries, Czechoslovakia included, national identity 
underwent a thorough metamorphosis.  In a word, people’s entire meaningful worlds were 
abruptly altered.  Commenting on the immediate post-1989 experience in Czechoslovakia, 
Šiklová wrote: 
We are experiencing cultural shock like migrants, refugees, and 
emigrants experience. The shock originates in the fact that one has been 
uprooted and is suddenly living in a totally new environment in which he 
must quickly adapt. In the case of migrants and emigrants it is well 
understood that such a rapid change may also be a cause of neurosis, and 
the social workers assigned to work with refugees are aware of this fact. 
                                                
3 Jowitt, K. (1992). The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press. 
4 Dawisha, K. (2005). "Communism as a Lived System of Ideas in Contemporary Russia." East 




It is difficult to provide aid for migrants and refugees; to ensure therapy 
and quick adaptation for an entire nation is impossible. Moreover, we 
have not changed our place of residence, we have not moved anywhere; 
only the society around us has changed completely.5  
Strangely enough, however, despite the enormous magnitude of the symbolic 
transformation that has taken place in the former communist world over the past two decades, 
the symbolic dimension of the post-communist change remains an understudied subject.  
Despite all the monuments that have been replaced, streets that have been r named, the dead 
bodies which have been reburied, despite all the large and small quarrels, debates, and 
skirmishes over which historical figures should be placed on national curren ies, which 
events and personas should be emphasized in history education, or which days should be 
instituted as national holidays, we still know relatively little about the enormous symbolic 
transformation that has taken place in the former socialist societies.  Beyond the widely 
popular, politically convenient, yet nonetheless conceptually weak assertion that history was 
“unfrozen” and “returned” to East Central Europe once the constraints of the bipolar 
ideological conflict were lifted, the role of the past in the democratization project remains 
obscure.  
To a large extent, the lack of research focusing on the symbolic aspect of d m cratic 
transitions is due to the way democracy and transitions to democracy have been routinely 
conceptualized in much of the sociological and political scientific literature.  More often than 
not, democratic transformations are understood to entail an aggregate body of rules and 
norms which, upon their successful adoption, will miraculously transform undemocratic 
systems into flourishing Western-type models of democracy.  Viewed in such rationalistic, 
positivist fashion, democracy represents no more than a set of abstract, institutional rules 
                                                




(such as a competitive party structure, free and fair elections, institutionalized rule of law, 
market capitalism, etc.) and democratization a fairly straightforward, technical process of 
getting there.6   
Inquiries into the role of the past in the democratization project, in other words, are 
strangely missing from the dominant picture of democratization.  In the rare cases when the 
role of the past is entertained by transitional analysts, it is usually framed in terms of rather 
vague blocks of pre-communist and communist “legacies” which are then treated in a 
deterministic fashion to post facto explain divergent post-communist trajectories of former 
communist countries.  Those countries with the “right” kinds of historical experiences are 
assumed to have better chances at achieving their democratic consolidation and those which 
lack such positive experiences are in trouble.  The role of the past, in other words, is reduced 
to one of democracy’s many prerequisites.7  As Harold Wydra correctly points out, however, 
such a view overlooks the possibility that past cultural meanings could play a ositive, 
integrative, role in the construction of new meanings and symbols and in the legi imization of 
the new political order.8    
The Story 
Starting with the basic premise that any meaningful study of democratization needs 
to consider the less palpable, symbolic processes hidden underneath the more visible 
                                                
6 For instance, the majority of scholarly journals and transitional analyses in the early 1990s focussed 
on questions of constitutional and political engineering with the major debates during this period 
including the pros and cons of various electoral systems, the risks and benefits of presidentialism vs. 
parliamentarism, the character of judicial review, the perils of different approaches to economic 
reform, privatization, etc.  See for instance some of the early issues of the Journal of Democracy and 
East European Constitutional Review – the two major jou nals founded in order to provide the Western 
and home-based reformers with theoretical and practical know-how on how to build a functional and 
stable liberal democracy in the region.   
7 See for example Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 





institutional changes, which accompany transitions to democracy, this dissertation zeroes in 
on the discourses of memory in the post-communist Czech and Slovak republics.  Taking a 
historical perspective, I analyze the key myths, collective memories and official histories that 
constitute the Czech and Slovak symbolic universe and trace their transformation over time, 
starting from the 19th century national awakeners, the interwar Czechoslovak republic, World 
War II, the immediate post-war period and the Czechoslovak communist era.  In other words, 
I study how memory has been instrumentalized for legitimacy and meaning formation by 
subsequent generations of Czechs and Slovaks over time and how the most recent, post-
communist “return of the past”, to use a popular metaphor, compares to previous phase of 
national memory construction.   
To address these questions, I take as my empirical focus discourses and rituals of 
collective memory in the Czech republic and Slovakia, in particular the debates about and the 
actual commemoration of Czech and Slovak national holidays.  I also enrich my analysis with 
examples of other instruments of “banal nationalism”9, such as statues and memorials, 
banknotes, history textbooks, etc.   I believe analysis of public debates over national holidays 
and various other tools of state propaganda mentioned above offers an especially fruitful way 
of looking at political transitions.  This is so because all new regimes, especially those 
emerging from a lengthy authoritarian experience, are faced with a need to confr nt their 
past.  They must decide which continuities to emphasize, which pasts to disassociate 
themselves from, how to deal with those directly responsible for the crims of the former 
regime as well as those (often the majority of the population) who helped perpetuate the 
repressive system in more passive ways.  As Paloma Aquilar and Carsten Humlebæk point 
out, by creating new holidays, collectivities give new contours to their past, they punctuate 
time in new ways, brand specific historical events as “national” and thus worthy of 
                                                




celebration and respect while consigning some other events to oblivion.10  Politics of the past 
(as captured in debates about national holidays, statues and memorials, history textb oks, 
etc.) thus promises to provide a fruitful way of capturing the symbolic, meaning-making 
dimension of democratic transformations. 
The Czech and the Slovak comparison in particular offers an especially interesting 
demonstration of these processes due to the puzzle it presents.   Given the fact t at Czechs 
and Slovaks lived together in a common state and were citizens of the same regi s for 
nearly seven decades,11 the difference between their post-communist discourses and ritualsof 
collective memory is rather striking.  While the Czechs became one of thfirst post-
communist societies to pursue serious de-communization efforts via lustration and public 
access to communist Secret police files, the Slovaks never really imp emented lustration 
policies, were much slower in publicizing the secret files and, unlike the Czechs, have been 
much more accepting of their communist past (as well as continued presence of former 
communist functionaries in public life).  In addition, while the Czechs maintained continuity 
with interwar Czechoslovakia and its legitimizing mythology even after the Czechoslovak 
split, the Slovak post-communist elites rejected the Czechoslovak past and began a 19th 
century-like nationalist project of constructing a brand new Slovak identity.   
The Czech- Slovak comparison is also interesting from the politics of the past 
perspective for another reason.  In the Czech and Slovak case, we are dealing with especially 
tangled, complex and divisive pasts (even in comparison with some of their other p st-
communist neighbors).  Czechoslovakia is one of a few countries in the post-communist 
region which had a well functioning and relatively prosperous democracy during the interwar 
years.  At the same time, however, it is also the only country in the region where communists 
                                                
10 Aguilar, P. and C. Humlebæk (2002). "Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish 
Democracy.  The Legacies of Francoism and the Civil War." History&Memory14(1): 121-164. 
11 Excluding the 1939-1945 period when Bohemia was annexed to Hitler’s Nazi Germany and 




won in free elections in 1946, in the absence of Soviet tanks on the Czechoslovak territory.  
Throughout its existence, the Czechoslovak communist regime represented one of the most 
ideologically rigid communist regimes of the bureaucratic-authoritarian style, to use Herbert 
Kitschelt’s classification,12 employing one of the most radical and thorough practices of 
organized forgetting.  It is thus interesting to investigate how much (if any) memory was 
preserved despite more than four decades of communist manipulation of the past – and 
whether any of it might still be useable in the new system.   
The Czech and Slovak World War II past is equally complicated – not least due to
the gross deformations and lies the communist regime constructed about it.  Memories of the 
war, including dark legacies of Slovakia’s collaboration with Hitler’s Germany and its role in 
deportations of Slovak Jews were never freely discussed during the communist rule.  
Similarly, memories of Czech and Slovak anti-fascist resistance during the war as well as the 
entire interwar period of the first Czechoslovak republic were either silenced or hugely 
distorted by the communist propaganda.  As Tony Judt fittingly noted, there was not one but 
indeed a whole archipelago of extremely difficult memories to be processed in the Czech and 
Slovak republics after the collapse of communism.13 
Adding to the already complex and multiple tasks of the Czech and Slovak post-
communist transformation was Czechoslovakia’s dissolution on January 1 1993 which further 
heightened the need for redefinition and self-reflection, especially in Slovakia where it led to 
a major revision of Slovak identity.   
                                                
12 Kitschelt, H., Z. Manfeldova, et al. (1994). Post-Communist Party Systems. Cambridge, Cambridge 
UP. 
13 Judt, T. (2002). "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe." Memory & 





Positioning the Argument 
To talk about democratization as sense- or meaning-creation necessarily calls for a 
cultural approach.  By this, I do not necessarily mean an approach focused on norms, values 
and attitudes toward politics as was characteristic of some of the earlier functionalist studies 
of political culture, most notably those by Almond and Verba.14  Neither do I imply a 
Geertzian, ethnographic, look at customs and traditions.15  Rather, drawing on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power, I conceptualize political culture as a “practice” – an 
ongoing work of symbolic representation, in which various actors maintain or subvert the 
words and categories through which reality is perceived and expressed.  They do so in order 
to impose and legitimize their vision of the world, its present meaning and their desired 
vision of its future direction.16  Political culture, the way I employ the term, thus is neither a 
social structure nor a normative system; it is better thought of as the constitutive symbolic 
aspect of all social processes.  
 The starting point of such culturalist argument is the realization that human 
knowledge is necessarily limited and particular; that in order to make sense of the world, we, 
humans, select and simplify.   We make “cosmos out of chaos”, to use Mircea Eliade’s fitting 
expression, by placing isolated events and experiences into collective narratives or myths.17   
It is through such narratives that similarity and difference are defined, boundaries are erected, 
rules are established.  Myths tidy up the immense complexity and contradiction of history by 
packaging it into a fairly simple explanation or story and encoding it in such a way as to 
                                                
14 Almond, G. A. and S. Verba (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, Almond, G. A. and S. Verba, Eds. (1980). The Civic 
Culture Revisited. Newbury Park, Sage. 
15 Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York, Basic Books. 
16 Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, Bourdieu, P. (1991). 
Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Bourdieu, P. (1997). Pascalian 
Meditations. Stanford, Stanford University Press..   




make it difficult to decode and question.  Myths function as agreed criteria by which the 
collectivity conducts its affairs.18  As Vladimir Tismaneanu explains, elusiveness is in fact 
one of the key characteristics of political myths.  It is precisely becaus  of their elusiveness 
(and thus ability to defy rational analysis) that political myths acquire their power.  The 
fundamental function of political myths is not to describe reality but to imagine it in line with 
certain political interests.19  According to another scholar of political culture, Mary Douglas, 
myths help create “shadowy place[s] where nothing can be seen and no questions asked.”20   
All the foregoing leads to the key argument culturalists make:  It is precisely through 
political myths – and not some strictly rational calculation – that individuals experience the 
world, make sense of it, and form their preferences.  In other words, for culturalists, politics is 
both strategic and constitutive.21  It involves much more than a purely instrumental pursuit of 
interest; it is also about individuals and groups making sense of their world and 
communicating it to themselves and others, in emotional as well as cognitive terms.   To put 
it yet another way, politics is also (at least partially) about sense- or world-making.  
All this has important research implications – both for the study of democratization 
and political transformations and for the study of politics in general.  First of all, cultural 
approach thus conceived calls for a different set of research questions from the ones 
traditionally raised by political scientists.  Instead of assuming that political actors are guided 
by some stable and well defined interests and identities and consequently focusing on 
explaining how their political acts succeed or fail to obtain those ends, scholars of political 
culture problematize these presumably given categories and raise questions about their 
                                                
18 Schöpflin, G. Central Europe: Defining a Thought Style, London: UCL-SSEES. 
19 Tismaneanu, V. (1998). Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-
Communist Europe. New Jersey, Princeton UP. 
20 Douglas, Mary.  1986: 69. 
21 Olick, J. K., Daniel Levy (1997). "Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth and 




construction, reconstruction and maintenance over time.22  In terms of understanding post-
communist democratization, this means abandoning the widespread assumption that post-
communist elites act on some clearly defined interests or conceptions of democracy and 
entertaining the possibility that figuring out, interpreting and articulating what democracy 
means (or ought to mean) may be what actually lies at the heart of post-communist 
democratization and consolidation.   
Another useful insight offered by cultural approaches to politics is their emphasis on 
public discourse and narrative construction.  In recognizing politics as a work of sense-
making or meaning-creation, culturalists draw attention to the special role that narratives, 
especially those explicitly focused on the past, play in legitimation and meaning creation.  In 
addition, aware that narrative construction does not take place in a vacuum but is instead 
infused with social power, they also point to the articulators of those frameworks and the 
multiple and intricate power relations which permeate narrative construction.  For the study of 
democratization, this means looking not only at the mentions and silences in narrative 
accounts put forward by the new post-com elites in their search for legitimacy and meaning 
but also examining the articulators themselves – including their ideologica  backgrounds and 
political agendas.  It means asking questions such as:  Which myths are being put forward?  
By whom?  Why?  What are the silences in the newly emerging narrative accounts and what 
do they mean?   
Closely related to this is another crucial point emphasized by scholars of political 
culture and that is the emphasis on the dynamic character of narratives, identities, and 
political cultures in general. 23  In contrast to earlier, what might be called “simple”, identity 
                                                
22 Verdery, K. (1999). The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change. N w 
York, Columbia UP. 
23 See for instance Schwartz, B. (1991). "Social Change and Collective Memory: The Democratization 
of George Washington." American Sociological Review 56(April): 221-36, Olick, J. and J. Robbins 
(1998). "Social Memory Studies: From "Collective Memory" to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic 




construction approaches (such as Hobsbawm and Ranger’s Invention of Tradition, and even 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities), more recent scholarship refuses to view 
political cultures as some static systems or once and for all inventons and insists instead that 
they constitute dynamic processes with histories of their own.  Nations are not simply 
invented or imagined; they are continuously constructed and reconstructed.  This brings into 
focus questions about their transmission, maintenance and transformation over time and 
highlights especially the role that critical historical junctions ad upheavals – such as 
revolutions – play in the construction/reconstruction and negotiation of natinal or collective 
narratives.24   
In sum, cultural approach offers a number of useful insights which enable us to move 
beyond the dominant, procedural, view of democratization, focused mainly on 
democratization’s palpable institutional elements, towards a much richer, symbolic, 
understanding of democratic transitions as essentially processes of sensemaki g which occur 
within cultural systems.   
The Tools:  Myth, Memory, History, Mythscape 
To analyze the evolving Czech and Slovak discourses of memory, I employ the 
concept of mythscape, recently proposed by Duncan S. A. Bell.25  Defined as “the discursive 
realm in which myths of the nation are forged, transmitted and negotiated constantly”,26 the 
concept of mythscape avoids some of the characteristic weaknesses of collective memory 
literature.  In particular, it circumvents the often criticized tendency to overinflate the concept 
                                                                                                                                          
Remembering. Philadelphia, Open University Press, Olick, J., Ed. (2003). States of Memory: 
Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection. Durham, Duke University 
Press. 
24 Wydra, H. (2003). Political Transformations and Islands of History. ECPR Joint Sessions, Panel 16: 
Politics and Memory, Edinburgh. 
25 Bell, D. S. A. (2007). "Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity." British Journal of 
Sociology 54(1): 63-81. 




of memory and use it to represent a whole host of different social practices, ognitive 
processes and representational strategies, even to the extent that institutions, buildings, 
statues, archives, museums etc are now said to remember.  Anthony D. Smith is a prime 
example when he speaks of myths and memories of the nation, using the terms 
interchangeably.27   
The opposite strategy has been to emphasize differences among various kinds of
memory.  To Maurice Halbwachs’ classic definition of collective memory as a socially 
framed property of individual minds,28 recent scholars have added concepts such as 
“individual” or “autobiographical” memory (signifying an individual psychological 
phenomenon or, simply, the human faculty of preserving traces of things directly 
experienced), “post-memory” (i.e., transmitted memory that involves generational distance),29 
“historical memory” (remembered past to which we no longer have “organic” connection, 
constructed by professional historians using rules of historical inquiry),30 “official 
memory”(i.e., those representations of history which are taught in schools, enshrined in 
national celebrations, passed down in print, etc), “cultural memory” (memory imbued with 
cultural meaning),31 “organic memory” (remembered past to which we have organic relation 
and is an important part of our lives), etc.  As several authors have pointed ut, however, the 
zeal for conceptual clarity has led to such degree of overspecification of the concept of 
memory that it is in danger of becoming essentially useless as a cognitive tool.32   
                                                
27 See Smith, A. D. (1999). Myths and Memories of the Nation. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
28 Halbwachs, M. (1992). On Collective Memory. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
29 See Hirsch, M. (2008). "The Generation of Postmemory." Poetics Today 29(1). 
30 Hutton, P. H. (1993). History as an Art of Memory. Hanover/London, University Press of New 
England. 
31 Sturken, M. (1997). Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, teh AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of 
Remembering. Bekeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press. 
32 For a useful discussion of these two fallacies see Olick, J. and J. Robbins (1998). "Social Memory 
Studies: From "Collective Memory" to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices." Annual 




In contrast, the benefit of Bell’s concept of mythscape is that it comprises various 
kinds of representational strategies, including myth, official and individual memory, and 
professional history, without conflating them all together.  It thus allows us to move beyond 
the conceptual disputes over what memory or history means or should mean and accept th t 
there are different ways in which identities can be represented, contested and transmitted and 
thus focus on the processes through which this is done.  In doing so, it also allows us to study
how organic memory may at times serve to subvert, and at other times to reinforce – or give 
credibility to – official forms of memory.  Bell’s concept of mythscape can subsume 
memories but, as he points out, the two are not synonymous.  Memory, in line with Maurice 
Halbwachs’ definition, as a socially framed property of individual minds,33 can function in 
opposition to nationalist myth.34  Memory is simply too awkward and too complex to fit into 
the simplifying schemas of myth.35  Nor is mythscape synonymous with history as a 
professional discipline concerned with a systematic study of the past.  Professional history 
may play a decisive role in forging the governing mythology but it is not its primary function.  
Like memory, it is too intricate and complex to fit easily into nationalist mythology.36   
 
Making the Question Concrete 
Going back to my previous discussion of culture as a discursive field within which 
politics takes place, Bell’s concept of mythscape can be seen as a subset of that field.  
                                                
33 Halbwachs, M. (1992). On Collective Memory. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
34 As discussed, in simple terms, national myths represent  narratives that selectively portray the story 
of a nation’s past and its place in the world, its h storical eschatology.  See Tismaneanu, V. (1998). 
Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe. New Jersey, 
Princeton UP. 
35 In turn, collective memory can be loosely defined as the result of individuals interacting socially in 
order to articulate their memories.   
36 Bell, D. S. A. (2007). "Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity." British Journal of 




Applying the above terminology to my present study, the dissertation esse tially maps the 
transformation of the Czech and Slovak national mythscape (its official h stories but also 
dissident counter-narratives, individual and collective memories) over tim  by examining 
Czech and Slovak public debates – in particular parliamentary discussions and media 
coverage of debates about national holidays, memorials, statues, history textbooks etc.  
I specifically make effort to avoid a common tendency in many studies of post-
communism to treat the year 1989 as some kind of a “year zero” when all things started and 
instead situate my discussion of the post-communist symbolic transformation within a larger 
historical framework of evolving official representations of the Czech and Slovak national 
past, starting with the inception of the First Czechoslovak republic, and continuing through 
the WWII period, the communist era, the Velvet revolution of 1989, up to the presnt.  The 
approach I employ here is thus doubly comparative – it involves both comparisons acrss 
time and between the two cases and emphasizes the dynamic, constantly negotiated character 
of national mythscapes.   
 
The Goals 
In telling the story of the evolving transformation of the Czech and Slovak national 
mythscape, the goals of this dissertation are both descriptive and conceptual.  On the 
descriptive level, the dissertation presents the Czech and Slovak post-communist discourses 
of collective identity from a historical perspective, comparing the post-communist symbolic 
battles over the meaning of national history and identity with similar battles that Czechs and 
Slovaks waged in the past – during the 19th century national awakening era, in interwar 
Czechoslovakia, during World War II and under communism and shows that this most recent,
post-communist, transformation may be unique in terms of the actors and issues involved but 




On a more conceptual level, the dissertation presents an argument on how we might 
think of post-communist transitions outside of the strictly institutional framework which 
tends to dominate studies of post-communism.  Its aim is to illustrate how, by studying the 
role of past cultural meanings in post-communist politics, we might enrich our understanding 
of post-communist transformations and move beyond the highly popular, politically 
convenient, nonetheless conceptually inadequate “return of the past” paradigm of post-
communist nationalism and actually investigate what pasts exactly are “returning,” how, and 
why.   
 
What is to Come: Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized in the following way.  Chapter Two 
begins to map the multiple and convoluted 20th century transformations of the symbolic 
mythscapes of Czechs and Slovaks by offering a brief overview of the Czech and Slovak 
history.  Instead of a comprehensive overview, I focus on select “islands of history” (to use 
Harold Wydra’s term), in other words bits and pieces of history which were later picked up 
by various nationalist elites and became building blocks for their political projects.  For 
purposes of simplification, I group these “islands of history” into four categories, based on 
the use to which they were put by later observers:  (1) Myths of the Origin, (2) Myths of the 
Golden Age, (3) Myths of the Heroic Age, (4) Myths of the Fall (and unjust persecution) and 
(5) Myths of Rebirth and Renewal.   
Chapter Three lays out the main constitutive elements of the Czechoslovak national 
narrative as it was constructed by Czechoslovakia’s founders in the 1920s and early 1930s. 
Specifically, I  take note of the deep religious and national tensions which arose in connection 
to state-promotion of what many considered to be a grossly one-sided (pro-Czech, pro-




of the interwar Czechoslovak society.  The chapter concludes with discussion of the Czech 
and Slovak experiences during the Second World War and the decisive impact of those 
experiences on the re-definition of the Czech and Slovak identity in the imm diate postwar 
period.  
Chapter Four discusses the three main phases of the Czechoslovak communist regime 
– the years of the Stalinist terror (late 1940s-early 1950s), delayed de-Stalinization (1960s-
1968), and Normalization (1969-1989) – and the communist practices of organized forgetting 
that accompanied each.  Contrary to the popular belief that nationalism was an idea lien to 
the communist ideology (and thus was supposedly temporarily frozen in East Central Europe, 
only to erupt with vengeance after 1989), I show that the Czechoslovak communist regime 
actively appropriated, used and periodically cleansed and revised elements of the Czech and 
Slovak national past to consolidate and maintain its power.  Furthermore, in contradiction to 
extreme constructivist theories of national identity which suggest that elites are capable of 
inventing national identities practically at will, I argue that the Czechoslovak communist 
regime, despite its reputation of being one of the most rigid, repressive, neo-Stalinist regimes 
in the region, was unable to achieve its goal of creating a “new socialist m n” and inculcating 
in him a new version of the past.  Instead, I concur with Shari Cohen that decades of 
communist massaging and erasing of history produced a highly cynical, historically 
disoriented and distrustful population which, after 1989, became highly vulnerable to the 
temptations of various new “fantasies of salvation”.37 
The final Chapter 5 maps the post-communist discourses of memory that have 
accompanied the Czech and Slovak transitions from communism.  Its key argument as well as 
the argument of the dissertation as a whole is that, instead of a spontaneous “unfreezing” or 
                                                
37 Tismaneanu, V. (1998). Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-
Communist Europe. New Jersey, Princeton UP.  Cohen, S. J. (1999). Politics without a Past:  The 




“return” of some previously repressed or tabooed memories, the so-called post-communist 
“return of the past” represents simply the most recent phase in the long and convoluted 
process, begun back in the 19th century by the Czech and Slovak national awakeners, of 
composing and re-composing Czech and Slovak national histories and identities.  What sets 
this post-communist phase of national imagination apart from its predecessors are 
communism’s enduring legacies.  After a brief overview of the main causes of the 1993 
Czechoslovak breakup and the actors and political cleavages that emerged in the Czech and 
Slovak republics afterwards, the chapter zeroes in on the Czech and Slovak post-communist 




Chapter 2: Islands of the Czech and Slovak Early History 
 
Having introduced the theoretical literature which provides the vocabulary and 
framework with which to think of the national identity and its construction in more abstract 
terms, this chapter begins to map concrete labors of national identity creation which went into 
the making of the Czech and Slovak nations.  As the previous chapter indicated, nations and 
traditions, while they may be imagined or invented, nonetheless cannot be simply conjured up 
out of nothing.  History does matter in other words, although certainly not in the deterministic 
fashion that primordialists attribute to it.  In order to make sense of theway Czechs and 
Slovaks imagined and repeatedly re-imagined themselves as nations throughout the 20th 
century, something needs to be said first about what came before.  My account of the multiple 
and convoluted 20th century transformations of the symbolic mythscapes of these two nations, 
therefore, starts with a brief overview of the Czech and Slovak past.   
Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive overview of the Czech and 
Slovak history, I focus here on select “islands of history.” These bits and pieces of history 
have left a deep mark on the Czech and Slovak national psyche and later, after care ul 
selection, were arranged and then disguised as recovered memory. They then became 
building blocks for subsequent Czech and Slovak national identity entrepreneurs a d their 
political projects.  Loosely combining several typological schemes, proposed by l ading 
scholars of nationalism,38 I group these “islands of history” into four categories, based on the 
use to which they were put by later observers:  (1) Myths of the Origin, (2) Myths of the 
                                                
38 Specifically, Hosking, G. and G. Schöpflin, Eds. (1997). Myths and Nationhood. New York, 
Routledge, Schopflin, G. (1997). The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myth. Myths and 
Nationhood. G. Hosking and G. Schopflin. New York, Routledge, Tismaneanu, V. (1998). Fantasies of 
Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe. New Jersey, Princeton UP, 
Smith, A. D. (1999). Myths and Memories of the Nation. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
MacDonald, D. B. (2002). Balkan Holocaust?  Serbian and Croatian victim-centered propaganda and 




Golden Age, (3) Myths of the Heroic Age, (4) Myths of the Fall (and unjust persecution) and 
(5) Myths of Rebirth and Renewal.  I use the above categories simply as useful heuristic 
tools, recognizing that they are neither exhaustive nor exclusive and that, in re lity, they 
greatly overlap.   
Foundational Myths: Myths of Origin and Descent 
All nations, no matter how recent they may be, claim to possess a long and glorious 
past, which usually stands in sharp contrast with the less than an ideal present.  Anthony 
Smith discusses myths of origin and descent as narratives describing ancient origins and 
noble lineage and genealogy of nations, including stories of founding fathers or tribes.39  In 
the Czech national imagination, Praotec Čech holds the status of the mythic forefather of the 
nation.  According to the legend, some time in the 6th century A.D., this mythic Czech
ancestor, having led his people from the east, looked out from the top of Mount Rip and 
seeing “a land subject to no one, filled with game and birds, flowing with sweet milk and 
honey, and with pleasant climate” decided that earthly paradise for his people had at last been 
found.40  The Czech history thus began.   
In fact, however, apart from the estimated date of the arrival of the first Slavonic 
tribes to the region some time around the year 530, little is known about the Czech history 
prior to the 9th century.41  What is known is that some time at the turn of the 6th and 7th 
centuries, these Slavic settlers, collectively known as Sclavi, formed themselves into two 
                                                
39 Smith, A. D. (1983). Theories of Nationalism. New York, Holmes and Meier. 
40 Cosmas chronicle, cited in  Agnew, H. (2004). The Cz chs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown. 
Standford, Stanford University: 9.   
41 The immediate pre-Slavic predecessors of Moravians were Germans who left the region deserted 
after their defeat (by another Germanic tribe) in 470.   Before the Germans, the region was inhabited 
by Celts.  In fact, the name “Bohemia” comes from the Celtic tribe known as the Boii which inhabited 
the region in Roman Times (approximately from the mid-fourth century B.C.) until the arrival of 
Germanic tribes moving into Bohemia from the north in the first century B.C.  Steinhubl, J. (2005). 
Odkedy mozeme hovorit o Slovensku a Slovakoch. Myty nase slovenske. E. Krekovic, E. Mannova 
and E. Krekovicová. Bratislava, SAV: 24-29.  Agnew, H. (2004). The Czechs and the Lands of the 




political “tribes” in order to resist external pressures from the Asian nomadic Avars.  The two 
tribes included the Czech tribe (referred to as Beheimi, Boemi), which resided in the Czech 
basin, and the Moravians (variously referred to as Maravi, Sclavi M rgenses, or Marahenses) 
who occupied Moravia and western Slovakia.  While the Bohemians did not form a unified 
state until later in the 9th century, the Moravians, led by their duke (knize) Mojmir I., 
established their state in or around the year 830.   For a short period of about twelve years, 
from 883 to 895, Bohemia was annexed to the Moravian state by the Moravian duke 
Svatopluk.42   
The Great Moravian Empire (or simply Great Moravia), as the state cam to be 
known, was relatively short lived – it collapsed in the face of the invadig Magyars in or 
around the year 906.  Nevertheless, its existence was noteworthy as it coincided with the 
growth of Christianity throughout the area.  At the time, Christian religion served as one of 
the key instruments of the Frankish expansion into the Danube basin.  Aware that 
establishment of an independent Moravian church was a key prerequisite for maintaining 
political independence of Moravia, Moravian Duke Rastislav requested missionary assistance 
from Rome.   When his request was denied since the papacy itself was under the Frankish 
influence at the time, he turned to the Byzantine emperor Michael III.  Faced with the threat 
of the emerging Frankish-Bulgarian alliance, Michael III agreed and, in 863, sent to Great 
Moravia two experienced diplomats and prominent intellectuals of the time, brothers 
                                                
42 The origins of the name of the 9th century Moravian state are disputed.  In the 9th century, in fact, no-
one had ever heard about an entity called “Great Moravia”, much less a Great Moravian Empire.  The 
name began to be used only decades after the collapse of the Moravian state.  The first written 
mentions of Great Moravia can be found in the writings of the Byzantine emperor Constantine VII 
Porfyrogennetos (905-959) who noted the existence of two Moravias – one smaller, situated in the 
Balkans and one larger (megalli).  To this day scholars debate whether, by using the adjective 
“megalli” Constantine really meant “larger” or whetr he used it to mean “more distant”, i.e., “the 
Moravia which was more distant from the Byzantine empire”.  The addition “empire” was added even 
later.  Turcan, V. (2005). Pribina a Svatopluk - slovenski velmozi? Myty nase slovenske. E. Krekovic, 




Constantine (later named Cyril) and Methodius.43  Their main contributions include the 
development of a new Slavonic “glagolitic” script based on the Greek alphabet, tr nslation of 
portions of the liturgy and scriptural texts into the Slavic language, establishment of a church 
seminary, development of civil law and the introduction of Slavic language liturgy.   
The Byzantine mission to Great Moravia was abruptly terminated by Rastislav’s 
successor, Duke Svatopuk in 886, one year after Method’s death (Cyril died in 869).44  
Expelled from Great Moravia, the Byzantines then took their missionary work to Bulgaria. 
There they established theological schools and, based on the glagolitic script invented by 
Constantine, devised Cyrillic Alphabet which gradually spread throughout most of the Slavic 
world to become the standard alphabet in the Orthodox Slavic countries.  In terms of the 
fruits of Constantine and Methodius’ mission work, these crumbled soon after the termination 
of the Byzantine mission.  Despite its great potential to raise the cultural level of the 
Moravian population, the Slavonic script devised by Constantine was introduced too arly 
and did not spread beyond the close circle of Constantine and Method’s friends and co-
workers.  Its practical role for the cultural development of the domestic population was 
virtually none since the majority of the Moravian population, including its ruling elite, 
remained illiterate throughout the 9th century.45   
Later on, with the commencement of literacy, the former Great Moravian territories 
reverted back to the Latin alphabet, the script first used by the Celts who resided in the region 
thousands of years earlier.   The Slavic liturgy introduced by Constantine ad Methodius was 
                                                
43 In other words, there were many pragmatic reasons involved in the decision to invite the Byzantine 
missionaries into Great Moravia.  To ascribe to the Byzantine mission in Great Moravia the role of 
some kind of a symbolic bridge between the East and the West as some later interpretations have done 
is therefore at odds with historical facts.  Turcan, V. (2005). Cyril a Metod - trvale dedicstvo? Myty 
nase slovenske. E. Krekovic, E. Mannova and E. Krekovicová. Bratislava, SAV: 36-41. 
44 Although the exact reasons which led Svatopluk to end the Byzantine mission in such an abrupt way 
are not known, they most likely had to do with the protracted conflict between the followers of Method 
and Method’s personal and ideological opponent the Nitran pro-Western oriented bishop Wiching; 
some even speculate about a possible failed coup by the pro-Byzantine side. 




prohibited by Pope Stephen V as early as in 870 so there was not much to build upon in this 
respect either.  In short, by the beginning of the 10th century, with no followers left to pass the 
fruits of the Byzantine mission work on to new generations, the otherwise remarkable work 
of Constantine and Methodius and their followers began to gradually fade into oblivi n.  "It 
would be rediscovered and would prove to be instrumental for nationalist purposes during the 
times of the Czech and Slovak national revival in the 19th century as will be discussed later.46   
The Moravian state did not outlive the end of the Byzantine mission for very long.  
Svatopluk’s death in 904 and the arrival of new nomads from the east considerably we kened 
the kingdom and after a decisive defeat by the Magyars in or around 903, the Moravian 
empire fell apart and its territory and population became divided along the bord r of the 
newly emerging Hungarian state.  Moravians living to east of the Morava River were 
absorbed by the Hungarian state and, surrounded by their new non-Slavic neighbors, 
gradually developed a distinct identity.  From the beginning of the 13th century, they began to 
be referred to as “Slavs”, Sclavi, Slavus, Slavi, Toth, Winde, Wenden, occasinally 
Slovyenyn and Slowyenyny and from the beginning of the 15th century also Slowak.47  The 
rest of the original Moravian ethnic group, i.e., the population living to the west of the 
Morava River, became fully integrated with the Bohemian population and gradually lost its 
Moravian identity.  By the beginning of the 10th century, the Great Moravian Empire and its 
population ceased to exist and the center of activity moved to Bohemia which gradually 
became the political center of the Western Slavs.      
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Picture 1: Byzantine missionaries Cyril and Methodius 
 
Myths of the Golden Age 
As the name suggests, Myths of the Golden Age refer to moments of national 
greatness, prosperity and glory.  They tell stories of harmony and plenty, of times usually 
long gone, when the nation stood tall and shone with confidence and power.  By far the mos  
comprehensive analysis of myths of the Golden Age and their functions comesfr  Anthony 




of nationalism and national identity.  The Golden Age comprises the essenc  of the nation.48  
Myths of the Golden Age are usually closely tied up with myths of defeat and national 
humiliation, forming a seamless narrative of a rise–fall–renaissance.  Their main function is 
to boost confidence and inspire loyalty and national pride in their audiences by providing 
proof of the nation’s capabilities.   
 
The Přemyslid Beginnings and the Czech Golden Age under Charles IV 
In the Czech national imagination, the Premyslid beginnings and the rule of Charles 
IV are generally considered to be the brightest, most glorious times in the Czech history.   
After all, it was under Prince Bořivoj I., Bohemia’s first historically documented lord and 
member of the medieval Czech Přemyslid Dynasty, allied with the Great Moravian ruler 
Svatopluk, that consolidation of the Czech state took place.49  It was also at this time that 
Prague was established as the state’s central castle – position which it holds till today.  The 
consolidation of the Přemyslid kingdom was finalized after 935 by Boleslav I who abolished 
all other Bohemian dukedoms, introduced a strict land organization based on the newly built 
castles and essentially laid the basis for Bohemia’s regional organization as we know it today.  
Through a series of territorial expansions, Boleslav extended the Přemyslid control through 
Moravia and parts of today’s Slovakia to Cracow and farther east, though most of these 
territorial acquisitions were lost as early as around 990 to the emerging Polish state.  Moravia 
was permanently attached to Bohemia at the beginning of the 11th century.  Since then, with 
the exception of the addition of “Chebsko” in the 13th century and the loss of Kladsko and 
                                                
48 Smith, A. D. (1983). Theories of Nationalism. New York, Holmes and Meier. 
49 According to the legend, Premysl was a plowman whom Libuse, a prophetess descended from Father 
Cech chose for husband.  From that point, Premysl left his plow and oxen and ruled the Czechs from 




Silesia in the 18th century, no significant changes to the Czech borders have taken place, 
which, considering the history of most other European states, is a rather rare occurrence.50   
The Přemyslid dynasty remained on the Bohemian throne for over four centuries. 
During this time, the kingdom gradually crystallized into an administratively sovereign state 
within the Holy Roman Empire, Bohemian kings were recognized by the Emperor, they were 
numbered among the seven electors of the empire and had the right to appoint their own 
bishops.   It was also under the Přemyslids that the first large scale colonization of Bohemian 
towns by German craftsmen and merchants took place, unintentionally sowing the first seeds 
of what would become a deep seated Czech-German animosity.51  
Contributions of Borivoj, Boleslav and other early Premyslids for the consolidati n 
and development of the Czech medieval state notwithstanding, no Bohemian ruler holds a
mystique as powerful among the Czechs as does Vaclav, the patron saint of the Czec  land 
whose statue in the Prague square has been traditionally a place where Czechs gathered in 
times of national trauma as well as national jubilation.  K own for his deep religious devotion 
and high education, Václav has become a symbol of virtue and religiosity to many Czechs 
(especially Catholics).  Adding to Vaclav’s saintly aura was certainly also the fact that he was 
murdered at a young age on his way to church in Stara Boleslav by his younger brother and 
successor to the Czech throne, Boleslav I.52  Later historians have interpreted the rivalry 
between Vaclav and Boleslav which ended Václav’s life in different ways.  Nationalist Czech 
historians have explained it as a reaction to Václav’s supposedly pro-German policies, 
specifically his submission to Henry I the Fowler after the German surpri e attack on Prague 
in 921 which resulted in resuming the payment of a traditional tribute which was first 
imposed in 806.  The German side, on the other hand, (especially during World War II 
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51 Sayer, D. (1998). The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
52 Although the exact year of Václav’s death remains disputed (some sources date it to 929 while 




(WWII)) has interpreted Václav’s policies as a realistic acquiescence to a stronger 
Germany.53  The question of Bohemia’s relations to the German state would re-appear again 
and again in Czech history as discussed in the following chapters. 
 
 
Picture 2: Statue of St. Vaclav by Josef Vaclav Myslbek in Prague's St. Vaclav Square 
 
                                                





Another name which holds a stable place in the pantheon of Czech national heroes 
and is tightly associated with the myth of the Czech Golden age is that of Charles IV, the 
firstborn son of Eliška Přemyslovna (Václav III’s sister) and John Luxembourg, under whose 
rule Bohemia reached the pinnacle of its territorial, economic and cultural power and 
prosperity.54  Deliberate in cultivating his Czech heritage, Charles IV, who from 1355 to his 
death in 1378, held the double title of the Bohemian king and the Holy Roman Emperor. To 
his credit, he greatly extended the borders of the Bohemian state, 55 str ngthened the 
kingdom’s constitutional position within the Holy Roman empire, jumpstarted the Bohemia’s 
economic growth and greatly contributed to the development of arts and culture, earning a 
nickname Pater Patriae (Father of the Country, or Otec vlasti) from his compatriots while 
being derided as “stepfather of the empire” and “pope’s king” by his opponents.56  He took 
Prague for his imperial capital and made it into one of the main commercial and cultural 
centers of medieval Europe.  In addition to fully rebuilding the devastated Prague castle 
which, by that time, had not been a royal seat for two centuries, Charles IV founded Prague’s 
New Town. He built the largest town square in Europe (Charles Square), a new 520-meter-
long stone bridge over Vltava (Charles Bridge), a Benedictine cloister (Emmaus Abbey), in 
addition to other projects.  In fact, much of the architectural beauty Prague is known for dates 
                                                
54 Charles IV took up the office of Margrave of Moravi  from his father at the age of seventeen in 
1333.  Thirteen years later, he became the Bohemian king, and nine years after that he gained the titl 
of the Holy Roman Emperor. 
55 In addition to Bohemia proper, Moravia, and Luxemburg, Bohemia’s borders expended under 
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Bohemian rule.   Sayer, D. (1998). The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press: 34.  Agnew, H. (2004). The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown. 
Standford, Stanford University Press: 36.  
56 Pope Clement VI  was a former tutor and advisor of young Charles while at the French court.  
(Charles was sent to the French court at the age of s ven to receive education.  He spent ten years 
there).  Part of the reason for the revival of the Luxembourgs’ connections to France and the papacy 
were the deteriorating relations with the Wittelsbach emperor Ludwig of Bavaria.  (The Papacy had 
been involved in a power struggle with Ludwig for sme time already).  Few years later, after the 
election of Clement VI these factors would help bring Charles to the imperial throne Agnew, H. 





back to Charles’ era.57   Charles IV was a devout Christian and an ardent promoter of the Cult 
of St. Vaclav after whom he was named at his baptism.  He received the name of the Renewer 
of the Empire Charlemagne at his confirmation  To his saintly predecessor Vaclav, Charles 
built a extraordinarily ornate chapel in St Vitus Cathedral in Prague.  Highly educated 
himself, Charles IV was a great patron of arts and education which he believed to be the key 
to Bohemia’s sovereignty and prosperity.  He founded and supported a number of Czech 
cultural and educational institutions, including the oldest university in central Europe, which 
now bears his name.58   
 
Great Moravia – The First Slovak State? 
Due to Slovakia’s more than ten century long incorporation into the Hungarian state, 
the repertoire of Slovak moments of glory is much thinner than it is in the Czech case.  As 
has been already mentioned, after the demise of the Great Moravian Empire, the Moravian 
population living to the east of the Morava River was subsumed by the newly emerging 
Hungarian state and remained its integral part for the following ten centuries.  This is not to 
say there were no moments of greatness during those ten centuries.  As partof the Hungarian 
state, Slovaks participated in the Hungarian successes.  Particularly prosperous, for instance, 
were the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries which, due to the absence of major wars, 
invasions, epidemics or famines, are generally considered Hungary’s Golden Age.  The 
territory of Slovakia, with its rich resources of gold and silver ore, shared in this 
development.  Its major towns – Bratislava, Trnava, Košice, Prešov, and Bardejov as well as 
a number of independent royal mining towns – Banská Štiavnica, Banská Bystrica and 
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Kremnica – experienced a rapid development during that time.  Especially positive was also 
the time of the rule of Maria Teresia, when Bratislava became the royal seat and Slovakia the 
economic and cultural center of Hungary.  For a time (until it was relocated to Buda), the 
University of Trnava, with its largely Slovak faculty, became the center of scientific life in 
Hungary.  Reformed along the lines of the University of Vienna, it housed a medical faculty, 
faculty of law, as well as natural sciences.  In addition, several mining academies were 
established in Slovakia in the second half of the eighteenth century, drawing on the area’s 
rich mining tradition.59  Nevertheless, since Slovaks were always in a subordinate position, 
lacking a state and a nobility of their own, they could not claim any of these momnts 
exclusively as their own.   For instance, the time of Maria Teresia’s enlightened rule, though 
undoubtedly positive in many respects, was also marked by heavy centralization (and 
Germanization) of the public life, generating strong dissatisfaction among the Slovak 
intelligentsia. 
 As a result, the 19th century Slovak awakeners, when searching for traditions around 
which Slovak identity could be invented, looked to the distant ninth century Great Mor via as 
the first state and the golden era of Slovaks.  A prime example is Pavel Jozef Safarik’s work 
Slovanske Starozitnosti (1837) which provided the blueprint with which subsequent 
generations of Slovaks learned to think was their history.  Not only did Safarik situate the 
Golden Age of Slovaks in the Great Moravian period, he also claimed an essential continuity 
between the Moravian population of the 9th century and the 19th century Slovak awakeners.  
In doing so, he stretched the age of Slovaks by several hundred years, to the times when 
Slovaks as a distinct ethnic group did not even yet exist.  Unlike the Bohemian tribes which 
were also briefly incorporated into the Moravian state as has been discussed, the Moravian 
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the Italian physicist Alessandro Volta.  Toma, P. and D. a. Kovác (2001). Slovakia: From Samo to 




population occupying the territory of today’s Slovakia (called Nitransians) wa  not yet 
ethnically differentiated as historical documents from the 9th century show.  This population 
developed a distinct identity only after the demise of Great Moravia when their territory 
became part of the newly emerging Hungarian state, not before, despite Safarik’s cl ims.  It 
was only due to their new exposure to an ethnic group significantly different from themselves 
– the Magyars – that the former Moravians or Nitrasians began to ethnically differentiate and 
gradually identify themselves as Slavs and later Slovaks.  Even then, it would still take a very 
long time before the sense of Slovak identity would take root in the Slovak s ciety.  In fact, 
even as late as at the beginning of the 20th century, many Slovak respondents when asked 
about their identity were unsure, typically responding that they were bilingual, Slovak and 
Hungarian speakers.  What it meant to be Slovak, in other words, was far from clear even ten 
centuries after the collapse of Great Moravia.  Nevertheless, as cholars of myths remind us, 
historical accuracy is one of the least important factors when it comes to the emotional appeal 
of myths.  And so, despite its historical inaccuracy, the 19th century myth of Great Moravia as 
the first Slovak state has been reused over and over again since Safarik’s times by subsequent 
Slovak nationalists, as will be seen in upcoming chapters.   
 
Myths of the Heroic Age 
Myths of heroism, or myths of military valour as Schopflin terms them, are tied to 
instances in a nation’s history when the collectivity, either represent d by the people or the 
elite, rebels against what they perceive to be an intolerable tyranny and in that rebellion finds 




and uprisings and typically have a powerful homogenizing effect on their audiences, i  
addition to serving to justify acts of violence.60   
The Hussite Era 
In the Czech national imagination, the Hussite era represents the brightest moment of 
national heroism when the Czechs stood up “against all”, as the famous 19th century Czech 
novelist Alois Jirasek put it, and armed with nothing but their fervent faith, religious hymns 
and simple weapons adapted from farm implements, defended the truth of the Gospel, 
successfully repulsed multiple foreign crusades. They eventually forced the hated King 
Žikmund (Charles IV’s brother and successor) to abandon his kingdom.61  In reality, the 
economic, political and cultural fallout of the Hussite period was clearly a negative one; the 
Hussite religious wars essentially undid most of the accomplishments Charles IV achieved 
forty years earlier.  Nevertheless, over time, the collective memory of the Hussite revolt 
proved to be equally, if not more galvanizing and inspiring, as the early Přemyslid beginnings 
or the golden era of Charles IV.   
The name most readily associated with the Czech reformation is that of t e Czech 
priest, lecturer and rector of  Prague University, articulator of many tenets which a century 
later would become the basis of Martin Luther’s Protestant reformation, Master Jan Hus.  A 
                                                
60 Hosking, G. and G. Schöpflin, Eds. (1997). Myths and Nationhood. New York, Routledge:32. 
61 Contrary to Romantic idealizations of Jirasek and others, however, it turns out that the 15th century 
Hussites were far less united than what the various successive interpretations have suggested.  In fact, 
it seems that when the Hussites were not fighting off Žikmund and his army or seizing Church 
property, they were busy fighting each other. The de pest division existed between the so called 
Utraquists – moderates willing to negotiate with the papacy who generally reduced their demands to 
the fulfillment of the Four Articles of Prague (i.e., the minimum program agreed by the Hussites on in 
May 1420 which consisted of (1) communion under both kinds for all lay people, (2) proper and free 
preaching of the Bible, (3) demand that priests live according to the Scriptures and (4) be punishable in 
lay courts for mortal sins) – and Táborites who, being much more radical in their demands, rejected all 
ecclesiastical authority (save that of the Bible) and called for radical social equality.  The conflict 
between the two groups culminated at the fratricidal battle of Lipany in 1434 where the Utraquists 
defeated the Táborites, after which the road to recnciliation between the Hussites and the papacy was 
open.  Sayer, D. (1998). The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History. Princeton, Princeton University 




fearless supporter of the ideas of the English reformer John Wycliff, Hus was 
excommunicated by the papal curia in 1411 as a heretic.  Defying the papal ban, Hus 
continued to organize public defense of Wyclif’s writings at the university and preach at the 
Prague Bethlehem Chapel against the sale of papal indulgencies.  Consequently, he was 
summoned to Konstanz where, in a public hearing resembling a show trial, he was charged 
with heresy and sentenced to death.  He was burned at the stake on July 6, 1415.62  
Hus’ immolation immediately generated a wave of protests by the Czech nobility 
(including the highest officials in Bohemia and Moravia), who denounced the Council’s 
actions as both a great injustice and a grave national insult.  When, less than a year later, 
another Czech Master, Jeroným Pražský, was burned at Konstanz, the movement began to
gain in numbers as well as radicalism until eventually, on July 30, 1419, in an incident which 
came to be remembered as the First Prague defenestration, a mob of radicalized Hussites 
thundered into the Town Hall in Prague’s New Town, threw its anti-Hussite town councilors 
out the window and replaced them with Hussite representatives.63  Žikmund of Luxembourg, 
who succeeded Charles’ deceased son Václav IV on the Bohemian throne shortly after the 
Prague events, immediately set out to obtain papal backing for launching a holy crusade 
against the heretical kingdom.64  From that point on, the Hussites were at war with the rest of 
the Western Christendom, including their own king.   
Reconciliation between the papacy and the Hussites did not come until 1436 when, 
after seventeen years of fighting, a settlement known as the Compactata of B sle was finally 
reached, permitting the Hussite Church the exception of practicing communion in b th kinds 
                                                
62 Hus’ teachings and activities must be seen in the context of the religious and national tensions at the 
Prague university at the time.  There in 1409 – when Václav IV’s Kutna hora decree gave the Czechs 
the majority in the university decision making body – Hus was elected the rector.  Hus’ election 
immediately spurred a wave of protests from the German faculty and students, many of whom left 
Prague to found universities at Leipzig and Erfurt. 
63 Agnew, H. (2004). The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown. Standford, Stanford 
University Press: 44.  




and allowing the Czech nobility to keep the property seized from the Church.  Revolutionary 
as it was for the times – Basle Compacts represented the first time that a separate 
confessional group within Western Christendom was recognized by the papacy – the 
agreement did not last for very long.  In 1462, the Compacts were renounced by the Pope, the 
Hussite leader Jiří  z Poděbrad (who in the meantime had been elected the King of Bohemia) 




Picture 3: Jan Hus monument in Prague's Old Town Square 
 
                                                





The Janosik Myth 
In the Slovak case, the absence of its own state and indigenous aristocracy has meant 
that many of the myths that populate the Slovak national mythscape are of a plebei n 
character – at least as far as the pre-20th century Slovak history is concerned.  Perhaps the 
most popular in the category of “heroic myths” is the legendary Robin Hood-like figur  of the 
Slovak folklore, Juraj Janosik.  According to the legend invented by the 19th century Slovak 
national awakeners, Janosik was a highwayman who robbed nobles and gave the loot to the 
poor.  Janosik became a symbol of resistance to oppression and this image was reinforced in 
numerous 19th century poems and stories which later became part of the Slovak and Czech 
middle and high school literature curriculum.  Janosik was also the themeof th  first Slovak 
film (made in 1921).   During the anti-fascist Slovak national uprising, one of the partisan 
groups bore Janosik’s name.  Similarly, after the war, the communist party ap opriated the 
Janosik myth, producing a score of films about the legendary thief.  According to the 
communist rendition, Janosik became a class warrior, fighter for social justice and direct 
precursor of the Communist Party.   
The actual historical figure Janosik was born in the village Terchova in the
Hungarian part of the Habsburg monarchy in 1688.  He fought with the Kuruc insurgents at 
the age of fifteen, was then recruited by the Habsburg Army and served as a prison guard in 
Bytca.  At the age of 23, he deserted the army and created a forest robber group of which he 
became the leader.  He was captured in 1713 and sentenced to death.  According to a legend,
he was caught in a pub, after slipping on spilled peas, thrown in his way by a treacherous old 
lady.  The manner of his execution was not known to the public until the early 19th century 




executed by being hung on a hook by his left side and was left dangling on the gallows to die 
(although some sources claim he was hung by the throat).66   
 
 
Picture 4: Statue of Juraj Janosik in Terchova 
 
Later in the 20th century, new moments from the Slovak past would be added to the 
category of Slovak “heroic myths”.  The chief among them would be the Slovak antifascist 
national uprising in which the Slovak Army and general population rose against the wartime 
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Slovak fascist regime led by President Tiso.  That myth too, however, would remain deeply 
contested and subject to numerous revisions, as discussed in chapters four and ive.  
 
 
Myths of the Fall and Persecution: Hundreds of Years We Suffered 
Perhaps no category of myth appears in East Central Europe with greater frqu ncy 
and enjoys popularity as great as do myths of unjust suffering, powerlessness and defeat.  
This peculiar East Central European preoccupation with one’s own misery is undoubte ly 
linked to the convoluted history of the region where shifting frontiers and rulers were a 
common occurrence.  Sense of geographical, political and cultural marginalization with 
respect to Europe has produced a mixture of self-doubt, self pity and anger which looks for 
scapegoats and external enemies to explain away its own powerlessness and humiliation.67  
As Schopflin explains, these are myths of powerless and compensation for that powerlessness 
– both of which stress the importance of status reversal.  They make virtue of passivity and 
fatalism and make suffering nations morally superior to others by the virtueof having 
suffered.   In East Central Europe, myths of suffering are typically tied to myths of 
redemption which claim that a nation, because of its sorrowful history, will be one day 
redeemed or may itself redeem the world.68     
 
The Battle at Bila Hora and the “Age of Darkness” 
 On the list of the “dark moments” in the history of the Czech lands, the defeat of the 
anti-Habsburg Czech rebellion at the Battle of Bílá Hora on November 8, 1620 and the brutal 
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Habsburg revenge that followed is undoubtedly one of the darkest ones.  The roots of the 
1620 defeat can be traced back to the unfinished business of the Hussite period. After the 
death of the Hussite King Jiří of Poděbrady, the country was left effectively lawless.69   
Eventually, in 1526, after five decades of disagreement over who should become the new
Bohemian king, the Czech Diet, now confronted with the Turkish thrust into Central Europe, 
finally decided to offer the Bohemian throne to Ferdinand I of the Habsburg royal family. 
Very soon, that decision proved fateful.  Intent on consolidating his power, Ferdinand quickly 
moved to limit the Czech sovereignty, made the Habsburg succession hereditary and 
gradually incorporated the once-autonomous Bohemian kingdom into what was to become 
the Austrian empire.70  The Czech resentment of the Habsburg heavy-handed rule, which was 
combined with strong renewed Catholicism pressures, eventually burst open in May 1618 in 
the Second Prague Defenestration.  One year later, the Czech Diet rejected th  Habsburg 
succession and elected a new king, the protestant elector of the Palatinae, Frederick.   
The Habsburg revenge against the rebellious Czech nobles came fast and with an 
exceptional brutality.  On November 8, 1620, the Czech rebellion was decisively crushed at 
the Bílá Hora (White Mountain) on the western outskirts of Prague by the legitimate 
Habsburg successor, Ferdinand II.  The “Winter King” Frederick immediately fled Prague, 
taking his army with him.71  The following May, public execution of twenty-seven Czech 
                                                
69 For about five decades following Jiří  z Poděbrad’s death in 1471, the country was ruled in abstentia 
by the Polish Jagellons since no suitable domestic replacement could be agreed upon.  This meant that 
the power was effectively devolved to the Czech nobility.   
70 Ferdinand’s strategy of political centralization included bypassing of the Land diets which had 
served as the traditional forums for domestic, fiscal and foreign policy issues, establishing Vienna-
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right to elect the king (although they technically still kept the right to “accept” the king).  Habsburg 
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Jesuit university, Klementinum, being established in Prague in an effort to counter-balance the 
Utraquist controlled Prague university.  Sayer, D. (1998). The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History. 
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aristocrats and burghers took place in Prague’s Old Town Square.  Their heads were 
exhibited on the tower of the Charles Bridge for the next ten years as a memento of the events 
of 1620.72  The property of the Protestant nobility – comprising over three quarters of the land 
in the kingdom – was confiscated and transferred for little or no cost to Catholic loyalists, 
many of them foreigners.  Catholicism was declared the only permitted religion in the 
kingdom, communion in both kinds was forbidden, Protestant priests were expelled from the 
country and Protestant nobles and burghers were given the choice of either converting back to 
Catholicism or leaving their homeland.  The Prague University was put underJesuit 
administration in 1620 and, about three decades later, merged with the Klem ntinum to form 
the Karl-Ferdinand University.  
 
 
Picture 5: Execution of 27 Czech Lords in Prague's Old Town Square in 1621.  Source: 
commons.wikimedia.org. 
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The resulting cultural and political devastation of Bohemia was enormous.  About
one-fifth of Czech and Moravian nobles and close to a quarter of the burgers chose voluntary 
emigration in order to preserve their faith, including such renowned European int llectuals as 
J.A. Komenský, the author of The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart, or 
the renowned historian Pavel Stransky.  In addition to physical exodus, strict censure of the 
Czech written word was put in place, accompanied by the burning of virtually all Czech 
writings from the years 1414-1620.73  German language was made equal with Czech in state 
administration, a status it had never had before.  On the other hand, the Czech language, once 
a language of education and higher administration, retreated from cities and became a sign of 
a low class status.  The class structure was thoroughly altered as a result of the confiscations 
and emigration of the Protestant nobility.  Even though legally Bohemia remain d n 
independent kingdom linked to Vienna only by the person of the monarch, in reality, its 
sovereignty was effectively lost.  The few residual powers the Czech Land Diet still retained 
after several decades of Habsburg centralization were now either severely curtailed or totally 
erased.74  In short, Bohemia’s political status as well as its ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
class structures were changed beyond recognition in the aftermath of Bílá Hora.  By the later 
18th century, the great majority of Czechs – from nobility down to peasants – were once again 
Roman Catholic.75    
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books proclaimed to be heretical or erroneous by the Jesuit censors.  Among these was the Bible 
kralicka, the treasure-house of the Czech language.  As Derek Sayer perceptively noted, this was not 
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that the Habsburg succession was officially proclaimed hereditary on both the male and female side.  
The Diet also lost its power to initiate legislation and was only allowed to debate issues put before it by 
the king.  It could no longer control residence in the kingdom, which meant that foreigners were free to 
buy estates without first acquiring Czech permission.  Ibid. 47.  
75 To make the transformation complete, the links to the Czech past were severed and historical 
memory re-arranged to reflect the new circumstances.  One example of this is the Jesuit attempt to 




In the 19th century, during the period of the Czech national awakening, the battle of 
Bila Hora was singled out as the defining moment in the Czech history and a key pillar of the 
new narrative of Czech identity.  That narrative was provided by Frantisek Palacky in his 
distinctly Romantic, five-volume History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia 
(Dějiny Národu Ceského v Čechách a na Moravě, 1836-1867). Although  Palacký’s work 
covered only Bohemia’s medieval history, in particular the golden age of Charles IV and 
completely pushed to the sidelines Bohemia’s more recent, two and half centuries long, 
incorporation into Austria, its simple framework, summarized by Palacky himself as “We 
were here before Austria, and we will also be here after it!” offered a convenient way to re-
interpret later events as well.  The 1620 anti-Habsburg revolt of Czech nobles thus became 
reduced to a Czech national rebellion –its class and religious dimensions omitted from the 
story.  Similarly, the twenty-seven victims of Ferdinand’s revenge in the aftermath of the Bílá 
Hora defeat were inscribed into Czech history as national martyrs.  And so were Jan Amos 
Komenský and the other post-Bílá Hora émigrés who left the country when the Protestant 
faith was banned.  In short, the entire post-Bílá Hora period was recast as a period of purely 
national oppression of the Czechs by the Germans; the wider European currents which had an 
impact on the Czech-German relations at that time (such as the Protestant r formation or the 
emergence of the modern state) were glossed over, as were the class roots of the conflict. 76   
                                                                                                                                          
Nepomucky and creating a commemorative day for him on May 16.  As it later turned out, 
Nepomucky, who according to a legend was supposed to be hrown from the bridge into Vltava by 
Václav IV in 1393 after he refused to reveal the secrets of the confessional, was indeed a Jesuit 
fabrication – a composite of two 14th century personages – and was eventually stripped of his 
sainthood in 1963.  Ibid. 47-52.   
76 The Hussite period held a special place in this narrative and was also re-cast in a new, national, light.  
The Hussites ceased to be the medieval soldiers of God which they believed themselves to be, and 
instead became the soldiers of the Nation, fearlessly defending the Czech language and embodying all 
of the uniquely Slavic values which Herder celebrated in his pan-Slavist writings, including 




 “Thousand Years we Suffered” – Myth of the Millennial Slovak Oppression under 
the Magyars 
While the Czechs refer to the Bila Hora defeat as the beginning of their national “age 
of darkness”, Slovak nationalists place the beginning of their national “millennial oppression” 
in 906 – the year when Great Moravia was defeated by the Hungarians.  A short episode from 
1999 provides a good example of how deeply entrenched this myth in the Slovak society i .  
In 1999 the ultra nationalist Slovak National Party led by Jan Slota, a politician infamous for 
his xenophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-Hungarian, and anti-Czech rhetoric, request d that the 
Party of Hungarian Coalition, which at the time was part of the center right governing 
coalition led by Premier Dzurinda, apologized to the Slovak nation for the “mill nnial 
oppression perpetrated on the Slovaks by Magyars” and thus demonstrated its loyalty to the 
Slovak Republic.  Slota’s statement was bound to provoke strong reactions from va ious parts 
of the Slovak political spectrum – which it did.  But what was especially significant about the 
incident was that it showed the extent of the myth of the millennial oppression in the Slovak 
society.  Politicians, journalists, observers, readers, regardless of which side of the ideological 
divide they stood, could place and decode the myth of Slovak victimhood without any 
difficulty or further need for elaboration.  The myth of the millennial oppression of Slovaks 
by Magyars was a cultural code, understood and taken for granted both by its supporters and 
its opponents.   
In fact, however, the myth has a relatively recent pedigree. It was not until the 19th 
century when Slovak national awakeners, especially Pavel Jozef Safarik, invented and 
popularized the concept of millennial oppression of Slovaks by Magyars that it entered public 
consciousness.  In his 1837 work Slovanské Starožitnosti,77 Safarik did what Palacky had 
done for the Czech history – provided the conceptual matrix, with which to associate the 
                                                




Slovak past.  Similar to Palacký’s rendition of the Czech history, Šafárik’s account of the 
Slovak past was a story of an age-old antagonism and oppression.  Only, in this case, the 
main actors, the peaceful, democratic and freedom-loving Slovaks, were fending for 
themselves not against the Germans but against their belligerent Hungarian neighbors, whose 
aggressive arrival into the Danube Region at the beginning of the 10th century ended the 
Slovaks’ Golden Age in the Great Moravian Empire and marked the beginning of the Slovak 
millennial suffering and subjugation.  Another similarity which connects Palacky’s and 
Safarik’s narratives is a noticeable historical re-ordering and stretching present in both 
narratives.  Just as the two and a half centuries of Bohemia’s incorporation within the 
Austrian empire were pushed aside and presented as simply an aberration or n malous 
disruption of a much longer and a much more glorious historical continuity in Palacky’s 
narrative of the Czech history, the entire nine hundred plus year-long time of Slovak 
incorporation into the Hungarian state were labeled simply a “millennial darkness” in 
Šafárik’s story.   
That Šafárik’s interpretation of Slovak history was historically inaccurate is without 
question.  As discussed, Slovaks as a distinct ethnic group did not yet exist athe ime of the 
9th century Moravian state; drawing a direct line between the Moravian population and the 
19th century Slovak national awakeners was therefore historical nonsense.  Mor  importantly, 
however, by placing Slovakia’s Golden Age in the time of the 9th century Moravian state and 
rejecting the entire period of the Slovak incorporation into the Hungarian state as “darkness” 
or an aberration, Šafárik projected negative experiences of his own times on Slovakia’s entire 
post-Great Moravian history and in the process stripped Slovaks of ninety percent of their 
history.78   
                                                
78 Findor, A. (2005). Tisicrocna poroba? Myty nase slovenske. E. Krekovic, E. Mannová and E. 




In reality, the policies of heavy Magyarization that Šafárik referrd to in his book did 
not begin until the later half of the 19th century, specifically until the failed 1848 revolt and 
the subsequent dualization of the Habsburg monarchy in 1867 when Austro-Hungary became 
divided into two states, each of which pursued an independent minority policy.  In the 
Hungarian half, of which Slovakia was part, the original St. Stephen’s conception of a 
multinational Hungary was abandoned for the nationalist project of building a “single Magyar 
political nation.”  With it, all Slovak cultural and higher education institutes were abolished 
and Hungarian was established as the sole official language of the state.  
As harsh and devastating as Hungary’s post-1867 minority policy was, however, it 
ought to be emphasized that it was a specific 19th century phenomenon.  No Slovak sources 
dating back to the 14th, 16th or 18th century ever mention a five hundred-, seven hundred-, or 
nine hundred-year long oppression of Slovaks by Magyars.  The character of the Slovak-
Hungarian relations during Slovakia’s incorporation in Hungary was simply uch more 
complex than what we find in Šafárik’s narrative and only rarely did it reflect purely ethnic 
criteria.  This is not to say that there were no episodes of ethnic conflict r linguistic battles 
between the two groups. But to use these isolated instances as some proof ofa th usand-year- 
long discrimination of the entire ethnic group as the nineteenth century historiography had 
done is historically inaccurate.  Ethnic criteria simply did not weigh that much in the final 
decisions of the state, the Church or the landlords at that time.  If the Slovak peasant was 
suffering from the burdens of an unjust feudal system, chances were the Hungarian peasant 
was suffering just as much.  In other words, rather than one’s ethnic identification, it was 
more likely one’s social status and religion which determined his or her societal hierarchy at 
that time.79   
                                                




Paradoxically, by trying to endow his compatriots with a long and glorious past, 
Šafárik effectively erased most of the past that Slovaks had.  It is here that we can locate the 
seeds of the perpetual Slovak frustration with their history and attempts to compensate for 
this deficiency by inventing glorious pasts in places where they did not exist.  Šafárik’s 
“thousand years we suffered under the Magyars” thesis would later undergo numerous 
modifications.  During the First Czechoslovak Republic, for instance, the millennial 
subjugation of Slovaks under the Hungarian rule would be interpreted as a thousand-year- 
long separation of “two brotherly branches of the Czechoslovak nation” which “finally and 
definitely” ended with the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918.  During the wartime 
Slovak state, the millennial oppression of Slovaks would be interpreted in a simil r way, 
except for the fact that Great Moravia would become the first state of Slovaks and the date of 
the “final and definite” end of the Slovak suffering would be represented by March 14, 1939.   
The Czechoslovak communist historiography would generally follow the interpretation of the 
First Czechoslovak Republic and depict Great Moravia as the first common state of Czechs 
and Slovaks but the interpretation of the thousand-year-long oppression would focus on the 
class roots of the conflict, downplaying its national causes.  And the post-communist Czech 
and Slovak elites would find their own ways to re-work the myth into their own narrative 






Picture 6: Hungarian jail of the nations.  A postcard issued by Ferdis Juriga, Slovak deputy in the 
Hungarian Diet, commemorating Juriga’s two year long imprisonment for anti-Hungarian 
provocations. 
 
Myths of Rebirth and Renewal – The Czech and the Slovak National Awakening 
Scholars of political myth often point to similarities between politica and Biblical 
myths, emphasizing the theological and cyclical nature of both.  Political myths, much like 
Biblical myths, leave their audience with an assumption that contemporary events are but an 




history as well as the specific era in which the nation finds itself.80  According to Henry 
Tudor, “Mythical time is reversible.  What is done is not forever lost. It may in the fullness of 
time repeat itself.  Every myth is a story of death and rebirth, of an end or eschatos with 
simultaneously a new beginning.”81  Similarly, George Schopflin describes myths of rebirth 
as stories of reawakening in which a nation that is partially destroyed or suppressed by a fall 
may reawaken and redeem itself.  “Rebirth can create a sense of a clean slat , a new start, in 
which the awfulness of the past can be forgotten.”82  In political myths, history is composed 
of falls and redemptions and although there may be a belief that the nation will eventually 
come out victorious, there is a sense of constant threat from the outside enemies who hinder 
the nation’s progress and thus make it necessary for members of the nation to rally together to 
preserve their identity.83   
Up until the 18th century, the primary form of personal identification in both the 
Bohemian and the Slovak societies was based not on one’s ethnicity or language but on one’s 
estate.  Although there existed a rather strong awareness of “Czechness” among the 
Bohemian population, this awareness did not correspond to an ethnic identification but could 
more appropriately be described as land patriotism – a much broader form of identification 
which subsumed all those living in Bohemia at the time, regardless of their national, 
linguistic or religious identification.  A similar land-based form of patriotism existed in 
Moravia.  The situation was somewhat different in Slovakia where the dominant awareness of 
a Hungarian state identity (i.e., the idea that all privileged inhabitants of the Hungarian state 
formed one Hungarian nation) co-existed with an awareness (although weak) of “Slavness” 
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among the country’s Slovak population.  The 19th century national awakening movement set 
out to change all that and replace the existing land-based, historic, affinities with new, 
linguistically-based ones.   
The idea of linguistic ties was adopted from Germany and drew, specifically, on 
Herder’s writings on nations.  Instead of unifying independent dukedoms into empires as 
Herder had in mind, however, the Czech and Slovak national “awakeners”, as the 19th century 
Czech and Slovak nationalist elites came to be referred to, sought the opposite goal – division 
of an existing empire, i.e. the Austro Hungary, into autonomous national units.84  And even 
though they liked to refer to themselves as mere “awakeners” and defined their goals in 
cultural rather than overtly political terms, their activities were, in fact, revolutionary.   
With the help of dictionaries, history, language books and other publications as well 
as institutes and learned societies focused on the promotion of Czech and Slovak literature, 
the awakeners succeeded in gradually redefining the Czech and Slovak identity and historical 
experience. This after centuries in which it had been inextricably tied to the history of the 
Holy Roman Empire and the kingdom of Hungary. They replaced them with a new, 
linguistically-based, set of associations.  Re-imagined as a Slavic nation, Bohemia ceased to 
be the most eastern outlier of the despised German civilization and, instead, became – at least 
in the minds of its creators – the most western outlier of the newly constructed Slavic world 
(the fact that the Czechs had never been Orthodox and had never written in Cyrillic
notwithstanding).  Similarly, Slovakia ceased to be an isolated Slavic island in the Hungarian 
dominated multinational state and became part of an imagined, linguistically-based Slav, later 
Czechoslav and still later Czechoslovak community.  This was far from a mere “revival” of 
an existing national identity.  The identities constructed by the Czech and Slovak awakeners 
were new creations, miles away from the original land-based patriotism which had bound 
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together the inhabitants of these countries over the preceding centuries and made it possible 
for each member of the society – whether they spoke Czech, German, Jiddish, Polish, Slovak, 
Hungarian or other languages – to call them their home.  With identity redefin  in strictly 
linguistic terms, all non-Czech and non-Slovak speakers were effectively rel gated to the 
position of “outsiders”.  
 It should be noted that the question of what the exact contours of the new linguistic 
community ought to be was deeply contested both among the Czech and the Slovak 
awakeners at the time.  In Bohemia, a narrower conception of Czech identity championed by 
Josef Havlíček Borovský, sought to draw the borders of the imagined Czech community 
rather narrowly – including only the Slavic inhabitants of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and 
Slovakia.85 This competed with a much broader, “pan-Slavist” program – advocated, for 
instance, by Josef Jungmann, Josef Dobrovský, Ján Kollár, Pavel Jozef Šafárik, among others 
which saw the Czech identity as part of a much larger Slavic identity, which in addition to 
Moravians and Slovaks, included Poles, Russians and Illyrians.  To representatives of the 
broader conception, the Czech language, just like Polish or Russian languages, was but one 
dialect of a single Slavic language.86  To proponents of the narrower conception of Czech 
identity, the Poles, Czechs, and Russians constituted independent nations.  Despite th ir 
linguistic affinities, they no more constituted a single “Slavic nation” than Germans, Danes, 
Swedes, Dutch, Norwegians and English comprised a single “Germanic nation” or Spaniards, 
French, Portuguese and Romanians formed a single “Romance Nation”.87  In Slovakia, the 
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key division was between Slovak Catholic intelligentsia who advocated the i ea of an 
independent Slovak nation speaking Slovak, and Slovak Protestants who were in favor of a 
“Czechoslav” identity based on the Czech language.88   
What was at stake in these seemingly theoretical disputes about linguistic similarity 
(or otherwise) between Czech, Slovak and other Slavic languages was clearly more than just 
pure linguistics.  As Benedict Anderson reminds us, dictionaries and grammars, in ddition to 
serving their educational purpose, are key instruments through which nations are created and 
sustained89.  At stake in these theoretical arguments was a fundamental disagreement over the 
character of the Czech and Slovak identity and nation that was in the making90.  A d at the 
heart of the argument was a tacit agreement that non-Slavs, specifically the Germans and the 
Hungarian, were not to be included.  In short, purely linguistic battles, they wer not.   
 It was not until the second half of the 19th century in Bohemia and much later in 
Slovakia, however, that the Czech and Slovak awakeners’ construction ceased to be mere 
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a strong awareness of their mutual closeness Rychlík, J. (1997). Ceši a Slováci ve 20. století: Cesko-
slovenské vztahy 1914-1945. Bratislava, Academic Electronic Press: 26.  
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private activities of a handful of poets and intellectuals and gradually came to be embraced by 
the Czech and Slovak middle classes.  The shift was especially noticeable in Bohemia where 
modernization provided a set of instruments and technologies (cheap news rint, schools, 
postal services, political parties, public buildings, etc.) through which the national project 
could be carried out.91  It also generated a modern and prosperous civil society which was 
capable of being nationalized.  This was a population which increasingly lived in towns and 
cities, could read and write, was becoming increasingly affluent, and, perhaps most 
importantly, had a personal interest in the circulation of the Czech language.92  As a result, as 
Derek Sayer writes, by the mid 19th century, the national image constructed by the Czech 
awakeners became so deeply ingrained in the Czech everyday life – in the la guage, customs, 
folk tales, nursery rhymes, dress – that it ceased to be a mere intellctual construct and 
became an integral part of social reality.  And this image was never seriously disrupted since;  
not even after the failed revolts of 1848 and the subsequent imposition of neo-absolutism.93   
The situation in Slovakia was considerably different.  Unlike in Bohemia where 
modernization was already in full swing by the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
Hungarian part of the monarchy, where Slovakia belonged, was still deeply enmesh d in 
feudalism.  The majority of the Slovak population was comprised of peasants with only a 
weekly developed sense of their national distinctiveness.  The middle class, which proved to 
be essential in transforming the ideas of Czech awakeners into a truly mass-based movement 
in Bohemia, was emerging only very slowly in Slovakia and where it did exist, it tended to 
easily succumb to Magyar pressures.  Similarly, support from the patriotically-minded 
aristocracy, so instrumental for the success of the Czech national movement, was missing in 
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Slovakia where the majority of Slovak nobles were either Hungarian or, when Slovak by 
origin, were more loyal to the Magyar than to the Slovak cause.94  Finally, as has been 
mentioned, the relatively small group of Slovak intelligentsia which exist d and was active at 
the time was deeply divided along religious lines.95   
The gap between the Czech and the Slovak realities and national programs grew still 
larger after the 1867 dualization of the Habsburg monarchy.  As has been mentioned, 
Budapest (under whose administration Slovakia belonged) quickly abandoned the original St. 
Stephen’s conception of a multinational Hungarian state and began to take drastic me ures 
to make Hungary into a “single Magyar political nation”.96  Meanwhile, Bohemia which was 
administered by a much more nationally lenient Viennese government enjoyed a considerable 
degree of social, economic, political and cultural autonomy, including the rigt to use the 
Czech language in administration and education.  As a result, by the early 1890s, Bohemia 
was able to develop into a fully fledged political nation (minus the stat) wi h all attributes of 
a well-developed civil society while in Slovakia, the development of natio l life was 
stagnating under the heavy yoke of Magyar nation. 
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The outbreak of the First World War took the developments of Czech and Slovak 
national movements in a wholly new direction.  Previously limited to efforts t  secure an 
equal position within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the aims of the Czech and Slovak
national movements began shifting towards national self-determination as the war progressed.  
With them, the pragmatic benefits of a union between Czechs and Slovaks began to gain in 
attraction.  With Austro-Hungary’s capitulation on October 27, 1918, the centuris-long 
association of Czechs and Slovaks with the House of Habsburgs ended and a new phase in 
the Czecho-Slovak relations began.    




Chapter 3: Constructing the Czechoslovak Nation – Act I: The 
Interwar Republic 
 
As Mona Ozouf poignantly notes in her book on festivals and the French Revolution, 
revolutionary events open up time in both directions – forward and backward.  They offer the 
winners the opportunity to legitimize themselves by inventing traditions and propose their 
own version of the past and of the future.97  The fall of Austro Hungary and the creation of 
Czechoslovakia in 1918 was one such transformative event.  And even though, as the 
previous chapter made clear, invention of tradition as a tool of political legitimization had 
been already used and abused by the Czech and Slovak national awakeners back in the 19th
century, the establishment of Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of World ar I (WW I)gave 
the Czech and Slovak intellectual elites a state apparatus of their own to institutionalize their 
invented traditions and thereby achieve, at least partially, hegemonic control over the content 
of their national mythscape.  This chapter lays out the main constitutive elements of the 
Czechoslovak national narrative as it was constructed by Czechoslovakia’s founders in the 
1920s and early 1930s. Specifically, I  take note of the deep religious and national tensions 
which arose in connection to state-promotion of what many considered to be a grossly one-
sided (pro-Czech, pro-Protestant) form of identity, unrepresentative of th  multiethnic and 
multireligious character of the interwar Czechoslovak society.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the Czech and Slovak experiences during the Second World War (W  II) and 
the decisive impact of those experiences on the re-definition of the Czech and Slovak identity 
after the war.  
                                                




Establishment of the Interwar Czechoslovak Republic 
The establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic on October 28, 1918 could 
very well be described as an accident of history – a fortuitous result or coincidence of 
activities of a handful of Czech and Slovak politicians, supported by Czech and 
Slovak émigré groups in North America, with the aims of the victorious Allies.  There 
was nothing inevitable about Czechoslovakia’s birth.  In fact, it took more than three 
years of concerted diplomacy, military planning and organization before the 
arguments of the Czechoslovak founders – Tomas Garique Masaryk (the intellectual 
father of the idea of a joint Czechoslovak state and later its first president) and his two 
émigré colleagues, Edvard Benes and a Slovak astronomer living in France, Milan 
Rastislav Stefanik – finally began to find willing ears on the side of the Entante 
powers.  And even then, it was primarily for pragmatic reasons that the up-until-the  
hesitant western leaders eventually decided to change their position and support 
Czechoslovakia’s establishment.   
At its core, Masaryk’s idea of a joint Czecho-Slovak state, was a pragmatic 
one.  It stemmed from Masaryk’s personal conviction that the emergence of a 
German-dominated Mitteleuropa – the inevitable outcome of the war, were the 
Central Powers to prevail – was fundamentally irreconcilable with the Czech national 
aspirations.  Dismantling of the defunct Austro-Hungary and creation of a new 
system based on the principle of national self- determination, Masaryk reasoned, was 




nation.98  Czechoslovakia – a state incorporating Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia – 
was to be the product of this new system.  The incorporation of Slovakia was an 
essential part of Masaryk’s plan for two reasons.  First, without Slovakia, an 
independent Czech state – if it ever came into being – would be predestined for the 
role of the weakest central European state.  Union of the Czech lands with Slovakia, 
however, would create a state large enough to withstand the pressures of its powerful 
neighbors.  Incorporation of Slovakia into the new state would also provide the 
Czechs with a direct corridor to Russia – providing another powerful check on 
Germany’s imperial ambition.   
Masaryk’s strategy of convincing the Western powers of the pragmatic merits 
of the Czechoslovak union had one caveat, however, which as it soon turned out 
became the Achilles heel of the new republic.  In order to gain the approval of the 
Western powers, Czechs and Slovaks had to be presented as two branches of one 
homogeneous Czechoslovak nation (otherwise the argument that Austro-Hungary had 
to be dismantled based on the principle of national self-determination would fail).  
From the Czech perspective, this did not present serious difficulties as the sentiment 
prevalent among the Czech political elites at the time, Masaryk included, was that the 
difference between Czechs and Slovaks was mainly a matter of different political and 
economic conditions in the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the Habsburg monarchy 
– a gap that could easily be overcome with proper education and modernization of the 
Slovak society.   Masaryk’s statement “Slovak is a Magyarized Czech”, though 
                                                
98 This was a novel idea since up until then, the Czech political program (like most other national 
movements in Austro-Hungary at the time) was focused on achieving a greater degree of autonomy 




insensitive to the intricacies of the Slovak question, was, in fact, a fairly 
representative reflection of the Czech elite’s view of the Slovak society in the late 
19th century.99     
On the Slovak side, Masaryk’s idea of the Czechoslovak union met initially 
with skepticism.  In part, this was due to the fact that, unlike the Czechs who 
generally understood the Czechoslovak project to be essentially a renewal of the 
historical Bohemian state (with more favorable, expanded, borders), the Slovaks 
never had a state of their own; their historical experience had always been 
inextricably linked to Hungary.  For Slovak political elites, therefore, the idea of 
Austro-Hungary’s disintegration and creation of Czechoslovakia was something 
completely new, not to mention the fact that due to heavy political and national 
repression, conditions for open discussion of various political alternatives simply did 
not exist in Slovakia at the time.  Reservations toward the idea of a Czecho-slovak 
union, however, were also strong among Slovak émigré circles abroad where political 
openness to discuss alternatives did exist.  Especially in the United States, Slovak 
émigré organizations had been calling for Slovak autonomy in Hungary for some time 
already and viewed the Czech-led initiative to create a joint Czechoslovak state with 
suspicion.  Nevertheless, pragmatic considerations spoke loud and clear and neither 
side could ignore them.  After some initial hesitation, therefore, representativ s of the 
Czech and Slovak émigré groups agreed to work together toward the establishment of 
a common, democratic, Czecho-Slovak federal state, expressing this agreement in 
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two crucial agreements – one signed in Cleveland, Ohio on October 22, 1915, another 
endorsed in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on May 30, 1918. 100     
It was not until the summer of 1918, when the inevitability of Austro-
Hungary’s demise was becoming increasingly clear, however, that the up-until-the  
hesitant Western powers began to take note of the arguments made by Masaryk and 
his colleagues.  By that time, the allied armies were also beginning to lose strength 
and so the political weight of the well-organized Czechoslovak legions grew 
considerably.  The decisive point for the establishment of Czechoslovakia then came 
on October 18, 1918 with President Woodrow Wilson’s decline of Austro-Hungary’s 
last attempt to strike a deal by offering its nations a federal arrangement.  Nine days 
later, Austro-Hungary accepted the US note and the following day, on October 28, 
amidst mass demonstrations and celebrations, the establishment of Czechoslovakia 
was officially proclaimed by the national committee in Prague.  Czechoslovakia w s 
born.   
Paradoxically, however, the news of Czechoslovakia’s establishment did not 
reach Slovakia until October 30,  two days after Czechoslovak independence had 
been proclaimed in Prague.  Since Czech newspapers had been banned in Slovakia 
since April and neither the Hungarian nor the German papers informed about the 
Prague events, Slovak representatives who gathered at a planned meeting in Martin 
on October 30, were completely unaware of the events that had taken place in Prague.  
The meeting produced a document entitled Declaration of the Slovak Nation, which 
expressed the desire of “the Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak nation” for self-
                                                




determination.  Only later that day, after a messenger finally arrived from Prague with 
the news of the Prague events, did the remaining delegates (by that time most of the 
participants had already left for home) make an addition to the existing document, 
citing Austro-Hungary’s acceptance of the demands of the American government as 
the justification for the Slovak demand for self-determination and desire to be part of
a joint Czechoslovak state.   
It must have been clear to Czechoslovakia’s founders from the very 
beginning, however, that the road ahead would be a rocky one.  First of all, 
Czechoslovakia, like most other states which had emerged out of the debris of the 
former Austro-Hungary.  faced serious minority problems.  Of Czechoslovakia’s tot l 
population of 13.4 million, only about two-thirds identified themselves as Czechs or 
Slovaks in 1918, approximately 6.8 million or fifty-one percent were Czech and 
1.967 million were Slovaks.  The rest of Czechoslovakia’s population consisted of 
ethnic minorities – approximately 3.124 million Germans (32.6 percent of the 
Bohemian population, i.e., roughly every third person living in Bohemia, or about 
23.3 percent of the entire population of CSR), 745,000 Hungarians, 462,000 
Ruthenians, Ukrainians and Russians, 181,000 Jews (0.345 if considered by religion 
rather than declarations of Jewishness as a nationality), 76,000 Poles, in addition to a 
smaller number of “others”.101  Creating a nation, out of this diverse motley of people 
who suddenly became citizens of Czechoslovakia was bound to be difficult, not to 
mention the fact that many of those who became minorities on the date of 
Czechoslovakia’s establishment had in fact been the Czechs’ and the Slovak’s 
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yesterday’s masters and so their incorporation into the new state was reluctant at 
best.102     
In addition to Czechoslovakia’s minority problem, considerable differences 
divided the Czechs and the Slovaks themselves.  Even though Bohemia and Slovakia 
had common rulers since the election of Vladislav II Jagellon to the Hungarian throne 
in 1490, Czechs and Slovaks remained separated by a political and economic border 
dividing the Hungarian and the Austrian part of the monarchy.103  As a result, the 
Czechs were entering their new state with a well developed modern civil society, 
established political parties, trade unions, voluntary organizations, strong Czech 
language press, universities, schools, art galleries, theaters, and most importantly, a 
literate and nationally conscious public – almost half of which lived in cities and 
towns.  By contrast, Slovakia remained largely agricultural and rural.  Out of thetotal 
Slovak workforce in 1921, sixty-six percent worked in agriculture and forestry (only 
about fifteen percent worked in industry).  For comparison, Bohemia’s agricultural 
employment figures for that same period were below thirty percent.  Even in 1930, 
i.e., twelve years after the founding of Czechoslovakia, there were only eight Slovak 
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towns with a population of 20,000 (compared to thirty such towns in Bohemia) and 
only three Slovak cities had more than 30,000 inhabitants (compared to twenty such 
cities in the Czech lands at the same date).  Moreover, five decades of heavy 
Magyarization left the Slovak society with a very fragile sense of national identity.  
Even in 1919 (one year after the establishment of Czechoslovakia), many ordinary 
Slovaks were still unable to clearly identify their nationality, usually identfyi g 
themselves as speakers of both Slovak and Hungarian.104       
There was also a significant religious rift separating the Czech and the Slovak 
society.  The issue was not of a different religion – both Czech landsand Slovakia were after 
all confessionally divided; neither of them had “a national religion”, although, statistically 
speaking, Catholicism was the dominant creed in both Bohemia and Slovakia.  The key 
difference lied in the different role that religion played in the two societies.  Catholicism, due 
to its close association with the resented Habsburg rule in Bohemia, could not p ay a positive 
role of a national catalyst in the Bohemian society.  At the same time, due to the heavy 
renewed Catholicism campaign between 1620-1781, Protestantism in Bohemia was weak and 
unable to play that role either.  The result was a religious 
detachment and skepticism among the majority of Czechs.   In Slovakia, by contrast, religion, 
both Catholic and Protestant, could and did play an active and positive role in the national 
life, as can be seen in the activities of the 19th century Slovak national awakeners discussed in 
the previous chapter.  The relative decline of the role of the Catholic Church in the 
Czechoslovak society after 1918 was thus observed with considerable dissatisfaction, 
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particularly among the Slovak Catholic clergy who were highly critical of the “Czech atheist 
influence” on the Slovak society.105   
To summarize, Czechs and Slovaks at the time of the establishment of their 
common state were miles away both in terms of their historical experiences a d the 
type of societies they represented.  Despite the rhetoric of centuries-long fraternity 
between the two nations, there was no common state that Czechs and Slovaks were 
renewing in 1918.  Apart from the linguistic kinship and the only recently invented 
pan-Slavist ideology, very few historical, political, economic or even cultural 
linkages existed between the two nations prior to the mid- to-late 19th century.  
Moreover, the new Czechoslovak state inherited from its Austro-Hungarian 
predecessor a large number of ethnic minorities, many of whom were resentful of 
their newly subordinate status.  What needed to be reconciled, in other words, were 
not only physical groups of people but also multiple historical memories and wounds 
which they carried with them into the new state.  Creating a common narrative tha 
would overcome the vast differences between the Czech and Slovak societies and at 
least to some degree attempt to incorporate the multiple and often contradictory 
historical experiences and memories of Czechoslovakia’s many minorities was, 
therefore, bound to be very difficult.   
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Constructing the Narrative of the Czechoslovak Nation: Act I – Interwar 
Czechoslovakia 
The new Czechoslovak government used all tools at its disposal to eliminate 
reminders of the previous rule and instill new markers of identity.  In the revolutionary 
atmosphere of the days and weeks following October 28, both spontaneous and state-
sponsored attacks on symbols of the Habsburg rule took place. Hundreds of monuments, 
statues, signs and symbols of Habsburg dominion were destroyed as Czechs and Slovaks 
sought to assert dominance over their new public space and cleanse the Czechoslovak t wns 
and cities of traces of what they considered to be an imperial and specifically, German and 
Hungarian past.  The issue of fallen, vandalized, desacralized statues is especially significant 
here because statues and memorials, as scholars of nationalism remind us, in addition to 
fulfilling their key function of conserving tradition, also serve to mark te ritory, delineate 
borders – in both physical and symbolic sense.  Katherine Verdery’s insight about links 
between physical and symbolic desacralization is especially relevant here, pulling down a 
statue is more than just an act of physical removal of the statue from the landscape, it is also 
an attempt to deprive the symbol embodied in the statue of its sacredness and timelessness.106  
By actions such as toppling of German and Hungarian statues and symbols, Czechs and 
Slovaks were not only removing the physical markers of Austro-Hungary’s legacy from 
Czechoslovakia’s towns and cities, they were also claiming possession of the commemorative 
public space that up until then had been closed to them.  This was especially not ceable in 
Slovakia, where removal of Habsburg statues and symbols went hand in hand with physical 
liberation of the Slovak territory from the occupying Hungarian army.107   
                                                
106 Verdery, K. (1999). The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change. N w 
York, Columbia UP: 5. 
107 Especially frequent targets of the revolutionary monument destruction in Slovakia were statues of 
the 1848 Hungarian revolutionary leaders, esp. Lajos K ssuth and poet Sándor Petıfi , but also Ferenc 




Perhaps one of the best known examples of the Czechoslovak post-revolutionary 
destructive euphoria was the toppling of the Marian column in the Old Town Square in 
Prague by radicalized masses just one week after the declaration of Czechoslovak 
independence.  Erroneously believed to have been erected by Emperor Ferdinand III to 
commemorate the Habsburg victory at the battle of Bila Hora (White Mountain) under the 
leadership of Ferdinand’s father Ferdinand II, the Marian column was seen by Prague’s 
Czech inhabitants as a mnemonic symbol of German domination – and consequently of 
Czech national shame.  Therefore, it had to go.108   
                                                                                                                                          
memorials erected by the Hungarian government on the occasion of the millennial anniversary of the 
Hungarian arrival in the Danube basin region in 1906 (??check yr).  See Lipták, L. (1999). Rošády na 
piedestáloch. Storocie dlhšie ako sto rokov: O dejinách a historiografii. L. Lipták. Bratislava, 
Kalligram: 311-350.  Also see Kodajová, D. (2008). "Starý režim padol, co s jeho symbolmi?" 
Historická revue 10: 26-31.  Babjak, J. (2008). "Osudy pomníkov po roku 1918." Historická revue 10: 
38-40. 
108 In fact, the monument was erected in 1650 by residents of Prague to mark the Swedish withdrawal 
from the city at the end of the Thirty Years’ War.  Over time, however, the origins of the monument 
became blurred in the public imagination and the monument came to be equated with Habsburg 
domination.  For an excellent account of the toppling of the Marian column in Prague see Paces, C. 
(2001). "The Fall and Rise of Prague’s Marian Column." Radical History Review Winter 2001(79): 
141-155.  Also see Paces, C. and N. M. Wingfield (2005). The Sacred and the Profane: Religion and 
Nationalism in the Bohemian Lands, 1880-1920. Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe. P. 
M. Judson and M. L. Rozenblit, Berghahn Books: 107-125, Wingfield, N. M. (2007). Flag Wars and 






Picture 7: Marian column in the Old Town Square in Prague built in 1650.  Since 1915, it has shared 




Picture 8: Toppling of the Marian Column on November 3 1918.  Source: Společnost pro obnovu 






Picture 9: The Old Town Square one day after the destruction of the Marian column.  Behind is the 
statue of Master Jan Hus.  Source: Společnost pro obnovu mariánského sloupu v Praze. 
 
Other monuments, statues and symbols in Prague and in cities and towns throughout 
the country which were considered insufficiently “Czechoslovak” soon followed suit.  Key 
among them were statues of Habsburg monarchs and officials, especially the omnipresent 
statues of Joseph II which had been adopted by Bohemia’s German nationalists at the end of 
the 19th century as mnemonic sites of the golden era when Germans had predominance in the 
Monarchy.109  In Slovakia, an equestrian statue of Maria Theresia, created by a celebrated 
artist of the age János Fadrusz in 1896, which had stood in one of Bratislava’s central 
squares, symbolizing loyalty of Hungarian estates to their female ruler, was pulled down by 
                                                
109 Wingfield, N. M. (2001). Statues of Emperor Joseph II as Sites of German Identity. Staging the 
Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present. M. Bucur and 
N. M. Wingfield. West Lafayette, Purdue University Press: 178-208.  Also see Paces, C. and N. M. 
Wingfield (2005). The Sacred and the Profane: Religion and Nationalism in the Bohemian Lands, 
1880-1920. Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe. P. M. Judson and M. L. Rozenblit, 




Czechoslovak legionaries and Slovak nationalists in October 1921.  Paradoxically, Maria 
Theresia was the one Habsburg ruler who contributed the most to the cultural and economic 
development of Bratislava.  What prompted the outburst of rage against the symbol captured 
by the statue was an attempt (unsuccessful) of Hungary’s last emperor and Maria Theresa’s 
great great grandson, Charles IV, to re-gain power in Hungary.  Ironically, after the statue 
was destroyed, a parchment was discovered in the foundation on which the statue used to 
stand.  Its words, “Stand for eternity!  Stand, until the millennial, beloved homeland stands!” 
turned out to be prophetic.110     
 
Picture 10: Toppling of Maria Theresa statue in Bratislava in October 1921 
                                                
110 Fragments of the vandalized statue then made their way to Budapest where they were exhibited at 
the National Museum and throughout the interwar period were exploited by the Hungarian propaganda 
as a proof of the barbarity of the Czechs.  See: Lipták, L. (1999). Rošády na piedestáloch. Storocie 




   
Frequently targeted were also symbols of Roman Catholicism which, in the eyes of 
many Czech nationalists, were inextricably linked with the Old Empire.  Hundreds of statues 
of St. Jan Nepomuk – the “favorite saint” of the Roman Catholic Church whose cult was 
specifically invented and propagated by the Habsburgs with the intention of erasing the 
Hussite tradition from the Czech popular memory – as well as many other statu s and 
symbols of Catholicism were removed from public spaces.  Although the majority of these 
acts were spontaneous in nature, they often took place with a tacit approval of the 
Czechoslovak government which was sometimes unable and sometimes unwilling to prevent 
them.  In fact, in 1923, following an avalanche of statue court cases, removal of st tues, 
inscriptions, and memorials of the Habsburg past from public view was codified into 
Czechoslovak law and justified as an essential act for the protection of the Republic.111  As 
could be expected in a country whose population was overwhelmingly Catholic, such a
massive attack on symbols of Catholicism was bound to generate protests from those Czech 
and Slovak Catholics who viewed them not as political but as religious symbols, not to 
mention the three million of the country’s Germans who saw the removal of Hbsburg 
symbols as a personal attack meant to marginalize and exclude them from the new state.112    
                                                
111 Národní shromáždení, R. C. (1923). Zákon 50/1923 Sb. na ochranu republiky [Law for the defense 
of teh republic]. Sbírka zákonu a narízení statu ceskoslovenského, Rocník 1918–1938 [Code of laws 
and decrees of the Czechoslovak state]. Praha, Státní tiskárna.  For a fascinating discussion of Czech-
German clashes over statues in the interwar period see Paces, C. and N. M. Wingfield (2005). The 
Sacred and the Profane: Religion and Nationalism in the Bohemian Lands, 1880-1920. Constructing 
Nationalities in East Central Europe. P. M. Judson and M. L. Rozenblit, Berghahn Books: 107-125. 
112 Interestingly, as Nancy Wingfield notes in her book, it was not only the visual landscape that the 
Czechoslovak regime thought as worthy and necessary to cleanse of traces of the previous Habsburg 
rule.  The audio space too became nationalized by the new Czechoslovak state.  Laws were passed, 
regulating music to which Czechoslovak citizens would be exposed in public.  German patriotic songs 
like “Die Wacht am Rhein” and “Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles,” for instance, were forbidden 
from being played or sung in restaurants and taverns, except in closed, reserved rooms.  Failure to 
comply with the government regulations carried considerable financial sanctions and could even lead 
to imprisonment.  See Wingfield, N. M. (2007). Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian 




“Dates to be Celebrated with Exuberated Minds” 
In place of the removed statues and symbols of the Habsburg, German, Hungarian, 
and Catholic rule, the new Czechoslovak state invented new cultural traditions to legitimatize 
the new political and social order.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, after the demise of 
Great Moravia, Czechs and Slovaks had belonged to different states and after 1526 to 
different parts of the Habsburg Empire.  As a result, in the absence of a shared political 
history, the Czechoslovak nation-builders had to make use of whatever Czecho-Slovak 
contacts there were throughout the centuries, which they did.  And since the Czechs were the 
dominant force in the new state, the language and imagery of the Czechoslovak nation 
became distinctly Czech and highly reminiscent of the writings of Palacky and his 19th 
century contemporaries.   
The war, and in particular the exile activities of Czechoslovakia’s Founding Fathers, 
Masaryk, Benes and Stefanik, together with the wartime accomplishments of the 
Czechoslovak Legions offered an emotionally resounding and politically powerful 
foundational myth for the new state.  Shortly before the first anniversary of the proclamation 
of Czechoslovak independence, the Czechoslovak parliament made October 28, the date of 
the official establishment of Czechoslovakia, the most important holiday of the young state.  
The date was given a special status of a non-working “state holiday” (while the other official 
holidays recognized by the Czechoslovak state had merely the status of “memorial days” or 
simply “holidays”) and its observation was regulated by special rules, violation of which 
carried serious sanctions, including imprisonment.113   
                                                
113 Národní shromáždení, R. C. (1919). Zákon 555/1919 Sb. ze dne 14.10.1919 jímž se prohlašuje 
dvacátý osmý ríjen za každorocní svátek státní [Law proclaiming October 28 a state holiday]. Sbírka 
zákonu a narízení statu ceskoslovenského, Rocník 1918–1938 [Code of laws and decrees of the 
Czechoslovak state]. Praha, Státní tiskárna.  See also Národní shromáždení, R. C. Stenoprotokol 83. 





Throughout the interwar period, annual celebrations of October 28 were accompanied 
by pompous celebrations.  The government encouraged all citizens to celebrate the 
anniversary by displaying publicly their joy and decorating their houses with state flags and 
flowers.114  Especially festive was the first anniversary of the republic’s founding in 1919, on 
which president Masaryk delivered a celebratory speech in the National Assembly, outlining 
his vision of the new state.  The speech recalled the Czechoslovak road from the Austro-
Hungarian “prison of nations” to independence, paid special tribute to the great men who 
contributed to the founding of the state and emphasized the democratic, progressive, secular 
character of the Czechoslovak state, especially its pro-Slavic orientation, while at the same 
time assuring Czechoslovakia’s national minorities of their national and inguistic rights.115  
Similarly lavish were the decennium celebrations in 1928 which lasted sevral weeks and 
featured military parades, speeches by government officials, unveiling of statues, educational 
activities for schoolchildren, museum exhibitions, etc.116     
Yet, despite the government’s encouragements, not everyone celebrated October 28 
with an “exuberated mind” as the initiators of the October 28 holiday law had intended.  
Predictably, the holiday was contested by Czechoslovakia’s Germans who continued to reject 
the Czechoslovak national vision and considered October 28 a day of mourning for the 
dissolved monarchy rather than a day of joy.  Already in 1925, when the new holiday law was 
being debated in the Czechoslovak parliament and in the Senate, representatives of 
Czechoslovak ethnic German parties protested against the forceful nature of the law, which 
stipulated that schools, state offices and state-run public institutions be closed on October 28.  
The law also gave authority to local police departments to enforce “respectful” observance of 
                                                
114 Wingfield, N. M. (2007). Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands became Czech. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press: esp. Chapter 6. 
115 Národní shromáždení, R. C. Stenoprotokol 85. schuze.  Úterý 28. ríjna 1919. Spolecná cesko-
slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna. Available, http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1918ns/. 
116 For details of the decennial celebrations, see Wingfield, N. M. (2007). Flag Wars and Stone Saints: 




the holiday through issuing financial fines and imprisoning the offenders.  German deputies 
objected that respect for a country and its national symbols could not be forced by the police 
but their complaints found little positive response in the new Czechoslovak government.117  
Throughout the interwar period, annual celebrations of the October 28 anniversary continued 
to be accompanied by scattered public displays of opposition by ethnic Germans.   
Ethnic Germans were not the only ones to use the October 28 anniversary as an 
opportunity to voice their grievances against the new state, however.  Th  way in which the 
idea of Czechoslovakism was being implemented in practice was sharply criticized by a 
growing autonomist movement in Slovakia as well.  Gathered around the Slovak People’s 
Party and its leading figure, Catholic priest Andrej Hlinka, Slovak autonomists demanded 
that both October 28 and October 30 (date of the Martin Declaration of 1918) be celerated 
as equal birthdays of the new Czechoslovak state since it was only on October 30 that Slovak 
representatives formally confirmed their desire to join the Czechs in a common state.118  
Much like the German protests, however, the Slovak demands fell on deaf ears of the Czech-
dominated government which feared that concessions to Slovaks would only encourage mo e 
demands from Czechoslovakia’s ethnic Germans which could potentially endanger 
Czechoslovakia’s existence.  Czech assurances that Slovaks were free to celebrate October 30 
if they so wished but that October 28 would remain the sole official state holiday since that 
was when Czechoslovakia was internationally recognized did little to ease the tension that 
began to form between the new state and the Slovak autonomists.  
                                                
117 See speech by Senator Niessner in the Czechoslovak Senate on April 3 1925. Senát, R. C. 
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knihovna. Available, http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1918ns/. 
118 See for instance the parliamentary speech by Andrej Hlinka delivered on March 21 1925.  Národní 
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In addition to October 28, Masaryk himself, styled as “President Liberator”, became 
an important constitutive element of the new Czechoslovak foundational myth.  Only a few 
months after the establishment of Czechoslovakia, Prague’s oldest embankment bearing the 
name of the Austrian emperor Francis I was renamed Masaryk Embankment (Francis’ st tue 
was quietly removed).  Soon after, in a manner quite unusual for the times, since publi  
spaces were rarely named after living people (this would change dramatically during the 
communist era as we shall see in the next chapter), Masaryk’s name was added to squares, 
streets, bridges, libraries and schools.  By the late 1930s, statues of h  immensely popular 
and sincerely beloved “President Osvoboditel” (“President-Liberator”) or more familiarly 
“Taticek Masaryk” (“Little Father Masaryk”) could be found in most towns and villages 
throughout the country, typically depicting Masaryk as a scholar or a wartime leader wearing 
his military uniform.119  Although the parliamentary proposal to add March 7, the date of 
Masaryk’s birthday, to the list of Czechoslovakia’s official memorial days was withdrawn on 
Masaryk’s personal request, many Czechs and Slovaks celebrated their president’s birthday 
spontaneously.120  Masaryk’s cult grew even larger after Masaryk’s death in 1937 when, in 
the atmosphere of a rising Nazi threat, Masaryk’s monuments became powerful sit s of 
remembrance and a source of solace for many Czechs and Slovaks.  
                                                
119 The first Masaryk statue was unveiled in Loučka u Litovle in August 1919, followed by two more 
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Garrique Masaryk and the First World War. International Historical Conference "Fateful Eights in 
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Picture 11: Statue of T.G. Masaryk by Vincenc Makovský and Jarosl v Fragner built between 1937-
1948, situated in front of Faculty of Education of Palacký University at Žižkovo náměstí in Olomouc.  
Typical of other statues of TGM, the statue depicts the first Czechoslovak president as a philosopher, 
thinker, a man of moral resolve and integrity.  The monument was removed in 1953 and reconstructed 
between 1990-1993.  Since 2003, a copy of the monume t stands in T.G. Masaryk Memorial Park on 
Massachusetts Avenue in Washingtoon DC. Source: wikimedia.org.  
 
In Slovakia, Masaryk’s pupil, wartime colleague and organizer of Czechoslovak 
foreign legions during the war, General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, becam  the object of a 
widespread official, as well as popular, mythologization.  Interestingly, it was not until his 
tragic death in an airplane crash on the outskirts of Bratislava on Štefánik’s return home from 
the war on May 4, 1919 and the lavish state-sponsored funeral service he reciv d that 
Štefánik’s name entered the public imagination and became part of the Czechoslovak national 
pantheon of heroes.  Heroic as it was, Stefanik’s memory was not unproblematic, however, 




representatives of Czechoslovakism, each of whom vied to claim Stefanik’s mantle as their 
own.121  While the Czechoslovakists celebrated Stefanik’s contributions to the establishment 
of Czechoslovakia, Slovak nationalists emphasized his strong sense of Slovak patriotism 
which had brought him into conflict with Eduard Benes on a number of occasions.   
The culmination of the clash between the two visions of the Stefanik myth came in a 
form of a public controversy related to a proposal to build a new statue of Št fánik in 
Bratislava which was announced on the occasion of the republic’s tenth anniversary in the 
fall of 1928.  The winning proposal, designed by a renowned Czech sculptor Bohumil Kafka,
depicted Štefánik in his pilot uniform, standing on the ground and looking across the Danube 
River.  Situated behind Štefánik on a separate pillar was a large lion holding the 
Czechoslovak state emblem, symbolizing the strength, unity and heroism of the 
Czechoslovak legions, which Štefánik helped found.  The proposal was attacked by Slovak 
autonomists who protested that the gigantic lion dominated the composition and symbolized 
Czech colonialism over Slovakia.  By the time of the republic’s decennial on October 28, 
1938 when the controversial statue was to be ceremonially unveiled, Czechoslovakia no 
longer existed.   The newly established Slovak autonomist government swiftly ordered the 
Czechoslovak state symbol on the shield held by the lion to be replaced with a Slovak one.  
Two years later, following Hitler’s famous remark “Die katze musst gehen” (“That cat must 
go”) on his visit to Bratislava, the “Czech” lion was removed completely.  The lonely 
Stefanik’s statue survived in its place until 1952 when it was destroyed by the communist 
regime as a relic of the corrupt bourgeois interwar system.122   
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Krekovic, E. Mannová and E. Krekovicová. Bratislava, Historický ústav SAV, Ústav etnológie SAV, 
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Milan Rastislav Štefánik - vojak a diplomat.  Zborník z vedeckej konferencie v Bratislave 4.-5. mája 
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Picture 12: The fate of Bohumil Kafka’s Stefanik monument illustrates the ups and downs in the 
Czecho-slovak relationship.  The monument, featuring a 7.5 meter high statue of Stefanik and a 3.5 
meter statue of lion standing on a 27 meter pillar and holding the Czechoslovak state emblem, was 
commissioned by the Czechoslovak government on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of CSR’s 
establishment in 1928.  Following the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in the fall of 1938, the 
Czechoslovak emblem was replaced with a Slovak double cross.  The “Czech” lion was removed by 
the Slovak government in 1940 and Stefanik’s statue was destroyed by the communists in 1952.  In 
1988 on the occasion of the republic’s 70th birthday, the restored original statue of the Czechoslovak 
lion was unveiled in Bratislava as a Monument of Czecho-Slovak reciprocity.  In 2009, on the 90th 
anniversary of Stefanik’s tragic death, Stefanik and the lion were reunited again in front of the newly 
built Slovak National Theatre after nearly seventy years of separation.  Source: TASR/AP archive 
SME- 4/5/2009 Sochu Štefánika uvidíme. Ale až o rok.
 
In order to legitimize the new state, however, drawing on recent history was not 
enough.  The founders needed to show that their creation had a much longer pedigree.  To 
demonstrate the longevity of the Czecho-Slovak union, Czechoslovakia’s founders thus 
reached to the historically distant and murky period of the 9th century Great Moravian State 
and, just like Charles IV and the 19th century national awakeners had done before them, 
appropriated the Great Moravian heritage for their own purposes.  In the so called 




signatories spoke of “the right to be linked with [their] Slovak brothers in Slovakia”, which, 
supposedly, “once was part of [their] national state [and] was later torn off f om the body of 
[their] nation”.  Historically, of course, the claim was nonsense and the founders must have 
known that.  At the time of the ninth century Great Moravian State, as stated in the preceding 
chapter, Slovaks as an independent ethnic group did not yet exist and what it meant o “be 
Czech” was far from clear.  Nevertheless, the myth of Great Moravia being the first common 
state of Czechs and Slovaks took root and became one of the key pillars of Czechoslovakia’s 
official historical narrative during the interwar years.   
The Cyrillo-Methodius tradition took back seat to the Great Moravian myth.  
Although the two Slavonic missionaries invited to Great Moravia by the Moravian Duke 
Rastislav in 863 received a special date in the calendar of the new stat (officially entitled 
“July 5, Day of Slavonic missionaries, Cyril and Methodius, founders of the Slavic script”), 
the date as well as the tradition were contested.  Part of the controversy stemmed from the 
fact that, historically, Cyrilo-Methodius tradition had been celebrated only in Moravia and 
Slovakia and was relatively unknown in the Bohemian part of the republic.123  In addition, the 
choice of July 5 as the date on which the Cyrilo-Methodius tradition was to be 
commemorated was problematic also because, traditionally, the holiday was associated with 
February 14, the date of Constantine’s death in Rome in 869, not July 5.   
Controversial as they were, neither the foundational myth of October 28, nor the 
newly reinterpreted Cyrilo-Methodius and Great Moravian myths, generated nearly as much 
anger and protests as did the official state promotion of Jan Hus, the 15th c ntury Czech 
priest, advocate of the vernacular in religious practice and an unwavering critic of the 
medieval Church.  Although the memory of Jan Hus had been commemorated by Czech 
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nationalists since the mid-nineteenth century, establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918 gave 
the Czechs an opportunity to celebrate their national hero with official pomp, which they did.  
July 6, the date of Hus’ execution at Constance in 1415, was included in the new holiday law 
of 1925 as one of Czechoslovakia’s four official memorial days and its annual 
commemorations were among the most festive commemorative events in the year.124   
President Masaryk himself was a vocal promoter of the Hus myth, seeing in Hus a 
moral example for the nation, embodiment of the quintessential meaning of the Czech (now 
Czechoslovak) history, symbol of truth, freedom of conscience and defender of th  
vernacular, as he expressed already in his 1895 The Czech Question.125  As did Masaryk, 
other Czechoslovak leaders also felt equally strongly that the new state needed a potent 
national symbol that would convey stability and tradition but at the same time emphasize 
Czechoslovakia’s break from Austro-Hungary.  And Hus fit the bill perfectly.  Charles IV, 
despite his great contributions to the development of Bohemia, was a Holy Roman Emperor – 
thus a problematic symbol for the new state.  Invoking Charles IV’s legacy would suggest 
that Bohemian lands were merely part of an empire rather than a state in i s own right.  Saint 
Vaclav – another popular figure from the Czech history whose holiday the Czechs 
traditionally celebrated on October 28 – was unfortunately also known for neg tiating with 
the neighboring Germanic kingdoms, presenting a somewhat ambiguous legacy for the new 
state.  Hus, the steadfast promoter of the Czech language, defender of truth and national 
                                                
124 The other three holidays included in the 1925 legislation under the rubric of “memorial days” were 
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martyr, however, provided a highly resonant national symbol that was unambiguously distinct 
and opposed to the German culture.126   
Official promotion of a Protestant martyr in a “nation” in which Roman Catholics 
comprised more than three-fourths of the population was bound to generate discord, however, 
and the Czechoslovak leaders were well aware of the fact.  In fact, the controversial decision 
to shift the date of the Cyrilo-Methodius holiday from its traditional date in February to July 
5 was an attempt by the Czechoslovak legislators to find a compromise and calm down 
protests of those Czech and Slovak Catholics who considered Hus to be a heretic and saw in 
the government’s promotion of the July 6 holiday an open promotion of a Protestant state 
identity.  By devoting another official memorial day in the same week to a religious symbol 
that was acceptable to the Catholic Church, Czechoslovak leaders were hoping to extend an 
olive branch to the country’s Catholics and diffuse their objections against the official 
promotion of Hus.   
The controversy reached its highest point in July 1925, when, following a state-
sponsored commemoration of the 510th anniversary of Hus’s immolation, the Vatican 
withdrew its official representative to Prague in protest and ceased ll contacts with the 
Czechoslovak leadership.  Although the Czechoslovak representatives tried to assure the 
papacy that the Czechoslovak people celebrated Hus for his national, not for his religious 
contributions, the Vatican insisted that Hus was a heretic and his official promotion by 
Czechoslovakia’s government was an insult to the Catholic Church.  The international 
discord between the Vatican and Czechoslovakia continued till 1928 when the two sides 
finally agreed that the Catholic Church would accept the designation of Hus’ anniversary as a 
                                                
126 Paces, C. (2001). Religious Heroes for a Secular State: Commemorating Jan Hus and Saint 
Wenceslas in 1920s Czechoslovakia. Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg 





national holiday and the Czechoslovak government in turn would abstain from extending 
official patronage to Jan Hus commemorations.  Still, sour taste remain d.127   
In addition to reigniting deep-seated religious friction in the Czechoslovak society, 
the Hus controversy had national undertones, as well.  The July 6 holiday was fiercely 
attacked by ethnic Germans to whom, in the words of one parliamentarian member of the 
German Socialist party, celebrating Hus as an anti-clericalist might have been fully 
acceptable, celebrating Hus-the Czech nationalist however was not and would never be.  
Strong objections came also, quite predictably, from the Slovak side wherethe Hussite period 
was tainted by memories of devastation and poverty that accompanied the medieval Hussite 
raids into Slovakia and thus could hardly evoke feelings of national pride and xhilaration.  
Moreover, in an atmosphere of rising disenchantment with the way Czechoslovakism was 
implemented in practice, Hlinka’s Ludak party used the Hus controversy as yet nother 
convenient illustration of the government’s anti-Catholic and anti-Slovak rientation.   And 
even though the more secular Czech politicians tried to diffuse Slovak objecti ns by 
emphasizing that they celebrated Hus as a symbol of truth and justice, rather than a religious 
martyr or an exclusively national hero, none of this was sufficient to ease the growing sense 
on the Slovak side that Slovaks were relegated to the role of second fiddle in the new state 
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and that the character of the Czechoslovak identity that was being constru ted was in fact 
largely, if not exclusively, Czech.128   
 
 
Picture 13: Jan Hus monument in Prague's Old Town Square 
Historical photo from the mid-1920s featuring the Jan Hus monument built by Ladislav Šaloun in 
1915.  The monument which was the focal point of the 1925 Hus commemorations depicts Hus 
standing on a granite base with an inscription “Love the truth and wish it to everyone.”  Behind Hus, 
on the right side, there stand six Hussite warriors and an inscription below quotes the Hussite religious 
hymn: “Who are the Soldiers of God and of His Law”.  On the left, there is a group of exiles and in the 
back is a group symbolizing the Czech national revival with an inscription “Live the nation blessed in 
God do not die.”  Another inscription on the side of the monument comes from Jan Amos Comenius 
and reads:  “I believe that self rule will return to you, oh the Czech nation.”  Source: Společnost pro 
obnovu mariánského sloupu v Praze.   
 
In an attempt to show respect for the country’s Catholic population and make up, at 
least partially, for the fury caused by the government’s promotion of Hus, the Czechoslovak 
leaders thought it important to dedicate one official memorial day to a Catholic hero.  St. 
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Vaclav, the patron saint and protector of Bohemia who instituted Christianity n the 
Bohemian crown lands and whose tradition represented the longest continually maintained 
tradition in Bohemia was a natural choice.  Moreover, Vaclav’s multifaceted persona made it 
possible for vastly different constituencies to adopt St. Vaclav legacy as their own.  The 
Catholics could celebrate St. Vaclav for his deep religiosity, the progressives, led by 
Masaryk, used the St. Vaclav myth to demonstrate the long duration of Czech politi al 
leadership in the region.  Vaclav’s reputation of a just, peaceful and compassionate leader fit 
also quite nicely with Czechoslovakia’s self-proclaimed liberal democratic character.  Just as 
importantly, in contrast to other popular Catholic saints, such as Jan Nepomuk or even the 
Virgin Mary, St. Vaclav did not conflict with the tradition of Jan Hus.  In fact, the 
progressives were able to combine St Vaclav’s status as a national martyr with the martyrdom 
of Hus to create a powerful myth of the Czech’s suffering on the road to sovereignty.129    
Not even Vaclav’s legacy was problem-free, however.  Especially troublesome was 
Vaclav’s politics of negotiating with the Germans which, in a state which derived its 
legitimacy from being opposed to Austria, presented considerable concerns.  The Czech 
nationalists were especially worried that invoking Vaclav might suggest that compromise had 
been possible with Austria in 1918 – a fact that would put in question not only the 
inevitability of Czechoslovakia’s establishment in 1918 but also the founders’ contributions.  
Mentions of Vaclav’s relations with the Germans were thus carefully avoided in the official 
celebrations of Vaclav’s life and his contributions to the Czech statehood.130  Despite the 
governments’ efforts, however, the rift between Czechoslovak Catholics and their Protestant-
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oriented government was healed only partially and disputes over a perceived one-si edness 
with respect to the religious issue remained a constant theme that continued to paralyze the 
Czechoslovak regime for the entire interwar period. 
To summarize, despite the rhetoric of Czecho-Slovak fraternity which permeated the 
official language of the First Republic, the national narrative constructed by 
Czechoslovakia’s founders was Czechoslovak only in name.  In substance, it was distinctly 
Czech and highly reminiscent of the historical interpretations of Palacky and his 19th century 
contemporaries.  It rested on four key pillars - the foundational myth of Octber 28 
accompanied by a widespread although benign personality cult of Masaryk and Stefanik, he 
Great Moravian and Cyrilo-Methodius tradition and a somewhat uneasy mix of the Czech 
Protestant and Catholic heritage expressed in the Jan Hus and St. Vaclav’s tradition.  
Needless to say, such Czech-centered national discourse spoke neither to the historical 
experience of Slovaks nor to the experiences of the other national groups that comprised the 
Czechoslovak state.  And so, even though interwar Czechoslovakia – unlike many of its 
neighbors at the time – went to some lengths to guarantee minority protection o i s ational 
minorities and made sincere attempts to diffuse Czechoslovakia’s religious tensions, the one-
sided Czech-centric language and imagery that the Czechoslovak Founding fathers invented 
for their new state could not but alienate many of Czechoslovakia’s diverse ethnic and 
religious groups.   
From the perspective of Slovaks, who, for over thousand years, had been an integral 
part of the Hungarian state, the achievements of the Premyslid medieval kingdom or 
memories of the Hussite wars evoked few feelings of belonging or national ide tification.   
The Hungarian King Stephen was probably more relevant to the Slovak national experience 
than was Jan Hus or St. Vaclav.  As for Czechoslovakia’s Germans and Hungarians, they 
were afforded no place in the Czechoslovak identity as it was newly define. U derstandably, 




Great Depression which further magnified the economic grievances that existed throughout 
much of the interwar period and it comes as no great surprise that the national grievances 
which had been accumulating in interwar Czechoslovakia for some time found their 
expression in the radicalization of the Slovak and German nationalist parties in he late 1930s.  
 
Intermezzo: World War II  
Much like Czechoslovakia’s establishment in 1918, its demise in 1938 was caused by 
developments largely beyond the Czechs’ and Slovaks’ immediate control.  Without going 
into great details of the story of Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment following the Munich 
conference in September 1938, a brief recapitulation of the events is i place – especially 
since these events left deep marks on the Czech and Slovak national psyche and significantly 
influenced Czechoslovakia’s post-war geopolitical and symbolic reorientation oward the 
east, which will be discussed in the next chapter.   
The road to Munich began in mid September 1938 when Adolf Hitler at a meeting 
with Neville Chamberlain in Berchtesgaden first raised his demands on the Czechoslovak 
territory.  Few days later, the Czechoslovak government was presented with an ultimatum by 
its British and French allies– either it accepts Hitler’s demands and surrenders all of its 
German majority districts to Germany or it will stand alone and be solely responsible for the 
outbreak of a war.  Under great pressure, the Czechoslovak leadership headed by Pr sident 
Benes complied.  On September 29, another meeting took place, this time in Munich, at 
which Hitler increased his demands, insisting on total evacuation of Czechoslovakia’s 
German majority districts and Czechoslovakia’s acceptance of Polish and Hungarian 
territorial claims.  Czechoslovakia was not invited to the talks and its western allies, France 
and Britain, once again, chose the path of appeasement.  Abandoned by its allies, the 




territory with close to five million inhabitants, 1.25 million of whom were Czechs and 
Slovaks.131   
Yet Hitler’s ambition did not stop there.  On March 13, 1939, aware of the growing 
tensions between Slovak autonomists and the Czech-dominated Czechoslovak government, 
Hitler summoned the Slovak autonomist leader, Jozef Tiso, to Berlin.132  There, Tiso was 
presented with a choice – either Slovakia proclaims independence and requests Germany’s 
protection or the country will be left to Hungary’s mercies.  Slovak autonomists did not 
conceal their desire for an eventual independence from the Czechs.  In fact, on October 6, 
1938, taking advantage of the weakened position of the Czechoslovak leadership after the 
Munich conference, they proclaimed Slovak autonomy the result of which was that Czecho-
Slovakia (the new official spelling of the name of the country) became a loose federation with 
strong confederative elements.  However, with the exception of the radical wing of Hlinka’s 
Slovak People’s Party HSLS represented by Alexander Mach and Vojtech Tuka, the majority 
of the party, including Tiso himself, believed that Slovakia was not yet ready for full 
independence and were in favor of gradual loosening of ties with the Czechs.  It was also 
clear that independence guaranteed by Hitler would amount to no more than a puppet 
existence.  Tiso’s report of Hitler’s offer was thus greeted with mixed feelings in the Slovak 
Parliament.  Nevertheless, there were not many choices left and so, on March 14, 1939, 
without much enthusiasm or fanfare, the Slovak Parliament proclaimed Slovakia’s 
independence.  The following day the German army occupied the rest of Bohemia and 
Moravia and annexed it within the German Reich as the so-called Protectora  B hmen und 
Mahren. 
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The issue of the proclamation of Slovak independence in March 1939 continues to 
divide audiences.  While some claim that the Slovak government represented by Tiso did not 
want independence and moved to create the Slovak state only due to pressures from Berlin, 
respectively due to fears of Hungarian occupation, others maintain that the demise of interwar 
Czechoslovakia was caused by Slovak betrayal.  Neither view represents an adequate 
description of the situation and the choices that were available at the time.  Threats of 
Hungarian occupation with which Hitler operated during his talks with Tiso were unreal; 
Germany had no interest in facilitating the emergence of a strong Hungary on its eastern 
border.  Moreover, the autonomists did not conceal their desire for an eventual independence.  
They just did not want it right away.  At the same time, however, Tiso’s refusal of Hitler’s 
demands would not have changed anything in the final outcome.  The fact was that 
disintegration of Czechoslovakia was in Hitler’s interest and if Tiso had not accepted Hitler’s 
offer, Hitler would have found another willing Slovak politician to accomplish h aims.  
Arguments that the proclamation of Slovak independence on March 14, 1939 represented a 
knife in the back of the Czechs, therefore, does not stand either.133    
Between 1939 and 1945, the paths of Czechs and Slovaks diverged.  The Protectorate 
became an integral part of the Greater German Reich and the Czechs were relegated to a 
lower status of Protectorate citizens.134  Although the Protectorate retained its own 
administration, police, gendarmerie and a tiny ceremonial army, the Reich controlled its 
foreign affairs, defense, customs, monetary policy and communications and the Reic  
Protector had the power to abrogate any of the Protectorate’s government decisions.  The 
harshest treatment, however, was undoubtedly reserved for the Protectorate’s Jewish 
population which was placed outside the law, gradually stripped of all civic and human rights 
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and eventually deported to concentration camps.135  Between October 1941, when the Jewish 
deportations started, and May 7, 1945, when the Red Army finally liberated the concentration 
camp in Terezin, approximately seventy thousand Bohemian and Moravian Jews were 
deported to Nazi extermination camps (about 50,000 to Terezin and another 20,000 to other 
camps).136     
Still, in comparison to many other European countries, the Protectorate did not suffer 
as much in terms of material and human losses (excepting the tragedy of the Protectorate’s 
Jews).  Prague and other Czech cities were relatively unscathed by bombing.  Most historians 
also tend to agree that the actual war losses the Czechs suffered were lower than what they 
definitely would have been had Czechoslovakia fought in September 1938 after the Munich 
verdict came in or in March 1939 when Slovakia was offered independence by Hitler.  The 
economic measures introduced by the Germans were also milder in the Protectorate than in 
most other nations due to Germany’s strategy of trying to win the recalcitrant Bohemian and 
Moravian workers over by offering them economic and material concessions.  Food and 
clothing rationing, for instance, was introduced later in the Protectorate th n in the Reich.137   
Nonetheless, as Derek Sayer notes, there was enough cruelty and humiliation to sear 
new names and dates into the Czech collective memory.  One such date was November 17, 
1939.  The name associated with it was that of Jan Opletal – a medical student who was shot 
and mortally injured when the police broke up a demonstration on October 28, 1939, the 
Czechoslovak Independence Day.  Opletal’s burial on November 15 spurred a wave of anti-
German student demonstrations throughout Prague.  German retaliation two days later, on 
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November 17, was brutal and thorough, including the closure of ten Czech universities, 
execution of nine arbitrarily chosen ringleaders, imprisonment of over eighte n hundred and 
deportation to German concentration camps of over one thousand students and faculty 
members.  After the war, November 17 became internationally recognized as the 
International Day of Students.  Fifty years later, on November 17, 1989, police suppresion of 
a peaceful student demonstration in Prague would mark the beginning of Czechoslovakia’s 
Velvet Revolution and the end of the country’s forty-year-long communist rule.138   
Another date, painfully seared into the Czech collective memory, was June 10, 1942, 
the day when the entire village of Lidice near Prague was slaughtered in an act of vicious 
German retaliation for the assassination of Reichsprotector Reinhard Heydrich by two 
Britain-based Czech parachutists on May 27, 1942.  All 192 male and 196 female residents of 
the village were shot dead, 105 children were deported to concentration camps or stationed in 
German families.  A similar fate befell another small village of Lezaky two weeks later. 139  
These events (along with others) would be carefully (and selectively) cultivated by the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party KSC after the war as will be discussed in the next chapter.   
As in most other German occupied countries, reactions to German repression in the 
Protectorate varied.  On one end of the spectrum were those who openly resisted the Nazi 
rule, including organized resistance groups such as the Central Committee of Home 
Resistance UVOD, recognized by and linked to Benes’s exile government in London, or the 
Communists linked to the Moscow center led by Klement Gottwald.140   There were also 
several high profile Czech politicians such as General Alois Elias, executed by the Nazis in 
1942 after his contacts with the resistance underground were revealed, for instance, who 
defied the Germans and maintained links with the domestic resistance.  On the other nd of 
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the resistance-collaboration spectrum were some genuine quislings including the Protectorate 
President Emil Hacha or Minister Moravec, who were previously supporters of Benes.  As in 
most other occupied countries, the majority of the population was in the gray zone between 
their circumstances and their preferences and resorted to passive resi tanc  and symbolic 
protests.141   
Importantly, for many Czechs during the war, national history and culture became the 
source of strength and perseverance.  Although seemingly minor, this form of sybolic 
resistance was highly significant – especially since the purge of symbols of Czech identity 
and culture formed an important part of the German cultural policy in the Prot ctorate.  To 
many Czechs, Palacky’s statement about Czech history being the historyof a struggle with 
the Germans was brutally confirmed by the experience of Munich and horrors of the war.  
The old 19th century myths and stereotypes of Germans as the oppressors, the Czechs as an 
exposed Slavic peninsula, Russians as liberators were revived.142  After the war, these same 
images would provide an emotionally powerful symbolic material out of which the post-war 
Czechoslovak identity would be constructed.  The same images would also be used to 
legitimize the forced expulsion of ethnic Germans from the Czech lands in 1945 and the 
communist takeover in February 1948.   
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Picture 14: Protectorate stamps. Nazis imposed themselves on signs, postage stamps, route maps, 
official documents, etc. 
  
In contrast to Hitler-occupied Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia officially enjoyed 
formal sovereignty.  Officially, the regime proclaimed itself to be a “w rtime authoritative 
democracy”.143  In reality, the political regime of the wartime Slovak state was 
unambiguously totalitarian in character, bearing strong fascist elements.  Fascization of the 
Slovak regime had begun already in 1938 when HSLS, having eliminated its political 
opponents, abolished freedom of speech, freedom of the press and other political righ s, and 
effectively established itself as a totalitarian party, ruling by decree.144  Gradually, the party 
took control not only of the administrative apparatus of the state but of the entire public life.  
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Emulating the Italian and the Austrian model, Slovakia’s constitution, adopted on July 21, 
1939, was clerical, corporate and authoritarian.  President Tiso combined the functions of the 
head of the state, the head of the government, head of HSLS and commander in chief of the 
armed forces; his title of the “Leader” was made official and mandatory in 1942 and 
unconditional obedience was required not only to Tiso himself but also to the totalitarian 
regime which he established and led.145  HSLS also created institutions such as the Bureau of 
Propaganda, a paramilitary party organization called Hlinka’s Guard as well as a network of 
concentration and labor camps for detaining its political opponents.146   
Despite Slovakia’s formal sovereignty, the regime’s military and economic policies 
were fully subordinated to Nazi Germany.  Two days after the proclamation of the Slovak 
independence by the Slovak Diet, president Tiso was forced to sign a speci l “Treaty of 
Protection” with Germany which subordinated the Slovak army and foreign policy t the
Reich.  In September 1939, Slovakia became the only state to join Nazi Germany in its attack 
on Poland.  Less than two years later, in June 1941, the Slovak army began its operations on 
the Eastern front against the so called “judeo-bolshevik threat.”  Both of these conflicts, 
officially presented as acts of heroism and proof of Slovakia’s loyalty to Germany, were 
highly unpopular among Slovak soldiers who saw no reason to fight their fellow Slavic
neighbors.   
Claims that wartime Slovakia represented some kind of an “island of peace and 
prosperity” or “Switzerland of Central Europe”, which were systematically enforced by the 
Slovak state propaganda machinery during the war and repeated by the exiled regime’s 
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members and supporters after the war’s end, are also unfounded.  Although the economy of 
the Slovak state did indeed benefit from wartime conjecture which helped alleviate the dire 
economic and social situation the country had been suffering from for years, Slovakia’s 
actual economic and fiscal sovereignty was in reality severely curtailed.  A secret protocol 
about economic and financial cooperation between Slovakia and the Reich fully subordinated 
Slovakia’s economic policy to Nazi Germany, fixing the exchange rate between the two 
countries’ currencies to an unfavorable 10:1 ratio while the real valueof th  Slovak crown 
relative to the German mark was 5:1.147  Eventually, Germany’s wartime debt to the Slovak 
Republic reached close to eleven milliard crowns, not counting the 280 million crowns paid 
by Slovakia to Nazi Germany as the so-called “settlement fee” for the Slovak Jews who were 
deported to the Nazi concentration camps.148   
 The greatest stain on the shield of the wartime Slovak regime, undoubtedly, was the 
regime’s active participation in the Holocaust.  Disregarding its own constitution, 
international law as well as sharp criticism both at home and abroad, the regim  l d a brutal 
ideological campaign against its eighty nine thousand Jewish citizens.  The Jewish Codex of 
September 10 1941 introduced a Nazi racial definition of Jew and provided the l gal 
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foundation for transportation of the Slovak Jewish population.  Hundreds of anti-Jewish la s 
and regulations followed.  Jews were proclaimed the enemies of the state and he nation, 
stripped of all political, economic, social, civic, and eventually also human rights and 
proclaimed responsible for all of the past and present wrongs perpetrated against the Slovak 
nation, including the outbreak of the Second World War.  Between March 25, 1942 and 
October 20, 1942, Tiso’s regime deported almost two thirds or 58,000 of Slovak Jews to Nazi
concentration camps.149  Slovakia was in fact the only state in Europe not occupied by Nazi 
Germany to conduct deportations of its Jewish citizens using its own administrative means, 
even paying the Germans five hundred Reichsmarks for each deported Slovak Jew for th  so-
called “resettlement costs”.  The deportations were stopped only under repeated protests from 
theVatican and others after which the Slovak government began interning its Jewish citizens 
in relatively more humane work camps.  Only the second wave of deportations after 
Slovakia’s occupation by Germany between 1944 and 1945 was carried out by the German 
military and police.  It involved about 13,000 people.  Altogether, by concealment, 
exemptions, escape abroad, only about one third of Slovak Jews managed to survive the end 
of the war.150     
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Slovak attitudes toward the wartime Slovak state were divided.  There were those 
(especially Protestants, former Agrarians and left-leaning individuals) who considered the 
breakup of Czechoslovakia a loss of their state and remained critical of the new state and its 
regime.  Part of this group soon began to form civic resistance groups seeking th  overthrow 
of the Ludak regime and reinstatement of Czechoslovakia (although, it should be noted that 
their vision of postwar Czechoslovakia was not exactly identical with the form 
Czechoslovakia had before the war).  There were also those for whom the wartime state, 
despite its satellite character, evoked feelings of national pride, confidence, as well as a sense 
of relative safety from the war atrocities.151  Though they may have had reservations 
regarding the state’s ideology, they generally identified with the statand its leadership.  And 
then there were also genuine quislings, who supported and fully identified not only with the 
new state but also with the deadly ideology it professed.  The majority of the population, 
however, most likely came to more or less accept the new regime as a “lesser evil”, despite its 
many flaws.152  (Post-war, communist, depictions of mass popular resistance against the 
Slovak wartime regime therefore need to be taken with a grain of salt.)   
Gradually, as the war progressed and the regime’s undemocratic character nd blatant 
disregard for civic and human rights, especially the treatment of Slovak Jews, was revealed, 
however, Tiso’s regime began to lose its legitimacy.  By 1943, it became clear that policies 
and actions of the regime effectively burned Slovakia’s chances of surviving the end of the 
war and entering the new post-war European order as an independent state.  As he regime 
fell into a deep crisis, the opposition comprising the former Slovak Agrarians (called the 
                                                                                                                                          
demokraciou a slovenským štátom v stredoeurópskom kontexte. Prešov, Universum, Nižnanský, E. 
(2000). "Deportácie Židov zo Slovenska v novembri 1938." OS 4.   
151 War atrocities did not reach Slovakia until the summer of 1944. 
152 Objective evaluation of the wartime Slovak regime is xtremely difficult.  On the issue, see Lipták, 
L. (1965). Politický režim na Slovensku v rokoch 1939-1945. Slovenské národné povstanie roku 1944. 





Civic Bloc and later the Democratic Party, represented by Jan Ursiny, Jozef Lettrich and 
Matej Josko) together with the Communists (Gustav Husak, Ladislav Novomestsky and 
Karol Smidke) formed a resistance organization called the Slovak National Council 
(Slovenska Narodna Rada, SNR) and with the help of democratically oriented officers in the 




Picture 15: Slovak crown from 1944, depicting Slovak President Jozef Tiso with the inscription.  







The Slovak national uprising (Slovenske Narodne Povstanie, SNP) began on August 
29, 1944.  Lacking in coordination, heavy weapons, and external help it was defeated by the 
approaching German Army on October 27, 1944, only two months after its outbreak.153  The 
role of the uprising has been one of the most divisive and controversial topics in re ent 
Slovak history, dividing audiences from its very beginning.  While sympathizers of the 
wartime Slovak State argue that the uprising took many Slovak lives, effctively ended even 
the limited autonomy that Tiso’s state had enjoyed and led to the country’s occupation by the 
German Army (until then Slovakia was relatively spared from the war atrocities), others see 
the uprising as one of the most significant positive chapters in recent Slovak history.  From 
the military point of view, they emphasize the significance of the Slovak resistance army 
which created and for two months maintained a continuous military front, disrupted German 
delivery of supplies and held up part of German military units, causing the German side 
significant material and human losses.  Politically, the uprising helped restore the country’s 
democratic credentials, previously damaged by the policies of Tiso’s regime.  This in turn 
enabled SNR to be recognized by the USSR, USA and Great Britain as a legitimate 
representative of the Slovak Nation and a member of the anti-Hitler coalition and 
strengthened the Slovak position in negotiations with the Czech side about Slovakia’s future 
status in postwar Czechoslovakia.  Over time, interpretations of the uprising and its role have 
undergone significant modifications.  The postwar communist regime appropriated, used and 
greatly abused the memory of SNP, modifying its narrative according to swings in its own 
ideological line.  After the collapse of communism, SNP reemerged again s one of the most 
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legiend. Bratislava, Obzor.  See also: Precan, V., Ed. (1965). Slovenské národné povstanie.  
Dokumenty. Bratislava, Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, Jablonický, J. (1994). Glosy o 
historiografii SNP: Zneužívanie a falšovanie dejín SNP. Bratislava, NVK International, Takác, L., Ed. 
(1994). SNP v pamäti národa. Materiály z vedeckej konferencie k 50. výrociu SNP. Bratislava, 
international, Halaj, D. a. and D. Tóth, Eds. (1996). Nezodpovedané otázky. K spochybnovaniu odboja 
a SNP v našich národných dejinách. Materiály zo seminára s medzinárodnou úcastou Banská Bystrica, 




controversial topics of the public debate.  We will return to these debates in chapters five and 
six.154   
WWII ended in Slovakia on April 4, 1945 when the Red Army entered the country’s 
capital of Bratislava.  Prague was not liberated until May 9, one day after the official German 
surrender in Berlin.  The Prague uprising of May 5-8, 1945 was the last significant fighting of 
WWII; it claimed the lives of 1,691 Czechs and 436 Soviet soldiers.155  After the war, 
President Tiso, President Hacha, the surviving members of the Czech and Slovak wartime 
governments and several leading German officials were tried in a national court in restored 
Czechoslovakia.  President Tiso was executed on April 18, 1947, after requests for his 
clemency were denied by President Benes.  Emil Hacha, the Protectorate President, died in a 
prison hospital on June 27, 1945.   
All in all, the Second World War claimed more than 380,000 Czech and Slovak lives 
(3.7 percent of Czechoslovakia’s prewar population).  Although these loses pale in
comparison to countries like Poland which lost some 6 million residents (about 1/5 of its pre-
war population), Yugoslavia with over 1.5 million dead (over 10 percent of its prewar 
population), not to mention the 20 million Soviet lives that were lost in the war (about 10 
percent of USSR’s huge 200 million population), there was nonetheless enough suffering and 
humiliation to sear new unhappy memories into the collective psyche of Czechs and Slovaks 
and turn the political barometer in the country significantly to the left.  
                                                
154 Negotiations about the post-war arrangement of Czechoslovakia between the representatives of 
SNR and Benes’ government in exile took place in Moscow between March 22-29 1945.  Their 
outcome was a success for the Slovak side.  Essentially, all Slovak demands were met – 
Czechoslovakia was to become a very loose federation.  The only areas which fell exclusively under 
the federal jurisdiction were foreign affairs, defens  and foreign trade and even in these areas, Slovakia 
was to have appropriate influence.  The compromise was then included in the government program 
which was announced on April 5 in Kosice which was to erve as the foundation of a new, post-war, 
Czechoslovakia.  Kamenec, I. (2005). Slovenská republika 1939-1945 a jej mýty. Mýty naše 
Slovenské. E. Krekovic, E. Mannová and E. Krekovicová. Bratislava, Historický ústav SAV, Ústav 
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After the war, these memories provided a convenient justification for an extremely 
radical solution to Czechoslovakia’s longstanding minority problem.  By a series of 
governmental decrees, collectively referred to as “Benes Decrees”, approximately three 
million of Czechoslovakia’s ethnic Germans and 89,000 ethnic Hungarians were tripp d of 
their Czechoslovak citizenship and expelled from the country on the grounds of their alleged 
wartime collaboration with the Nazis after the war.  Their lands a property were 
confiscated by the state.  All German institutions of higher education were dissolved and the 
newly evacuated border regions were resettled by Czechs and Slovaks.156  In Slovakia, a 
strategy of a voluntary population exchange (rather than a straightforward expulsion) was 
used, resulting in the removal of about 89,000 ethnic Hungarian citizens.157  All in all, 
between 1930 and 1950, the percentage of ethnic Germans in the Czech lands dropped from 
29. percent to a mere 1.8 percent.  The Hungarian population in Slovakia fell from 17.6 
percent to 10.3 percent.158   
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vycíslení. Praha., Kopecek, M. and M. Kunštát (2003). "Sudeton mecká otázka v ceské akademické 
debate po roce 1989." Soudobé dejiny x(3): 293-318., Deak, I., J. T. Gross, et al., Eds. (2000). The 
Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath, Princeton University Press. 
157 According to an agreement between the Czechoslovak and the Hungarian government, the 
Czechoslovak government could remove as many ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia as was the 
number of ethnic Slovaks living in Hungary who wished to voluntarily return to Slovakia.  (The 
Czechoslovak government determined who was to leave the country).  In total, about 89,000 
Hungarians were exchanged for about 7,000 Slovaks.  See Renner, H. and I. Samson (1993). Dejiny 
Cesko-slovenska po roku 1945. Bratislava, Slovak Academic Press: 15-16. 




Czechoslovakia’s ethnic makeup was changed beyond recognition.  To use Ernst 
Gellner’s eloquent characterization, what once looked like a painting by Oskar Kokoshka 
now looked like a picture by Amedeo Modigliani.159  What the awakeners and the Czech and 
Slovak interwar elites had done in the symbolic sense was now accomplished in practice.  
The Germans, the Hungarians, the Jews, in short “the others” were removed not only from 
the national script but, finally, also from the physical body of the “nation”.   Traumas of Bila 
Hora and hundreds of years of “darkness”, humiliation and injustice the Czechs and the 
Slovaks had suffered under their historical oppressors had finally been redr ss d.  Stripped of 
its ethnic and social complexities, Czechoslovakia became a very different place than what it 
once was.  And its fresh memories of the horrors of the war were added to the martyrdom of 
Hus and memories such as those of Bila Hora to provide a powerful symbolic material out of 




                                                




Chapter 4: Constructing the Czechoslovak Nation – Act Two: 
Under the Red Star 
 
Communism, above all, was a promise – a promise of humanism, 
universalism, equality and justice, of a new perfect civilization free of class divisions.  
As such, the central temporal category on which the communist project was built was 
the future.  It was in the name of the flawless communist future that all actions taken 
in the present and in the past were validated.  At the same time, however, it was only 
through the past that the proletariat’s progress toward the communist utopia could be 
“scientifically” demonstrated and the inevitability of communism’s coming proven 
beyond any doubt, regardless of the dire present circumstances.160  This is why 
control of history was such a central concern in East Central European communist 
regimes.  Czechoslovakia was no exception.   
Similar to Orwell’s “Ministry of Truth”, the Czechoslovak communist regime 
claimed for itself an exclusive insight into the past, the present and the future and, 
using its sophisticated propaganda machinery – history texts, holidays, elaborate 
public commemorative rituals, museums, research institutes, literature and film etc. – 
worked to maintain its aura of infallibility by periodically purging and revising the 
content of the nation’s past.  Organized forgetting was the cultural counterpart of 
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communist purges.  In communist Czechoslovakia as elsewhere throughout the 
communist bloc, the past was purged to erase political alternatives, affirm the Par y’s
monopoly on truth, and maintain power.  This was much more than simply a matter 
of tilting to the left the mirror through which history was refracted.  The key feature 
that distinguishes the use of the past by the Czechoslovak communist regime from, 
for instance, the interwar republic discussed in the preceding chapter is that no 
alternative “mirrors” were permissible under communism.  Having full control over 
libraries, historical institutes, history departments, archives, printing presses, 
newspapers and publishing houses, the Party was able to exert control over the past 
with a magnitude, forcefulness, institutionalization and totality never seen before.  
The Party’s interpretation of the past became the only correct, the only permissible, in 
fact the only possible, one.  
A Story and a Photograph 
Milan Kundera’s Book of Laughter and Forgetting offers a telling glimpse of 
the communist practice of purging and rewriting history.  The story Kundera tells is 
of a photograph taken in February 1948 when the communists seized power in 
Czechoslovakia.  Pictured in the photograph is the newly elected Czechoslovak 
communist leader Klement Gottwald delivering his famous balcony address to 
thousands of Czechs and Slovaks gathered in central Prague.  Standing on the balcony 
next to Gottwald’s right was a fellow high-ranking communist named Vladimír 
Clementis who, in the middle of Gottwald’s speech, removed his fur hat and placed it 
on the bareheaded Gottwald to protect him from the snow and the freezing 




convicted of a national Zionist conspiracy and treason and hung, his image was 
removed from all photos.  Clementis’ hat on Gottwald's head was the only trace of 
Clementis’ existence that remained.  Clementis was removed from history wi h an 
airbrush and soon, people could no longer remember he even existed.  All that 
remained was a hat.  “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory 
against forgetting” writes Kundera.161  
 
 
Picture 16: The case of a missing comrade.  Pictured in the first photo is Klement Gottwald delivering 
his February 1948 balcony address.  Standing to the left of Gottwald is Vladimir Clementis.  Few years 
later, Clementis became victim of the 1950s Stalinist-style show trials.  The photograph was then 
edited and the figure of Clementis erased. 
 
The Czechoslovak communist rule can be roughly divided into three main 
phases: the years of the Stalinist terror (late 1940s-early 1950s), delayed de-
Stalinization (1960s-1968), and Normalization (1969-1989).  Each phase is replete 
with its unique silences and “white spots” similar to the Clementis story describ d in 
                                                




Kundera’s novel.162  As much as the mentions, the silences were an integral part of 
the communist national narrative and formed the heart of the regime’s legitimization 
structure.   This chapter provides a brief (and unavoidably selective) account of the 
transformation over the forty-year-long Czechoslovak communist rule.  Contrary to 
the popular belief that nationalism was an idea alien to the communist ideology (and 
thus was supposedly temporarily frozen in East Central Europe, only to erupt with 
vengeance after 1989), the chapter shows that the Czechoslovak communist regime 
actively – and selectively – appropriated, used and periodically cleansed and revise  
elements of the Czech and Slovak national past to consolidate and maintain its power.  
Furthermore, in contradiction to extreme constructivist theories of national identity 
which suggest that elites are capable of inventing national identities practically at 
will, the chapter shows that the Czechoslovak communist regime, despite its 
reputation of being one of the most rigid, repressive, neo-Stalinist regimes in the 
region, was unable to achieve its goal of creating a “new socialist man” and 
inculcating in him a new version of the past.  Instead, decades of communist 
massaging and erasing of history helped create a highly cynical, historically 
disoriented and distrustful population – a population highly vulnerable, as it soon 
became clear, to the temptations of various new “fantasies of salvation”163 which 
emerged after the communist experiment collapsed in 1989, the topic to be discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
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The Communist Rise to Power 
Despite the widespread recent tendency throughout the former Eastern bloc – 
the Czech republic and Slovakia included - to try to exorcise the communist period 
from the popular memory as some kind of an alien, externally imposed idea, 
communism was not only and exclusively externally imposed regime.  As Bradley 
Abrams persuasively argues in his recent book, there were internal, domestic, reaons 
that brought Communists to power in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in East Central 
Europe after the war.  In fact, the spectacular forty-fold increase in the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party membership between May 1945 and March 1946 took place in the 
absence of the Red Army on the Czechoslovak territory. 164   The enormous postwar 
popularity of Czechoslovak communists was also confirmed in the 1946 
parliamentary elections in which KSC obtained 38% of the total vote, becoming the 
strongest party and the leading force in the new National Assembly. 165   
A look at some other countries in the region tells very much the same story.  
The Hungarian CP grew from a mere 3,000 in December 1944 to 300,000 by August 
1945 to twice as many by 1946.  The Romanian Communist Party experienced a 
similarly phenomenal growth from a mere 1,000 members during the war to almost 
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165 In the Czech lands, KSC obtained just over forty percent of the popular vote, becoming the 
strongest party, followed by National Socialists (23.6%), People’s Party (just over 20%) and the Social 
Democrats (15.5%).  In Slovakia, the Slovak Communist Party (KSS) gained just over thirty per cent 
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800,000 by October 1945.   Even in a traditionally strongly anti-communist Poland, 
the communists were able to increase their numbers from less than 30,000 in early 
1944 to 235,000 by the end of 1945 and more than 550,000 the following year.166  In 
short, the political barometer in the whole region (in fact, on the entire continent) was 
tilted to the left and the recent horrors of WWII as well as the fact that the region had 
been just liberated by the Soviet Red Army were without doubt some of the key 
factors responsible for this unprecedented shift.167   
In addition, in the Czechoslovak case, the still fresh memory of having been 
betrayed by the West in Munich in 1938 played a powerful role in re-orienting the 
country’s postwar foreign policy toward Moscow.  From the perspective of the 
Czechoslovak postwar leadership and especially President Benes, geographical 
proximity between Germany and Czechoslovakia (and hence the threat of potential 
future German aggression) could not be eliminated by a simple act of signing 
expulsion decrees.  A close and permanent alliance with the USSR seemed like the 
best, if not the only, option available.  Besides, there was a genuine and widespread 
desire for reform.  As Abrams demonstrates, virtually all recognized Cchoslovak 
post-war parties (with the exception of the Catholic People’s Party which maintained 
a reserved attitude) paid at least lip service to socialist ideas and the nation’s pro-
Slavic/pro-Soviet orientation.  All parties were in support of wide-scale 
nationalization, all were in favor of the expulsion of ethnic Germans, all lauded land 
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reform.  In short, the belief in the need for reform was strong, as was the deep 
dissatisfaction and disappointment with the failures and unfulfilled promises of the 
interwar “bourgeois” system.168 
In addition to the overall leftward shift in the political mood, however, it was 
in no small measure KSC’s clever tactics of presenting itself as a patriotic and 
moderate political force, committed to a calm, peaceful, gradual, parliament ry road 
to socialism, which helped convince 38 per cent of Czechs and Slovaks to vote 
communist in the 1946 elections.  Frequent assurances that the Czechoslovak road to 
socialism would be “our own, special, longer, slower, more complicated and more 
winding …, [that it would] not necessarily lead through the soviets and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat” 169  were key in winning sympathies of the majority of 
Czechs and Slovaks who were opposed to radical Bolshevik measures that had been 
implemented in the USSR.   
The events leading to the communist takeover on February 25, 1948 have 
been well documented.170  Without dwelling on the details, it suffices to say that after 
the 1946 elections, the Communists, under the pretext of fighting the Nazis and their 
wartime collaborators, gradually eliminated their political rivals and secured for 
themselves the control of the National Front.171  In February 1948, KSČ provoked a 
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governmental crisis, during which twelve non-communist ministers handed in their 
resignations, hoping to be joined by their Social democratic colleagues – an 
expectation which as it turned out did not materialize.  Faced with lack of unity and 
resolve among the Czechoslovak non-communist parties on the one hand and well-
organized communist demonstrations (and a prospect of a civil war leading to a 
potential Soviet intervention) on the other, president Benes, alone and seriously ill at 
the time, decided to accept the resignations and authorize the communist leader 
Klement Gottwald to form a new government.  With Gottwald’s appointment, the 
communist road to power and the country’s full integration into the Soviet bloc was 
completed – seemingly legally, according to constitution and with mass popular 
support.172   
 
Stalinist Terror of the Late 1940s / 1950s 
In the Czechoslovak history, the late 1940s and 1950s represent the period of 
consolidation of the communist power and full Stalinization of the Party and its 
tactics.  In accordance with the Stalinist strategy of the time, terror mployed by KSC 
                                                                                                                                          
parliamentary representatives, party organizations and the press.  Each party represented in the NF (the 
Social Democrats, the National Socialists, the People’s Party, the Slovak Democrats and the 
Communists) had three members in the National Front g vernment but since the KSS and KSC were 
counted as separate parties, communists controlled six portfolios.  Since the Communists held a 
numerical advantage in the NF government and since the acceptance of the common program was a 
condition of admission, in effect no opposition was po sible. 
172 The February coup was marked by two important deaths.  On March 10 1948, less than two weeks 
after the communist coup, Jan Masaryk – the son of the irst Czechoslovak president Tomas Garrique 
Masaryk and the only remaining minister in Gottwald’s reorganized government not under communist 
influence – was found dead under his apartment window.  Circumstances of his death remain unclear 
to this day.  President Benes -  the other remaining link to the interwar republic – resigned from the
presidency in June and died on September 3 1948.  With the death of these two important figures 
inextricably linked to the history of the First Republic, the break with the interwar Czechoslovakia and
its legacy was complete. Agnew, H. (2004). The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown. 




was both random and targeted and included loss of employment, forced relocation, 
assignment to forced labor camps, uranium mines and other penitentiaries, show trials 
and executions.  Initially, the prime targets of communist repression were non-
communist party functionaries, intellectuals and officials of the old order.  
Particularly hard hit was the Roman Catholic Church, as well as entrepreneurs, 
farmers and small businessmen who formed the backbone of the interwar order.  
After the Stalin-Tito split in 1948, the Party terror spread to the Party’s own ranks.  
Some 273 top Party officials were tried between 1952 and 1954.  Although the exact 
figures of the total number of victims of the Stalinist purges in Czechoslovakia are 
impossible to trace, estimates place the number of those imprisoned at 230-240,000 
(about 80 percent of those refer to political prisoners).  Another 100,000 individuals 
were sent to forced labor camps.  All in all, it is estimated that between 187 and 280 
death sentences were carried out as a result of political trials under Gottwald between 
1948 and 1953.  This was a level of repression unmatched among Czechoslovakia’s 
Eastern bloc neighbors (with the exception of Stalin’s Soviet Union).  The number of 
those who died in prisons or labor camps ran into many thousands.173   
Though the use of terror and intimidation remained a feature of the regime 
throughout its existence, the regime’s brutality reached particularly staggering 
proportions during the first years following the February 1948 takeover.  One of the 
most publicized political show trials of the time focused on Milada Horáková, the 
popular Czechoslovak National Socialist Party politician, former member of thean i-
                                                
173 Renner, H. and I. Samson (1993). Dejiny Cesko-slovenska po roku 1945. Bratislava, Slovak 
Academic Press.  For more details and estimates see Hejl, V. and K. Kaplan (1986). Zpráva o 
organizovaném násilí. Toronto.  Also Kaplan, K. and D. a. Tomášek (1994). O cenzure v 




fascist underground and Terezin concentration camp survivor who was sentenced to 
death  for her alleged role as a leader of a supposed plot to overthrow the Communist 
regime.174  (Horáková’s memory would reemerge as a potent political symbol in the 
Czech public discussions after the fall of communism as will be seen in the next 
chapter).  In another major show trial of the era, the so-called “Slánský process“, 
named after the trials’ most senior victim, Secretary General of KSC Rudolf Slánský, 
fourteen top Communist leaders and bureaucrats (eleven of them Jews) were found 
guilty of participating in “a Trotskyite-Titoist-Zionist conspiracy in the service of 
American imperialism”.  Eleven of the convicted were executed; three were 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 175  Vladimír Clementis, the Czechoslovak Minister of 
Foreign Affairs who appears in Milan Kundera’s story cited at the beginning of the 
chapter, was among the executed.  
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Soviet Great Purges of the 1930s, was supervised by Soviet advisors and broadcast on the radio.  
Albert Einstein, Winston Churchill and Eleanor Roosevelt all pleaded in vain for Horáková’s life.  
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the Slánský trial, see Kaplan, K. (1990). Report on he Murder of the General Secretary. London, I. B. 
Tauris & Co.  The Slánský trial was dramatised in the 1970 film L'Aveu ("The Confession"), based on 
the namesake book by Artur London – one of the three survivors of the trial. 
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Margolius, one of the eleven men executed during the Slánský trial.  See:  Kovály, H. M. (1997). 
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In Slovakia, Stalinist purges were directed primarily against the so-called 
“bourgeois nationalists” – high ranking Slovak Communist participants of the Slovak 
national uprising who were found guilty of supposedly “betraying class interests” by 
collaborating with non-communist resistance during the war.  Among those expelled 
were Gustáv Husák, Ladislav Novomeský and Karol Šmidke.  All received long-term 
jail sentences (in Husák’s case the sentence was for life).176  Following his release 
from prison and rehabilitation, Husák came to play an important role in the 
Czechoslovak communist reform efforts in the late 1960s.  Ironically, following the 
Warsaw Pact intervention in August 1968, after Husak became the General Secretary 
of the Party and later also Czechoslovakia’s president, he became the chief destroyer 
of the very reform ideas he helped introduce, turning Czechoslovakia into one of the 
most rigid, ossified, neo-Stalinist regimes in the region. 
 
The Communist Practice of Organized Forgetting 
The post-1948 physical liquidation of enemies of socialism was supplemented 
by KSC’s wide-ranging cultural massacre and memory purge.  Approximately hlf of 
the entire state book holdings, in total about seven million books, were liquidated 
after February 1948.  Out of those books that survived the massacre, only three 
million were declared safe enough to be held by public libraries.  To fill the place of 
thus removed “unhealthy” literature, “ideologically safe” titles were published in 
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record numbers.  Between 1950 and 1954, two million copies of Klement Gottwald’s 
selected writings were published, together with three million copies of Lenin and 
almost four million copies of Stalin’s writings.177  Memory was purged not only (or 
simply) to eliminate political alternatives but also to enable a new re-construction of 
the nation’s past. 
The Silences 
Among the many silences and “white spots” in the post-1948 communist 
narrative, the period of interwar Czechoslovakia represented one of the most 
conspicuous omissions.  History of the interwar republic was either not recalled at all 
in the official communist historiography or, when it was recalled, it was reduced to 
the history of KSČ and its political and social struggles.  The establishment of 
Czechoslovakia in 1918 was described as a direct outcome of the November 1917 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia, whereas the Munich events of 1938 and 
Czechoslovakia’s demise in 1939 were blamed on the domestic bourgeoisie and its 
alleged “betrayal” of national interests.  Similarly skewed was the picture of the 
social reality of the interwar republic.  The complexity of the interwar social structure 
was reduced to a simplistic black and white caricature of the “bad bourgeoisie” ver us 
the “good proletariat”.  Completely obliterated was interwar Czechoslovakia’s vibrant 
and diverse middle class as well as the many formal and informal structures of 
everyday life which formed the basis of the Czechoslovak interwar democracy.178 
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Although October 28, 1918, the date of Czechoslovakia’s 
establishment,remained on the list of official state holidays, the Communists 
attempted to displace the memory of the First Republic in public imagination by 
attaching a series of new meanings to the date.  In 1951, the official title of h  
holiday was changed to “Nationalization Day” – to commemorate the nationalization 
decrees signed by president Beneš in 1945.179  The date also coincided with two other 
“milestones” of the communist-led Czechoslovak “national and democratic 
revolution”: the launch of the first Czechoslovak two-year plan in 1946 and the end of 
the expulsion of Sudeten Germans.  Both events were ritually recalled, and 
disproportionately glorified, by the communist propaganda to illustrate the 
accomplishments the country had achieved under its communist leadership and to 
outline the bright and joyous communist future it was marching toward.    
While the Communists never concealed their dislike of the interwar republic – 
after all, KSC remained in opposition throughout the entire twenty years of thefirst 
CSR’s existence – the memory of Czechoslovakia’s popular first president, Tomas
Garique Masaryk, was simply too emotionally powerful to be discarded.  Initially, 
KSČ tried to claim Masaryk’s mantle and integrate Masaryk’s legacy into its own 
narrative scheme.  In 1945, for instance, the Party press upheld Masaryk as “the most 
prominent defender of social progress, justice, and liberty”.180  In 1946, the 
Czechoslovak parliament, with the Communists’ wholehearted support, approved 
March 7, the date of Masaryk’s birthday, as one of Czechoslovakia’s official 
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memorial dates.181  Emphasizing Masaryk’s socialist credentials, KSC went to great 
lengths to highlight Masaryk’s conflict with the bourgeois establishment of the late 
Habsburg Empire, Masaryk’s quest for truth in the famous “Manuscript Controversy” 
and his anti-clericalism. This while at the same time brushing away as simply a mark 
of the times Masaryk’s open anti-Marxist position elaborated in his Social Question.  
Some Communist commentators even went as far as to claim that nationalization, 
expulsion of Germans and KSČ’s monopolization of the National Front government 
were measures Masaryk would wholeheartedly approved of.182   
KSČ’s glorification of Masaryk continued for a brief while even after the 
communist coup on February 28, 1948.  On the anniversary of Masaryk’s birthday 
that year, Zdenek Nejedlý, the Party’s chief ideologue and historian who went to 
become Czechoslovakia’s minister of education, sang praises to Masaryk: “Today’s 
republic is Masaryk’s state… If anyone claims that today’s People’s democratic 
regime is not Masaryk’s, it is an insult…  Long live Masaryk’s heritage!”183  Before 
long, however, the Party’s propaganda course took a 180 degree turn.  Masaryk’s 
humanist philosophy was discovered to be dangerous – a kind of Trojan horse, which 
could eventually corrupt the Marxist ideology itself.  The Party press therefore 
insisted on vigilance:  
“Our problem now is to wipe out completely from people’s minds the last 
remnants of Masaryk’s influence, because it confuses the people and retards 
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them on the way forward.  …The working man of this Republic, the patriot 
who loves his country and his own people, can have nothing in common with 
Masaryk.”184  
The centennial of Masaryk’s birth in 1950 was not recalled at all, nor did March 7, 
the date of Masaryk’s birthday, make it onto the new list of official holidays of the 
communist regime.  Throughout the entire communist period, Masaryk did not appear 
on a single stamp, banknote or coin, not even in the 1968 reform period when several 
previously obliterated figures were temporarily rehabilitated.185     
 Together with Masaryk, obliterated were also Beneš, Štefánik and other 
prominent politicians of interwar Czechoslovakia.  Beneš Square in Prague became 
the Square of the October Revolution, Štefánik Square became the Square of the 
Soviet Tank Crews.  In 1951, statues and busts of Masaryk, Beneš and other key 
interwar politicians were removed from the Pantheon of the National Museum.  
Similarly purged were also statues and references to President Woodrow Wilson – the 
symbol of the interwar republic’s attachment to the United States.186  For the next 37 
years, October 28 was commemorated without any mention of the country’s 
Founding Fathers.  It was only in 1988 (one year before the collapse of the 
communist regime), on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of 
Czechoslovakia’s establishment, the decaying communist regime finally conceded to 
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public pressure and changed the title of the October 28 holiday back to 
“Czechoslovak Independence Day” and made it, once again, a state holiday.   
In addition to the history of the First Republic and its leading figures, 
comprehensively screened and excised from public memory were also events related 
to Czechoslovakia’s most recent, postwar, past.  Completely erased for instance were 
all mentions of the once prominent but now nearly non-existent ethnic German 
population as well as the long history of the Czech-German co-existence in Bohemia.  
Erased was also the memory of Czechoslovakia’s Jewish population which perished 
in the Nazi concentration camps.  Expunged from public memory was also the period 
of the immediate postwar history, especially the forced postwar nationalization and 
collectivization as well as the political visions and programs of the Czechoslovak 
non-communist socialist parties187.  Similarly silenced, as one would expect, were 
references to the many show trials and executions that took place during the Gottwald 
era.  Last but not least, obliterated was the promise of the “unique Czechoslovak road 
to socialism”, the key platform on which KSC won the 1946 elections.  After the 
1948 split between Stalin and Tito, the concept became an official taboo.188 
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Side-by-side with the purge of history went active cultivation of the preferred 
version of it.  And while the censorship was largely invisible, the cultivation was a 
highly public matter, accompanied by organized public celebrations, mass gymnastic 
spectacles, parades, official speeches, and, of course, monument building.  In contrast
to the pre-1948 era when official commemoration was a reflection of civic activities, 
cultural climate and politics, official commemoration after February 1948 was fully 
controlled by the ideological commission of the Ministry of Culture and Education 
which spelled out those themes and events that were deemed desirable, appropriately 
“didactical” and thus worthy of commemoration.  The Ministry’s detailed directives 
were distributed to all schools and workplaces and compliance with them was closely 
monitored.189   
Unsurprisingly, on top of the list of “ideologically correct” themes were 
Czechoslovakia’s liberation by the Soviet Army and the Czech and Slovak antifascist 
resistance.  May 9, the date when the first Soviet Army troops entered Prague in 
1945, became Czechoslovakia’s most important official holiday, carrying the status of 
a “state holiday”.190  Along with three other new holidays – November 7 (the 
anniversary of the Great October Revolution in Russia), August 29 (the anniversary 
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of the beginning of the Slovak national uprising in 1945) and May 5 (the date 
commemorating the commencement of the Prague Uprising in May 1945), May 9 
was to symbolize the crucial importance of the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship and 
the gratitude that the Czechoslovak communist leadership and the Czechoslovak 
people felt toward the Soviet Union.  Had it not been for the Soviet Union, the official 
mantra emphasized, there would be no free Czechoslovakia.  In fact, there would be 
no Czechoslovakia at all since the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and the establishment of the First Czechoslovak republic in 1918 was made possible 
only thanks to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.  Interpretations from the interwar 
period which cited the U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s principle of national self-
determination as a key contributing factor responsible for Czechoslovakia’s 
establishment were proclaimed “bourgeois distortions”, fabrications to cover up the
“sell-out” of Czechoslovak resources to Western capitalist interests.  
In contrast to October 28, 1918 which, according to the communist press, 
symbolized the “betrayal of the nation’s revolutionary yearnings by bourgeois 
politicians”, especially president Masaryk and Edvard Benes, May 5 and May 9 
represented “true liberation” and the beginning of a “truly national democratic 
revolution” in Czechoslovakia:  
“With the liberation of our homeland from the fascist yoke a new historic era 
in the life of the Czech and Slovak nation began.  Thanks to the victory of the 
Soviet Union over fascism, the Czech and Slovak hundred year long struggle 
for national independence was forever won.  For the first time in their history, 




independent state, free from foreign imperialists… [and]…under the 
leadership of the KSČ…laid the foundations of socialism.”191   
The natural continuation of this heroic, “truly national”, “democratic” 
revolution was the expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s ethnic Germans, nationalization of 
private property and commencement of the first two-year plan.192  In order to 
compensate for a “small” historical inaccuracy in the communist narrative – 
specifically the fact that Prague had been liberated and almost empty of Germans for 
three days before the arrival of the Soviet Army,193 competitions were arranged and 
awards were given for the best amateur photographic record of the Red Army entry 
into Czechoslovakia, showing troops being greeted by an enthusiastic population.  
Journalistic contests were also organized, such as the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship 
League’s contest for the “best factual account” of the liberation by the Red Army.194   
The “heroic and mass-based” Czech and Slovak anti-fascist resistance 
symbolized by August 29, the date of the commencement of the Slovak national 
uprising in 1944,195 represented another major pillar of the communist legitimizing 
mythology.  That past, too, however, was highly selective and repeatedly revised.  
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The first noticeable revision came immediately after the February 1948 coup when 
non-communist participants of the Slovak national uprising were charged with 
collaboration with Beneš’ London-based bourgeois government and their role in the 
uprising was belittled.196  Later on, in the late 1940s, when the communist witch-hunt 
turned inward and bourgeois nationalism was discovered inside the Party itself, the 
narrative of the resistance changed again.  This time, Gustav Husak, Ladislav 
Novomesky and other prominent Slovak Communists, participants of the resistance, 
were proclaimed traitors and collaborators of the bourgeois London government with 
which they were supposedly working toward the restoration of the pre-Munich 
bourgeois order.  It was only thanks to KSČ’s Moscow-based leadership, the Party 
line explained, that the Party was able to fulfill its historic role and save the resistance 
from being hijacked by the bourgeois elements in the leadership of the KSS.197  Over 
the next several decades, the official narrative of the resistance changed several more 
times, always reflecting the current composition of the Party leadership, as will be 
discussed below.   
In addition to the recent past, KSC attempted to boost its legitimacy by 
appropriating and reinventing several periods of the Czech and Slovak earlier history.  
Among them, the Hussite period and the Great Moravian era received particular 
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attention, and a special place on the official communist calendar.  July 5 (Slavic 
missionaries Constantine and Methodius Day) and July 6 (Master Jan Hus holiday) 
retained their status of memorial days – as they had in the interwar period.  The 
content of both holidays changed dramatically, however.  The Hussite tradition in the 
communist rendition became thoroughly secularized and contemporized.  The 
Hussites were essentially turned into class warriors.  Emphasis was placed on the 
radical Taborite faction led by Zizka and the abolishment of private property th  
Taborites advocated.  On the other hand, the core of the Hussite movement – its 
religious dimension – was downplayed.  Stripped of their religious significance, the 
Hussites became KSC’s revolutionary precursors and the Communist Party becme 
the Hussites’ 20th century incarnation as the following excerpt from Zdenek Nejedly’s 
Communists- the heirs of the great revolutionary traditions of the Czech nation 
shows: 
 “We sincerely, wholeheartedly and truly acknowledge Hus and other Hussite 
revolutionary heroes.  And we would not mind at all if Zizka appeared among 
us today and with his mace – a bit primitive but certainly a very effective 
method – helped make order in the world as he had done 500 years ago”.198   
While annual commemorations of the anniversary of Jan Hus immolation on 
July 6, 1415 were to remind the nation of its great revolutionary traditions, July 5, the 
date of the arrival of the Byzantine missionaries Constantine and Methodius in Great 
Moravia in 863, was turned into a symbol of Czechoslovak “fraternity, solidarity and 
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cooperation with other Slavic countries and People’s democracies”.199  Much like the 
Czechoslovak founders (and the 19th century national awakeners before them), the 
communists presented the ninth century Moravian state as the first common state of
Czechs and Slovaks.  The choice was deliberate, reflecting on the one hand a desire to
compensate for the relative lack of historical linkages between Czechs and Slovaks 
prior to 1918 and on the other, gloss over the aberration that Slovakia presented from 
the point of view of the official communist script.  As has been mentioned previously, 
the celebrated Hussite tradition played only a marginal (and, many would argue, a 
largely negative) role in Slovakia and did not represent a useable past there, despite 
concerted efforts to emphasize its significance.  Even more problematic was 
Slovakia’s most recent fascist past which did not fit at all with the official 
interpretation of the war and the resistance.  The distant and easily moldable Great 
Moravian history, on the other hand, offered a convenient way to demonstrate the 
ancient Czecho-Slovak relationship while drawing attention away from some of its 
darker, less convenient sides.   
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Picture 17: Czechoslovak communist era banknotes.  Banknotes, much like national flags and pledges 
of allegiance, are examples of instruments of everyday “banal nationalism” described by Michael 
Billig. 200  Subconsciously, they work to imprint the official ideology in the hearts and minds of their 
audiences.   Depicted below is a sample of Czechoslovak communist era banknotes, depicting some of 
the key “pillars” of the official conception of the Czechoslovak history discussed in the text.  The 
twenty-five-crown banknote depicts the one-eyed, nearly blind, Taborite leader Jan Zizka and 
symbolizes the long revolutionary traditions of theCzech and Slovak people.  In the background one 
can notice examples of Hussite weaponry made of farm implements.  The fifty-crown note is 
dominated by a drawing of a partisan and a Soviet soldier, symbolizing the Czechoslovak-Soviet 
brotherhood and cooperation during the Slovak natiol uprising.  The hundred-crown note symbolizes 
the union of workers and peasants, depicting a woman with a bouquet of wheat ears, walking side-by-
side to a male factory worker.  Depicted in the background are factories with smoking chimneys, a 
symbol of socialist industrialization. 
 
  
                                                




1960s: From Delayed De-Stalinization to Czechoslovak Spring 
Compared to Hungary or Poland, critique of Stalinism emerged much more 
slowly and gradually in Czechoslovakia.  The change in the Czechoslovak communist 
leadership that took place after Klement Gottwald’s death on March 14, 1953 (exactly 
nine days after the death of Gottwald’s master, J.V. Stalin) did not bring any 
relaxation to Czechoslovakia.  Antonín Novotný, Gottwald’s successor as the 
Secretary General of KSC,201 was a man thoroughly implicated in the brutality of the 
Stalinist purges and abuses that took place under Gottwald in the early 1950s. Thus, 
unlike the Polish leader Gomulka or the Hungarian leader Janos Kadar, both of whom 
were victims of the Stalinist persecution in the 1950s, Novotný and his people had no 
interest in launching the process of de-Stalinization that Khrushchev urged in his 
1956 “Secret Speech”.  It was only after the launch of Khrushchev’s second de-
Stalinization campaign in October 1961, that Novotný‘s regime grudgingly and half-
heartedly accepted to acknowledge certain past excesses and offered a mild critique 
of Gottwald’s “cult of personality”.  In 1962, the embalmed Gottwald’s remains were 
removed from the Prague mausoleum and the gigantic Stalin monument erected in 
Prague in May 1955 to demonstrate Czechoslovakia’s unrelenting commitment to 
Stalinism was finally destroyed and removed, officially, due to structural problems.202 
Victims of the Gottwald era purges were quietly released, several top functionaries of 
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the Gottwald era were sacrificed as scapegoats and removed from their posts but 
Novotný’s position remained untouched.   
 
 
Picture 18: “To our Liberator – from the Czechoslovak people.”  Stalin’s memorial in Prague.  
Unveiled on May 1 1955, the mammoth, 15.5 meters high, 22 meters long and 17 ton heavy, Stalin’s 
monument in Prague symbolized the leading role of the Soviet Communist Party in the Czechoslovak 
march to socialism and a close friendship of the Soviet and Czechoslovak people.  It depicted Stalin, 
accompanied  on his left by representatives of the Soviet people (represented by a worker, a scientist, a 
Kolchoz worker and a Red Army member) and by representatives of the Czechoslovak people on his 
right (including a worker, a peasant, an innovator nd a soldier).  The monument which was mockingly 
referred to by Prague residents as “the line for meat” (referring to chronic shortages of food supplies in 
the stores) was eventually taken down with 800 kilograms of explosives after Khrushchev’s second 
public denunciation of Stalin’s cult of personality in November 1962 – officially, due to foundational 
problems.  The author of the monument, academic architect Otakar Švec committed a suicide shortly 
before the monument’s official unveiling in 1955. 
 
It was not until 1963 that conditions in Novotný’s Czechoslovakia began to 
finally thaw.  Paradoxically, by that time, Brezhnev who replaced Khrushchev as the
Secretary General of CPSU after Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964, already started a de-




regime came from the younger generation of communist intellectuals,203 who, joined 
by older communists from the 1920s and 1930s, began voicing their disillusionment 
and frustration with the slow progress of Destalinization, deep economic regress, 
bureaucratization and low workers’ morale.  In Slovakia, dissatisfaction with the 
heavy-handed centralism of Prague was one of the top grievances.204  By the Fall of 
1967, the dissatisfaction spread to the top Party ranks.  After protracted in-party 
struggles, Novotný was forced to resign from his post of the Party’s first secretary.  
He was replaced in January 1968 by a young and relatively unknown Slovak party 
apparatchik named Alexander Dubček.205  With Dubček‘s election, the Czechoslovak 
experiment to reform socialism known as the “Prague Spring” (or Czechoslovak 
Spring) began.  Although, the Party’s leading role remained unchallenged, Dubček’s 
regime committed itself to a number of reforms outlined in the Party’s “Action 
Program” of April 5, 1968.  They included political pluralization, revival of the 
National Front and the acceptance of debate within it, better legal guarantees of 
personal rights and freedoms, including the freedom of information, speech, 
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movement, travel abroad, guarantee of personal property, full rehabilitation of victims 
of communist purges of the 1950s and genuine federalization of the state.206   
 
The Czechoslovak Reform and the Role of Czech and Slovak Historiography  
The struggle against dogmatism in the 1960s also meant attempts to achieve a 
more balanced view of the Czechoslovak history.  Especially important in this respect 
was the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak historians (in Brno in September 1966) 
whose participants adopted a memorandum calling for a more professional and less 
ideological, historiography.  The demands raised at the Congress were couched in 
terms of a struggle for truth.  This was significant since these were deman s not just 
for revision of the history of the 1950s but for a change in the regime’s approach to 
all aspects of history.207   
Among the areas that received particular attention during the 1960s were the 
history of the interwar republic and the 1939-1945 period.  Rejecting the previous 
purely class-based explanations which assigned responsibility for the collapse of 
interwar Czechoslovakia to greedy domestic bourgeoisie pursuing its own class 
interests, a number of scholars began to highlight the role of objective, international 
factors that contributed to Czechoslovakia’s demise in 1939.  Authors also began to 
acknowledge some positive features of the interwar regime, for instance the fact that 
                                                
206 The issue of federalization was one of the most divisive areas of the Action Program.  Although 
both the Czech and the Slovak reformers agreed that the existing asymmetrical system needed to be 
replaced with a federal arrangement, the Czech side saw this as one issues among many and gave 
greater weight to democratization of the system.  Most Slovak reformers on the other hand placed 
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Czechoslovak leaders, unlike many of Czechoslovakia’s allies, did not compromise 
themselves by signing agreements with Hitler’s Nazi Germany.  Undermin d was 
also the long-standing communist thesis of a Soviet offer of unconditional support to 
Czechoslovakia in 1938.  It turned out that no archival documents were found to 
support such a claim.208  Topics of the Czechoslovak foreign resistance and 
Czechoslovak legions in World War I were also revisited.209 
With regard to the 1939-1945 period, interpretations of the Slovak National 
Uprising underwent a thorough revision.  Here, demands for historical 
reinterpretation went hand in hand with calls for a reckoning with the purges of the 
1950s and the continuing debate between Czechs and Slovaks about Slovak 
autonomy.  Alexander Dubcek together with the newly rehabilitated Gustav Husak 
and Ladislav Novomensky took a leading role in the public debates on pages of 
Kultúrny život, Historický časopis and other cultural and historical magazines.  The 
debate was joined by writers and commentators (including Vladimír Mináč, Roman 
Kaliský, Miroslav Kusý, all of whom would become important public voices in the 
post-1989 period) as well as a number of historians (Ľubomír Lipták, Jan Křen, Jozef 
Jablonický, Anna Štvrtecká, Jiří Graca, Miroslav Kropilák, Vilém Prečan, among 
others).210  Whereas until then, the Slovak national uprising had been depicted as 
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a communist affair directed from Moscow, the new perspectives which emerged 
during the reform months included calls for recognition that the uprising had been 
primarily a Slovak undertaking, directed not by Moscow or Moscow-based exiles but 
instead by Slovaks at home, especially the disaffected units of the Slovak Army.  The 
role of non-communist participants in the uprising was also acknowledged.  Further 
recognized was the fact that the Czech participation in the uprising was under the 
Slovak command, and that the goal of SNP was not a return to pre-Munich 
Czechoslovakia but a development of Slovak stateness under new conditions.211  
Inevitably, debates about the interpretation of the uprising touched upon 
a whole host of controversial questions and white spots related to the history of the 
Slovak wartime state and its leadership. While until then, Tiso and his state had been 
depicted as lacking in popularity and legitimacy among the wider Slovak public, in 
the relaxed atmosphere of the weeks and months preceding the Warsaw pact invasion, 
historians and commentators began to more openly research the period, 
acknowledging certain positive aspects of the wartime state, especially the increased 
sense of confidence and self-realization that Slovak independence wartime brought 
along.  Gustav Husak himself in his memoirs of the uprising for instance 
acknowledged that, despite its many negatives, the Slovak wartime state was at least
temporarily accepted by a large portion of the population.212  Less pleasant aspects 
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related to the period of the Slovak wartime state, including issues of Slovak 
collaboration with the Germans and the Slovak role in the deportation of the Slovak 
Jews began to be also discussed.213  
 
Picture 19: Transformation of Czechoslovak communist era banknotes.  The liberalization of the late 
1960s found its reflection on new Czechoslovak bank notes where ideologically driven motives of 
workers, partisans, pioneers and Soviet soldiers wee replaced by portraits of Czech and Slovak 
cultural figures, including the Slovak writer Pavel Országh Hviezdoslav (featured on the ten-crown 
note), the 17th century Bohemian educator and writer Jan Amos Comenius (twenty-crown note), the 
19th century Slovak national awakener Ľudovít Štúr (fifty-crown note) and the Czech composer 
Bedřich Smetana (one thousand-crown note).  (Special care w s given to ensuring that figures from 
both the Czech and the Slovak history were equally represented.)  Paradoxically, the last banknote in 
the series– the hundred crown note featuring Klement Gottwald issued in 1989 – marked a reversal 
back to orthodoxy.  It represented one of the last attempts by the decaying Czechoslovak communist 
regime to hold onto power.  By that time, however, the days of the communist regime were already 
counted. 
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Although the reformists headed by Dubcek went to some lengths to control 
and direct the process of liberalization in a way as not to provoke a Hungarian-style 
response from Moscow, the unprecedented public mobilization in the country could 
not but raise alarm in the Soviet leadership.  After months of private and public 
discussions between Prague and Moscow, Brezhnev concluded that the Czechoslovak 
reform movement had gone too far and decided to put a military stop to it.  On the 
night between August 20 and 21, 1968, armies of five Warsaw state countries, 
masqueraded as “fraternal assistance” to Czechoslovak leaders who had appealed to 
the USSR for help, entered Czechoslovakia.  The intervention was the largest military
action in Europe since World War II.  It involved over half a million soldiers, over 
6,300 tanks, 800 airplanes and approximately 2,000 artillery pieces and even special 
missile units.214  
The Czechoslovak response was quick and took the Soviets completely by 
surprise.  On August 22, the Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress in Vysočan , 
Prague categorically condemned the invasion, demanded withdrawal of the occupying 
armies and an immediate release of Dubček and his group who had been interned by 
the Soviets.  Anti-reformist leaders were removed from their seats and a new Ce tral 
Committee was elected.  The Congress also called for a “one hour general strike”, 
which was promptly carried out the next day.215  In the atmosphere of massive 
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national resistance, thousands of ordinary Czechs and Slovaks rose against the 
occupying forces, expressing support for Dubček’s group, ridiculing the occupiers 
and demanding their immediate withdrawal.216  Faced with such an unexpected turn 
of events, the Soviets had no choice but to begin negotiating with the imprisoned 
Czechoslovak leaders.  During the negotiations in which the Soviets held all the 
trumps, however, there was very little Dubček’s team could realistically accomplish.  
In the end, although the Czechoslovak leaders won some verbal concessions, the 
victory was clearly the Soviets’.   
The Moscow Protocol of August 26, 1968 established the basis for removing 
the reformers and launching a wide-ranging process of “normalization.”  The 
document annulled the Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, promised to re-
impose censorship, purge the Party and state offices of reformist elements and 
provide protection for the anti-reformist party leaders.  Most importantly, 
Czechoslovak leadership was forced to agree to a “temporary” stationing of 
approximately 80,000 Soviet soldiers on the Czechoslovak territory without 
                                                                                                                                          
with cooperation of a few Czechoslovak hardliners ld by Vasiľ Biľak and anticipated a smooth 
trouble-free process – a request for help from a group of leading Czechoslovak communists was to 
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a timetable of the troops’ withdrawal which de facto amounted to a permanent Soviet 
military presence in the country.  Although Dubček’s team temporarily returned to 
their posts, under military occupation and Soviet pressure, they were reduced to the 
role of passive observers of the gradual destruction of the reforms they had fought 
for.   
Public activism with sporadic anti-Soviet mass protests continued for another 
few months.  One of the greatest waves of mass protests erupted in January 1969 
when a student, named Jan Palach, set himself ablaze on Wenceslas Square in protest 
against the invasion. A month later another student, Jan Zajíc, burned himself to death 
in the same place, followed by several others.  Scattered demonstrations also took 
place on the anniversary of Czechoslovakia’s establishment on October 28 and the 
anniversary of The Great October Revolution on November 7.  The final crisis arose 
in March during the World Ice-Hockey Championships when the Czechoslovak team 
defeated the Soviets, sparking a wave of rejubilation and mass anti-Soviet 
demonstrations throughout the country.  Eventually, however, after months of gradual 
chopping off of the reforms, the public – disenchanted, demoralized, and feeling 
betrayed – resigned.   When in April 1969 Dubcek stepped down from the Presidium 
of the Central Committee, the public did not even put up a fight.  Official 
“normalization” of conditions in Czechoslovakia could begin.   
 
1970s: The Gray Years of Normalization  
The name intimately associated with the Czechoslovak normalization process 




called Husak in his Book of Laughter and Forgetting, Husak became the Party’s first 
man (paradoxically on Dubcek’s personal recommendation) after Dubcek’s 
resignation in April 1969.217  Assidously trying to court Moscow, Husak quickly 
moved to undo the reforms he supported only a few months earlier.  In a document 
entitled “Lessons from the Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the 
Thirteenth Congress of KSC”, KSC under Husak’s leadership fully adopted the 
Soviet version of the Czechoslovak events of 1968.  The Action Program was labeled 
“revisionist”, the situation in the country a “contra-revolution”, the main leaders of 
the Prague Spring “traitors”.  In line with the official Soviet interpretation, the 
document, which was distributed in large numbers throughout the country for 
compulsory study, also contained a passage about the Czechoslovak request for 
help.218  
 Normalization purges under Husak reached their peak between 1970 and 
1974.  Estimates show that membership of the party decreased by one-third during 
that period (although, as will be discussed below, the degree of persecution was 
milder in Slovakia).  Approximately 327,000 members of the party were expelled; 
another 150,000 left voluntarily.219  Additionally, in the twenty years following the 
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1968 invasion, over half a million people emigrated (in a country of only 15 
million)220. Especially hard hit were research, educational and cultural institutions.  
Five university departments were completely abolished; about nine hundred 
university professors (out of the total number of 3,500) lost their jobs.  The Academy 
of Sciences was thoroughly reorganized, five of its institutes were closed down and as 
many as 1,200 scholars were dismissed.  The purges reached all the way down to the 
level of secondary and elementary schools which lost one-fourth of their teachers.  
The Czechoslovak cultural sphere, vibrant and flourishing during the reform period. 
turned into a cultural cemetery.  Out of 299 writers gathered in the Czech section of 
the Union of Czechoslovak writers, 117 were proscribed.  All twenty-five cultural and 
literary journals were closed, strict censorship of film, theatre and music wa  
imposed.  Control over the media was tightened, 1,500 employees of the Prague-
based Czechoslovak Radio were removed.  Intellectual life became frozen.221 
In comparison with the show trials and persecutions of the Gottwald era, 
however, Husak’s normalization represented a form of “civilized violence”, or 
“Stalinism with a human face”, as Ernest Gellner once called it.222 The initial purges 
of 1970-74, combined with the omnipresent spying eye of the secret police were 
sufficient in instilling fear and distrust and subduing the already disenchanted, 
demoralized and apathetic population.  The regime, in short, did not have to resort to 
more drastic measures.  In addition, much like Kadar’s “compromise” in Hungary and 
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Gierek’s labor compromise in Poland, Husak’s regime used positive incentives to 
maintain order and “normality”.  Docility and obedience were rewarded with a 
reasonable standard of living, occupational opportunities and other material 
advantages the regime could offer due to its relatively good economic standing i  the 
early 1970s.223   
It should also be remembered that the Party itself was deeply transformed by 
the 1968 experience.  Neither the top leadership nor the regular members of the Party 
possessed (or even bothered to pretend to possess) anymore the former idealism and 
faith in socialism that inspired so many to join the Party in the 1940s through the 
1960s.  Although the party membership recovered from its low point of 1.2 million, 
boasting a record 1.7 million by 1988 (an equivalent of about 12 percent of the 
population), the rate of participation was at its lowest.224  The true believer had 
practically disappeared from the Party ranks.  He was replaced by a pragmatic Party 
apparatchik, periodically participating in ritualized manifestations of loyalty, whose 
only interest was the preservation of his advantages.225  As Slovak dissident Martin 
Simecka put it, the aim of the 1970s purges “was not creation of some new, 
ideologically right-minded membership”, their goal was “simply to turn the 
membership into what it used to be (prior to the 1960s reform months): an apolitical 
conglomerate of the most varied concealed denominations, united only by obedience 
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and a readiness to fulfill its role as a trustworthy receiver of instructions and 
directives.”226   
The Czech and the Slovak Normalization Experience 
Before discussing the role of historiography in Husak’s normalized 
Czechoslovakia, a brief note about differences between the Czech and the Slovak 
experience during the normalization is in order.  Using a now classic taxonomy by 
Linz and Stephan, the Czechoslovak communist regime during the 1970s and 1980s 
can be characterized as a case of a “frozen post-totalitarian” regime.  Unlike the 
communist regimes in Poland or Hungary, which by the mid-1980s had already 
transitioned to Linz and Stephan’s category of “mature post-totalitarian regimes”, the 
Czechoslovak communist regime resisted the slightest attempts at regimechange or 
liberalization to its very last day. 227  A closer look at the Czech and the Slovak 
society during those last two decades of communism however reveals a noticeable 
difference between the ways in which normalization proceeded in the two parts of the 
Czechoslovak joint state.  Whereas the number of those purged from the Party 
between January 1968 and October 1970 approached 31 percent in the Czech lands, 
the number of Slovaks expelled from the Party in the same period was only 16 
percent.228  Normalization in Slovakia was also gentler in terms of its repression 
tactics.  While the majority of the Czech reform activists from 1968 were purged 
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from the Party and usually had no other choice but to become manual laborers and 
stokers, Slovak reformers from 1968 were more often demoted from their 
professional fields, rather than purged.    
There are several reasons for the divergent course of normalization in the 
Czech lands and in Slovakia.  To a significant degree, the milder scope and degree of 
normalization repression in Slovakia was linked to the fact that intelligentsia, the 
primary target of the post-1968 purges, was considerably thinner in Slovakia and thus 
would be much harder to replace had the purges proceeded at the same pace as they 
did in the Czech lands.229  Moscow’s strategy of divide and conquer certainly played 
a role, as well.  As previously mentioned, political goals and orientations expressed 
by Czech and Slovak communist reformist elites during the Prague Spring were not 
entirely in sync and Moscow was well aware of that fact.  While the Slovak demands 
focused primarily on achieving a more equal status between the two parts of the 
republic through federalization, the Czech reformers envisioned a much deeper 
process of democratization.  By offering their blessings to Czechoslovakia’s 
federalization, which officially came into effect on January 1, 1969, and backing 
Gustav Husak (a Slovak communist) as the new head of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party, the Soviets managed to take care of two birds with one stone.  
They and their domestic puppets could now point out that the hopes and dreams of 
the Prague Spring have in fact been met.  And, even though federalization had 
minimum impact given the overall centralization of the state and its dependence on 
Moscow, by symbolically supporting the Slovaks at the expense of the Czechs, the 
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Soviets effectively put another wedge into the already fragile Czecho-Slovak 
relationship.   
All this had important consequences.  For one, different levels of repression 
applied in the Czech lands and in Slovakia produced slightly different attitudes 
toward the normalization regime in the two republics, with a somewhat more positive 
view of the regime in Slovakia.  They also generated different types and strategies of 
dissent.  The somewhat more lenient approach of the Czechoslovak communist 
leadership toward Slovakia meant that even in the depths of normalization, things 
could be published in Bratislava which could not be published in Prague.  On the 
other hand, however, since Slovaks still had something to lose, dissent in Slovakia 
proceeded much more quietly and cautiously than in Prague, operating as “islands of 
positive deviance” or the so called “gray zone”. 230 This included individuals who, 
unlike the dissidents of Charta 77, refrained from taking an open stance against the 
regime (due to obvious professional, family and other risks involved) but who 
nonetheless sympathized with the dissidents and, in their own individual ways, 
expressed their opposition or disloyalty to the regime indirectly.  They included 
sociologists, preservationists, environmentalists, Hungarian activists, members of the 
secret Church, etc.  While this segment of the dissent was less isolated from the rest 
of the society than were the official dissidents (who, though admired, were also often 
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resented by the general population for the image of moral superiority they carried), 
the fear of losing their privileges kept these various individuals and groups from 
uniting until  late 1980s.  
To summarize and push the discussion onto a more theoretical level, what the 
preceding discussion suggests is that Czechs and Slovaks lived under two slightly 
different regime types during the last two decades of the communist rule.  While the 
Czech regime resembled a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime type described by 
Herbert Kitschelt et al., the Slovak regime represented a mixture of bureaucratic-
authoritarianism with some consensual and paternalistic features.231  This divergence, 
though slight, is significant for the present discussion since it significantly influenced 
the types of post-communist elites and consequently the character and the process of 
coming to terms with communism and its legacies in the two countries after the 
collapse of the Iron curtain and breakup of Czechoslovakia – a topic I will return to in 
more detail in Chapter 5.    
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Normalized Historiography and the Emergence of Dissent 
The dramatic end of the 1960s reform movement in Czechoslovakia put a 
drastic end to all official attempts to reform Czechoslovak historiography nd 
produce a more balanced view of the nation’s recent past.  Under Husak’s leadership, 
history once again became the handmaiden of political and ideological indoctrination.  
The vast majority of historians who had been active during the Prague Spring were 
silenced and expelled from historical institutes, their works banned.  (Ironically, the 
ultra dogmatic communist historian Václav Král who had been Husák’s chief critic 
and enemy during the reform months was awarded professorship by Husák himself 
and became one of the regime’s most celebrated historians).  In the absence of 
continued public discussion, new historical interpretations generated during the short 
period of the Prague Spring were never institutionalized.232  Historical discussions 
after 1969 could continue only on pages of clandestinely distributed samizdat 
publications. 
On most of the issues that were discussed in the liberalized atmosphere of the 
1960s, the normalized official historiography retreated back to the dogmas and 
silences of the Stalinist years.  With regard to the history of interwar Czechoslovakia 
this meant a rehabilitation of the thesis about the crucial role of the Bolshevik 
revolution in the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918.233  The official narrative 
went back to the pre-1968 official line also with regard to interpretations of the 
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wartime history and resistance.234  Once again, the role of the non-communist 
resistance was belittled, its key figures, Jan Golian, Karol Smidke and otherswer  
pushed out from the official narrative, the role of KSS (and within it, the role of 
Husak) was exaggerated.  The uprising was painted, once again, as mass-based, 
involving the majority of Slovaks who “heroically stood up against the despised 
fascist regime of the Slovak state,” Czechoslovak in orientation, demonstrating the 
“cordiality and friendship” of the Czecho-Slovak relationship and unequivocally 
aimed at restoration of the common Czechoslovak state.  Naturally, the key role in the 
uprising was attributed to the Moscow leadership.235  In fact, so much official praise 
and credit was given to the role of the USSR in ending the war that on the thirtieth 
anniversary of the liberation in 1975, newspapers were ordered to replace the heading
“30th anniversary of the victory over fascism” with “30th anniversary of the 
liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army”.236  Topics related to the immediate 
postwar period, including the forceful expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s German and 
Hungarian minorities, were once again pushed into obscurity.  The official history of 
the reform period became thoroughly normalized and “whited out” as one would 
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expect.  Official silence was imposed on events surrounding the August intervention, 
the issue of the invitation letter, the Moscow Protocol and other developments “at the 
top”.  The official interpretation, canonized in the “Lessons”, labeled the reform 
period as “revisionist” and the situation in the country “a contra-revolution” which 
supposedly put the country on the brink of a civil war.237 
Not everybody succumbed to the officially imposed historical amnesia, 
however.  Some historians defied official censorship by publishing their work in 
small underground circles, teaching at flying universities or illegally gaining access to 
closed archives.238  Some others subverted the system by maintaining solidarity with 
their dismissed colleagues and organizing petitions and letters of protest.  A minority 
adopted methods of open resistance, refusing to follow the official line despite the 
personal and professional risks involved and the most stubborn researchers oriented 
their work specifically toward those periods and topics that were officially silenced.  
Among the staunchest critics of normalized historiography in Husak’s 
Czechoslovakia were historians Vilem Precan and Milan Otahal who in the fall of 
1968 compiled an illegal Black Book about the first week of the August invasion.  
They managed to distribute 2,900 copies before the book was withdrawn.  Both 
authors were subsequently dismissed and charged with subversion.   Precan then 
became the leading historian who documented the repression of the historical 
profession and a lead critic of normalization.  Since 1976, he lived in exile in West 
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Germany where he established an archive of samizdat manuscripts.  In Slovakia, 
Jozef Jablonicky had been constantly watched for more than fifteen years bec use of 
his samizdat publications on the history of SNP.  Even though his manuscripts and 
documents were confiscated by the police numerous times, he always stubbornly 
began his research again.239  Other historians who challenged the regime’s 
falsification of history included Milan Hubl, Jan Kren, Lubomir Liptak, among 
others. 
Samizdat activities of Czech and Slovak historians gained strength especially 
after the establishment of the Czechoslovak human rights movement Charta 77.  Led 
by dissident philosophers Jan Patocka, Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Benda, Charta 77 
reflected the strategy of self-limitation; a strategy that was at the heart of the Polish 
KOR and would be later employed by the Hungarians in their negotiations with the 
Kadar regime.  Describing itself as “a free informal, open community of people of 
different convictions, different faiths and different professions united by the will to 
strive individually and collectively, for the respect of civic and human rights in 
(Czechoslovakia) and throughout the world”, Charta’s strategy aimed at subverting 
the stale Czechoslovak post-totalitarian order by creating what Havel term d an 
“independent life of society”.  The bulk of Charta’s activities focused on publication 
of documents detailing specific violations of human rights and demanding that the 
regime respect its own constitution, laws and international agreements, including the 
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newly signed Helsinki accords of 1975 to which Charta was a direct response.240  
Equally important were Charta’s samizdat publications.241  
Vaclav Havel’s essay “The Power of the Powerless” remains the most lucid 
theorization of Charta’s philosophy and of dissent in East European communist 
regimes in general.  According to Havel, the Czechoslovak communist regime of the 
late 1970s fundamentally differed from its Stalinist predecessor in that it was based 
on appearances, on lies.  An individual living in Husak’s Czechoslovakia was no 
longer expected to believe in the communist ideology; all that was required of 
him/her was to behave as if he/she believed.  Ritualized manifestations of loyalty t  
the regime were part of a “loyalty game” between the regime and its subjects in 
which both sides knew it was just a game, a pretense.   
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Havel illustrates the demoralizing effect of this “loyalty game” using a 
parallel about a greengrocer who habitually places a sign “Workers of the world 
unite!” in his fruit-and-vegetable shop.  Though the greengrocer is indifferent to the 
ideological content of the message, he nonetheless continues to fulfill his end of the 
social bargain by obediently displaying the sign in his shop window.   In exchange for 
ritually legitimizing the system in this way, the greengrocer is left in peace by the 
regime.  Nevertheless, as Havel explains, it is precisely such tiny, seemingly 
innocent, and almost invisible compromises manifested in everyday language, social 
practices and behaviors which help perpetuate the post-totalitarian system.  By 
thoughtlessly participating in these everyday rituals of loyalty to a despised regime – 
by living a lie – ordinary people like the greengrocer “confirm the system, fulfill the 
system, make the system, are the system”.242 
Given that lie forms the backbone of the post-totalitarian order, Havel argues, 
“living in truth” becomes the most effective weapon against it.  Since the system 
requires unconditional obedience, every individual act of dissent, no matter how 
small, is meaningful because of its destabilizing quality.  It is here that the pow r of 
the powerless resides.  By stopping to display the sign in his shop window, by 
refusing to participate in the “loyalty game” required by the regime, the greengrocer 
liberates himself.  Additionally, his personal decision to “live in truth” serves as an 
example to others, marking the beginning of wider opposition, of a genuine civil 
society:  
                                                




“By breaking the rules of the game, (the greengrocer) has disrupted the game 
as such.  He has exposed it as a mere game.  He has shattered the world of 
appearances, the fundamental pillar of the system.  He has upset the power 
structure by tearing apart what holds it together.  He has demonstrated that 
living a lie is living a lie.  He has broken through the exalted façade of the 
system and exposed the real, base foundation of power.  He has said that the 
emperor is naked.  And because the emperor is in fact naked, something 
extremely dangerous has happened:  by his action, the greengrocer has 
addressed the world.  He has enabled everyone to peer behind the curtain.  He 
has shown everyone that it is possible to live within the truth.”243   
Though Charta defined itself as primarily a human rights organization, the 
right to independent history was central to Charta’s concept of “living in truth”.  In 
Husak’s normalized Czechoslovakia, Havel wrote, history was reduced to no more 
than an ideological ritual; just like statistics and elections, it too, had been falsified.  
“In our country, one has the impression that for some time there has been no history  
We begin to forget what happened when, what came earlier and what later, and the 
feeling that it really doesn’t matter overwhelms us.244  Under these conditions, Havel 
continued; to struggle against forgetting represented a revolt against the mechaniz d, 
unthinking, ritualistic existence demanded by the communist regime, or, as Slovak
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dissident Milan Simecka put it, it was a simple act of “self-preservation, a striving for 
human dignity”.245   
Some of the key historical topics discussed in the Czech samizdat in the late 
1970s and 1980s included such official taboos as was the expulsion of the Sudeten 
Germans by the Czechoslovak postwar government (the so-called Benes decre 
debate which continued for over a decade in the Czech samizdat and became one of 
the most controversial foreign policy issues in the Czech post-communist politics),246 
the rehabilitation of the Catholic historiography which had been looked down upon in 
Bohemia ever since the time of Palacky and the Czech national awakeners,247 or a 
debate about the cultural location of Czech identity, spurred by Milan Kundera’s 
samizdat essay  “The Tragedy of Central Europe” in the mid 1980s.248  In Slovakia, 
samizdat discussions on history, though less extensive than the Czech samizdat 
debates, due to a smaller number of Slovak dissident historians and dissidents in 
general, centered primarily on the Slovak wartime past, specifically the character of 
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the Slovak state and its leadership.  Especially sensitive was the debate about the r le 
of the Slovak wartime leadership in the deportation of the Slovak Jews.   The main 
protagonists of these debates were Slovak Catholic dissidents and members of the 
Secret Church who were in conversation with Slovak civic dissidents as well as some 
Slovak émigré historians.249    
It should be noted that many of the participants in these debates were not 
professional historians and so from the professional point of view, their writings were 
sometimes no less flawed than the official myths they were criticizing.  Nevertheless, 
as Chad Bryant has perceptively argued, the real value in these debates about history 
was not so much the final product as it was the act of independent writing and 
speaking in a society where official and self-imposed censorship were the norm.250  
By speaking and writing about historical themes which were officially proscribed, 
Czech and Slovak dissidents were in fact expanding little islands of human freedom, 
autonomy and solidarity and rehabilitating values such as truth, dignity and dialogue 
in a society that was based (and depended) precisely on the negation of these 
values.251      
Even though Charta 77 and the initiatives it spawned never reached the mass-
base of the Polish Solidarity and to the very end remained an affair of intellectuals, 
who were isolated not only from the general public but often from each other, the role 
of the dissent and civil society more generally in contributing to the peaceful collapse 
of communism in 1989 cannot be denied.  For when the Annus Mirabilis did finally 
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arrive in Czechoslovakia in November 1989, it was the dissidents who acted quickly, 
enabled the mobilization of the society and used the momentum generated to press for 
the end of the communist system.  And it was the ideas of “truth”, “solidarity”, 
“love”, “non-violence” and “dialogue”,  which had been circulating in the dissident 






Chapter 5:  Constructing the Czech and Slovak Nations.  Post-
communist Politics of the Past in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics 
 
With the fall of communism in 1989, the past, the present and the future were 
re-opened again and a new phase of national imagining began.  Moreover, in the case 
of Czechoslovakia, the peaceful, or “velvet”, overthrow of communism in November 
1989 was soon followed by a peaceful dissolution of the country into two 
independent states which  added yet another – national – dimension to the already 
complicated task of shedding the difficult communist legacy.  This chapter maps the 
discourses of memory that have accompanied the Czech and the Slovak transition 
from communism.  The key argument of the chapter and the dissertation as a whole is 
that, instead of a spontaneous “unfreezing” or “return” of some  previously repressed 
or tabooed memories, the so-called post-communist “return of the past” represents 
simply a new, or better yet, the most recent, phase in the long and convoluted process 
of composing and re-composing Czech and Slovak histories and identities – of 
searching for useable pasts and arranging them into narratives meant to offer a sense 
of meaning and belonging to their listeners.   
What sets this most recent, post-communist, phase of national imagination 
apart from the past ones are communism’s enduring legacies which continue to shape 
the character and the content of East Central European societies.  These legacies
include for instance the many silences, taboos, deformations and white spots in 
national histories which require critical reckoning and re-evaluation before we can 




form of popular and elite attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, in short, the so called “habits 
of the heart” to use the term of Alexis de Tocqueville.252     
After a brief overview of the main actors and political cleavages that emerged 
in the Czech and Slovak republics after the collapse of communism and the 
subsequent dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the chapter zeroes in on the Czech and 
Slovak post-communist discourses of memory.  I demonstrate that the two sets of 
discourses have developed in noticeably different ways and attribute this difference to 
two main factors.  The first factor is the difference between the communist reg me 
types that were in place in the Czech republic and Slovakia toward the end of the 
communist rule.  As discussed, the Czechoslovak communist regime as a whole 
represented a case of bureaucratic-authoritarianism.  In Slovakia, however, a mixture
of bureaucratic-authoritarian and national accommodative strategies was used during 
Gustav Husak’s normalization.  As a result Slovakia experienced a relatively higher 
economic growth and a somewhat milder degree of normalization repression than did 
the Czech republic.  This, in turn, translated into relatively more forgiving attitudes 
toward the communist regime in Slovakia.  After the collapse of Czechoslovak 
communism in November 1989, the two different normalization experiences 
produced two different types of post-communist elites and consequently two different 
sets of political and economic strategies and priorities in the Czech republic and 
Slovakia, foreshadowing the breakup of the state.    
The second major factor accounting for the different character of the Czech 
and Slovak post-communist symbolic politics, I will argue, is not a legacy of 
                                                




communism but rather a legacy of the first Czechoslovak republic.  Specifically, ts 
failure to produce a national narrative that would facilitate the emergence of a 
common Czecho-Slovak identity.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the national identity 
constructed by Czechoslovakia’s founders was distinctly Czech and soon came to be 
opposed by Slovak autonomists.  The Czech lack of sensitivity toward Slovak calls 
for a more equal status in the Czechoslovak interwar state made it difficult for part of 
the Slovak political elite to identify fully with the new Czechoslovak state and its 
identity.  From that point on, the Czech and Slovak paths began to move parallel to 
each other, rather than together.   
In the post-independence context, this meant that while the Czech sense of 
identity was not significantly altered by the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the 
Slovaks were faced with an acute need for a new set of founding myths to justify their 
new statehood.  From the perspective of the Czech political elites, their starting point 
after the Czechoslovak split was also significantly simplified by the fact th t the 
Czech republic became a practically homogenous state and thus was not confronted 
by an internal need to redefine its identity.  For the first time in history, the Czechs 
were the only occupants in their “house”.  The Czech post-communist discourse has 
reflected this vacuum.  Devoid of grand debates about the meaning of Czech history 
and identity which had occupied the imagination of Czech cultural elites since the 
19th century, the Czech post-communist symbolic battles have been largely 
ahistorical, focused on the relative role of morality vs. pragmatism in politics, a 
conflict exemplified by the Vaclav Havel vs. Vaclav Klaus debate.  By contrast, he 




discovering that they were left in it with their eternal Hungarian “other”, adopted a 
more ethnic, 19th century like, style of identity politics.   
 
Who is speaking?  Key socio-political cleavages and actors in the Czech republic and 
Slovakia after 1989  
From Velvet Revolution to Velvet Divorce 
I begin my analysis of the Czech and Slovak postcommunist/post-
independence symbolic transformations by looking at the transformation of the field 
of political power.  Transitional scholars typically emphasize links between the mode 
in which former authoritarian countries exit from authoritarianism and their post-
authoritarian trajectories.253  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Czechoslovak 
communist regime roughly approximated Herbert Kitchelt’s ideal type category of 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.254  High institutionalization combined with 
ideological rigidity – the regime’s two key characteristics – meant that the regime 
was highly effective in silencing potential opposition but was utterly unable to adjust 
to the changing mood in the society and the international environment.  This, in the 
end, proved to be the regime’s Achilles heel.   
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When, on November 17 1989, police repression of a peaceful student 
demonstration in Prague on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the martyrdom 
of Jan Opletal (a Czech student murdered by the Nazis in 1939) galvanized the up 
until then passive masses and set in motion what came to be known as the 
Czechoslovak anticommunist “Velvet revolution”, the ossified Czechoslovak 
communist leadership was caught completely off guard.  Unable to swiftly react and 
adapt to the rapidly changing mood in the country (and acutely aware that, unlike in 
August 1968, “friendly help” from Moscow and other Warsaw Pact countries would 
not come forward this time), the regime practically collapsed – astonishingly fast and 
without putting up a fight.   
Political analysts have produced a number of terms to describe this 
unprecedented and unexpected turn of events.  Kitschelt talks of implosion, Linz and 
Stephan have suggested the term collapse.255  Using a slight hyperbole, Timothy 
Garton Ash has summarized the spectacular events that accompanied 
Czechoslovakia’s anti-communist revolution in one sentence: “In Poland it took ten 
years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks: perhaps in Czechoslovakia 
it will take ten days!”.256  As we now know, Timothy Garton Ash’s prediction was 
only very slightly off.  By the end of December 1989, Husak and his entourage were 
out of job, the Party’s “leading role” was scratched out from the Czechoslovak 
Constitution, Vaclav Havel, the rebel playwright and the articulator of the dissident 
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philosophy of living in truth, was sitting in the Prague Castle as Czechoslovakia’s 
new president, while Alexander Dubcek, the symbol of the 1968 Prague Spring, was 
elected chairman of the Federal Assembly.  The communist government was replaced 
by a new “government of national reconciliation” and democratic elections – fir t 
after 44 years – were scheduled to take place in June.  From the perspective of only a 
few months back, nothing could be more extraordinary that this.   
Once the initial revolutionary euphoria subsided and revolutionary posters 
disappeared from the streets, however, ideological differences within the opposition, 
previously muted by common opposition to Husak’s communist regime, gradually 
began to come to surface.  Both the Civic Forum (Obcanske Forum or OF) in the 
Czech republic and the Public Against Violence (Verejnost proti nasiliu, VPN) in 
Slovakia – the two diverse umbrella movements which emerged during the revolution 
and comprised the dissidents, liberals, conservatives, nationalists, students, artists, 
former ‘68 reform communists, technocrats and people from the gray zone – 
underwent significant splintering.257   
The OF split between the right-wing, represented by Vaclav Klaus, newly 
appointed as the federal finance minister, and the left-wing, represented by rform
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communists.  The main conflict between the two was over economic policy, in 
particular the speed of economic reforms and the nature of privatization, with Klaus 
championing overnight liberalization and privatization, while the reform Communists 
argued for a more restrained approach, involving a set of structural reforms that 
would break the large inefficient state enterprises into smaller, more efficient ones 
and make them ready to compete in the market.   Rejecting the reform communist 
proposals as a slippery slope that would take the country back to communism, Klaus 
moved to dissolve the Civic Forum and create his own Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS).  Reform Communists then joined the Czech Social Democrats (CSSD).  
Conservative dissidents formed two smaller parties – the Civic Democratic Alliance 
(ODA) and the Christian Democratic Union (KDU) both of which became captive 
allies of Klaus’ much larger ODS.  Liberal dissidents formed their own splinter party, 
the Civic Movement (OH).   
 Vaclav Klaus’ other battle was directed against the dissident group around 
President Havel.  Here, the key divisive issue centered not on the economics or 
rejection of communism but rather on the form and character of the OF, with Klaus 
favoring a traditional political party format, while Havel and other dissidents 
advocated a more informal structure of a movement.258  Klaus’ opportunity to divide 
and weaken the dissident camp came with the lustration debate.  This was not so 
much a debate about the meaning of the communist past (on this point Klaus and the 
dissidents were united in rejecting communism in all its forms, contrary to reform 
communists who argued for preservation of certain ideals championed in 1968), 
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rather it was a debate about how to name and punish the perpetrators of communist 
crimes.  And on this point, the dissidents were divided.  While the liberals around 
Havel emphasized the theme of universal complicity in the crimes of communism ad 
called for a thick line approach,259 the conservatives, together with Klaus, 
championed an approach that came to be known as “lustration” – a form of banning 
the former members and collaborators of the secret police from certain high level 
positions for a period of five years.260  The evidence determining who was guilty and 
who was not was to come from the STB files.    
The reason why lustration constituted such a powerful weapon in the post-
1989 Czechoslovak political context was that it could be effectively used to discredit 
both the 1968 reform communists and the dissidents – the reform communists 
because their names were likely to appear in the files since they had been at some 
point involved with the regime and the dissidents because their private lives (unlike 
those of people from the gray zone like Vaclav Klaus) had been under constant 
scrutiny by the STB for years and were thus likely to be captured in the files. 
Moreover, those whose names appeared in the files had nothing but their word to 
counter the accusations of collaboration as the case of Jan Kavan, prominent Czech 
émigré who had served as a link between the dissidents and the West during 
normalization, shows.  Kavan was one of the ten parliamentarians, fifty top civil 
servants and ten officials in the presidential chancellery, who were named a secret 
police informer in a nationally televised parliamentary session in March 1991.  Even 
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though he and many others denied the accusations, it was not until 1996 that the court 
finally ruled in Kavan’s favor and cleared his name.261  The incident, however, 
undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the former dissidents and tore the 
dissident community apart.  Soon after, the polls began showing OH’s support 
declining and in the June 1992 elections, the OH liberal dissidents did not even pass 
the threshold necessary to enter the parliament.  They were forced to join the social 
democrats, the cooperation with whom they had previously rejected.    
Having undermined his ideological opponents in the Czech republic, Klaus’s 
political battle now turned to the other side of the federal state – Slovakia – where 
Vladimir Meciar, a former reform communist, member of the Obroda group, now the 
Slovak Prime minister and, crucially, the exact ideological antithesis of Vaclav Klaus, 
was making a spectacular political rise.262  As Gil Eyal argues, Meciar’s successful 
political strategy rested on using his reform communist credentials and the 1968 
reform rhetoric of “authentic federation” to position himself in between three 
dominant trends in the Slovak society: (1) the liberal VPN wing championing 
federalism, rejection of the communist past and rapid economic transformation, (2) 
Slovak ultranationalists of the Slovak National Party (SNS) whose strategy was based 
on rejecting communism and presenting themselves as the only true defenders of 
Slovak national interests, and (3) Slovak Catholic nationalists represented by 
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Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) who, although sympathetic to Slovak 
independence, carefully avoided open criticism of the federation out of fear of being 
labeled “fascist” due to their links to the wartime Slovak state.263   
By picking up the 1968 reform mantle of “authentic federation” Meciar was 
able to present himself as the best possible defender of the Slovak national interests 
and gain support of a wide spectrum of the Slovak population, including the reform 
Communists, moderate nationalists, technocrats, managers of state enterprises, 
workers and the poor.  In his speeches, Meciar lauded democracy, spoke of 
federalism based on the 1968 principle of “authentic federation”, opposed Klaus’s 
economic shock therapy in favor of a more gradual economic restructuring, opposed 
communists’ presence in the parliament, condemned Tiso’s Slovak fascist state, 
criticized Slovak Christian Democrats (KDH) for their links to clericalism and fascist 
past, and chastised the Slovak nationalists of the Slovak National Party (SNS) for 
their extremist tactics.264  In short, there was little in Meciar’s rhetoric to distinguish 
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organizers as extremists.  Similarly, in July 1990, when the Catholic nationalists around KDH  
approved and participated in a ceremony of unveiling the bust of the wartime Slovak resident Jozef 
Tiso in Banovce nad Berbravou, Meciar strongly condemned the action, distanced himself from the 




him from his reformist colleagues in VPN, much less to indicate that he was someone 
who would soon become co-responsible for the Czecho-slovak split.   
It was only later, in the Spring of 1991, after Meciar was deposed from the 
post of the Slovak Prime Minister by his VPN colleagues, following a scandal 
involving allegations that he had doctored important STB files to protect himself and 
potentially harm his opponents, that Meciar began to form closer ties with the 
oppositional Slovak National Party and adopt their anti-Hungarian rhetoric, which he 
had previously criticized as extremist.  Even then, however, Meciar still continued to 
steer a middle course with regard to the Czechoslovak issue and it was only in 
response to Klaus that he eventually opted for independence.265  Without going into 
the details of the protracted Czecho-Slovak negotiations that preceded the breakup of 
Czechoslovakia in January 1993, suffice it to say that the breakup was neither a result 
of popular disenchantment with the federation, nor the outcome of some sinister 
cynical elite power play or Vladimir Meciar’s rabid nationalism.  Rather, as several 
authors argued, it stemmed from the incompatibility of the two very different 
ideological packages that won in the 1992 elections.266  With Klaus’ election in the 
Czech republic and Vladimir Meciar’s in Slovakia, the ideological conflict betwe n 
the left and the right in Czechoslovakia was transformed into a national conflict 
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between the Czech right wing and the Slovak left wing.  With it, the split of the 
country became inevitable.267   
There are couple important points to note about Vaclav Klaus’ ODS and 
Vladimir Meciar’s HZDS.  First, both represent examples of the so-called “catch all 
parties” – a specific post-communist phenomenon and legacy of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, perceptively described by scholars like Abby Innes for instance. 268  
The identities and political programs of ODS and HZDS are mostly the outcome of 
the Czechoslovak transition itself. They are linked neither to deep societal cleavages 
nor to strong pre-Communist identities such as Catholic populism, agrarianism, social 
democracy, etc.  Nor do they show connection to identities or debates of the 
Czechoslovak dissent.  Instead, the identities of the two parties developed in response 
to more immediate concerns of the Czechoslovak transition – issues of economic 
reform and market regulation, questions of anti-communist retribution, the Czecho-
Slovak question, and later civil society and corruption.  Innes correctly attributes the 
absence of deeper historical rootedness of political parties like ODS and HZDS to a 
specific legacy of bureaucratic-authoritarianism and its success in eras g and 
isolating all non-communist political alternatives.269  Shari Cohen, another scholar of 
the region, uses the term “mass elite parties” to describe the same phenomenon.270  
Parties like ODS and HZDS represent “mass-elite parties” in the sensethat they are 
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comprised of post-communist elites who, due to having been subjected to decades of 
communist rewriting of history, are noticeable by their lack of identifiable links to 
pre-communist political identities.271   
The second point to note is the influence of transitional expectations on the 
choice of strategies and political programs of postcommunist catch all parties like the 
ODS and HZDS.  As Innes points out, the fact that political identities of ODS and 
HZDS assumed diametrically opposite content in the Czech and Slovak post-
communist context was due not so much to the different character of political elites 
that comprised them (both Klaus and Meciar were representatives of the gray zone s 
were most of their party colleagues; both represented “mass elites” to u e Cohen’s 
term) but rather to different levels of economic development and consequently 
different prospects of success or failure (and by extension, likely social costs) of rapid 
economic reform in the two countries.  ODS under Klaus’s leadership became a 
classic type of a technocratic catch all party, juxtaposing its own economic expertise 
to what it portrayed as a naivete and impracticality of the liberal dissident group 
around Vaclav Havel.  It presented itself not only as the most competent party on the 
Czech political scene but also as the only democratic one, branding all others, 
especially its social-democratic rivals, as anti-system.  Rather than one option among 
many, ODS’s neoliberal economic views were presented as the only correct approach 
–a scientific formula to prosperity, democracy and return to Europe.272  By contrast, 
Vladimir Meciar’s HZDS chose the populist path, capitalizing on growing fearsof the 
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likely negative impact of austerity measures required for the success of the rapid 
economic transformation envisioned by Klaus and emphasizing the need for more 
gradualist economic policies that would better reflect Slovakia’s economic 
conditions.   
Both Cohen’s and Innes’s insights are highly relevant for my discussion since 
they suggest that debates and battles over the meaning of the past that have animated 
the two decades of post-communist politics in the Czech republic and Slovakia have 
not been a reflection of some spontaneous “return of the past” or some sudden 
outburst of previously suppressed identities as has been popularly claimed but rather 
involved actors who often lacked (or possessed only weak) identifiable links to pre-
communist identities and social cleavages and were reacting to immediate demands 
of the transition as they came.   Before turning to those debates, however, a very brief 
sketch of other relevant political actors in post-communist Slovakia and Czech 
republic is in order.  
 
The Czech post-1993 political scene – key actors 
Since the Czechoslovak split on January 1 1993, the Czech political scene has 
been dominated by four major political formations – the Civic Democratic Party
(ODS), the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) and a coalition of the Christian Democratic Union 
and the Czech Populist Party (KDU-CSL).  In terms of their ideological makeup, 
ODS represents political right, CSSD left center, and KDU-CSL typically oscillates 
between the two.  Despite its relatively high electoral gains, KSCM remains isolated 




severely limited  possibilities of power alternation on the Czech political scene.  Since 
1993, the power has alternated between the Civic democrats (ODS) (in power in 
1993-1998 and 2006-2009) and Social democrats (CSSD) (in power between 1998 
and 2006), while KDU-CSL has played the role of a balancer.273   
As mentioned, ODS presents itself as a party of the right, espousing 
conservative values and principles of classic European liberalism such as individual 
liberties, competitiveness, private ownership and limited role of the state (limited to 
areas of national defense, protection of rights and enforcement).  In its views on 
foreign policy, ODS emphasizes the principle of national sovereignty and 
transatlantic cooperation.  The party takes a clearly Euro-skeptic stance, stressing the 
role of national states and opposing federalization and loss of sovereignty.   
ODS’ chief political rival since the mid 1990s has been the Czech Social 
Democratic Party (CSSD) which has managed to transform itself from a relatively 
insignificant party (with only 6% votes in the 1992 elections) to a major player on the 
Czech political scene and ODS’ chief political contender.  CSSD’s political program 
approximates those of standard Western European social democratic parties.  The 
party supports ecologically and socially-conscious market economy, active 
intervention of the state in the economy, healthcare, education and the social sector.  
CSSD has also been a firm supporter of Czech membership in Western organizations, 
including the NATO and the EU.274   
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The KDU-CSL coalition represents another stable actor on the Czech post-
communist political scene.  Unlike ODS and CSSD which fit the profile of catch-all 
parties (ODS of the technocratic type, CSSD of the populist one), KDU-CSL 
represents a historical party.  It is a successor to the historical Czech Peoples Party 
with roots reaching back to the 19th century and the Czechoslovak People’s Party 
which was co-opted by the Communists and participated in the so-called National 
Front prior to November 1989.  In terms of its ideological make-up, KDU-CSL 
presents itself as a center-right party Western European Christian democratic 
orientation.  It focuses on the role of the family and the Church, social-market 
economy, private property and decent living conditions for all, and typically opposes 
liberal and social-democratic values.   In terms of its foreign policy views, it has been 
a firm supporter of Czech entry into the NATO and an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Czech membership in the EU.  Over the past two decades, KDU-CSL has gravitated 
from its original center-right position toward the center and now attempts to play the 
role of a balancer in the Czech politics.  It participated in coalition governments with 
both ODS and CSSD.   
KSCM is the direct successor party to the pre-November KSC.  Since 1990, 
KSCM has always held seats in the parliament but due to its anti-systemic nature, h s 
never been invited to be part of the ruling coalition.  Like all post-communist parties, 
KSCM has undergone internal differentiation since November 1989.  In December 
1992, after an unsuccessful attempt to radically transform the party, the reformist 
wing led by Jiri Svoboda left the party.  Since then, KSCM has been dominated by 




came in June 2002, when the party received 18.5% votes (an increase of more than 
7% over the previous elections and the best election result since the 1946 
Czechoslovak elections), mostly due to the disenchantment of former CSSD voters 
once CSSD entered into coalition with ODS.  In terms of its political program, KSCM 
remains an anti-systemic party, committed to socialism and is highly critical of the 
existing democratic system which it blames for growing economic inequalities, the 
rise of criminality, corruption, prostitution and other societal ills.  It calls for an 
increased role of the citizens in decision making, wide application of the referndum, 
strict separation of the church and state, constitutionally guaranteed right to work and 
shelter, full employment.  It is sharply opposed to the Czech membership in NATO 
and EU in their present form. According to its own data. KSCM had about 107,800 
members on Jan 1 2003, making it the largest Czech political party.275 
 
The Slovak post-1993 political scene – key actors 
Compared to the relatively stable development and relative simplicity of the
Czech political scene, Slovakia’s party scene in the last two decades has seen  gr at 
degree of institutional instability.  The most salient dividing line in the Slovak politics 
between 1993 and 1998 was not ideological but personal, focused on the figure of 
Vladimir Meciar and his increasingly demagogic and authoritarian style.  It was not 
until 1998, however, when Slovakia was already internationally isolated and engulfed 
in corruption scandals, that the until then fragmented anti-Meciar forces finally
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created a common front.  In the June 1998 elections, the newly established Slovak 
Democratic Coalition (SDK) under the leadership of Mikulas Dzurinda, defeated 
Meciar’s HZDS and restarted the much needed democratization and economic 
reforms.276  After two terms in power, internal tensions stemming from great 
ideological differences between SDK coalition members,277 combined with growing 
public discontent with economic pains brought about by the effective but painful 
economic reforms introduced by Dzurinda’s cabinet contributed to SDK’s decline.  In 
the June 2006 elections, SDK lost to a new populist catch-all party named Smer 
(Direction) under the leadership of charismatic Robert Fico, former high functionary 
of the Party of the Slovak Democratic Left (SDL).   
Currently, the Slovak political scene consists of about half a dozen political 
parties with potential to enter the parliament.  Robert Fico’s Smer is by far the most 
popular among them at the moment.  Established in late 1999, Smer initially 
presented itself in rather vague terms – as a formation trying to de-ideologize Slovak 
politics, restore order, institute a rule of experts, put an end to political revenge, etc.  
The party’s fast rise was due to an effective media campaign in which Robert Fico 
presented his party as a political alternative to Mikulas Dzurinda’s coalition as well as 
to Vladimir Meciar’s HZDS and the Slovak nationalists in SNS.  In an effort to 
increase its international credibility before the upcoming elections in 2002, Smer 
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began to present itself as a Western-style social democratic party committed to the so 
called “Third way.” This image, however, was largely intended for the foreign 
audiences.  Internally, in addressing its Slovak constituents, Smer’s language remains 
highly populist.  After the 2006 elections, Smer formed a ruling coalition with 
Vladimir Meciar’s HZDS and the ultra nationalist Slovak National Party under the 
leadership of Jan Slota, the parties it previously criticized.   
After HZDS’ political isolation between 1998 and 2006, Smer’s coalition 
offer to HZDS enabled Meciar and his party to return to politics.  Nevertheless, 
HZDS is no longer the mass party it used to be in the early to mid 1990s and its role 
in Robert Fico’s coalition government remains limited.  Since its defeat in June 1998, 
HZDS has gone through several phases of internal frictions and splintering, the most 
devastating of which was the 2002 exit of the faction around Ivan Gasparovic, 
formerly the second man in the HZDS hierarchy, who then went on to defeat Meciar 
in the 2004 presidential elections.278  HZDS’popularity has been steadily declining.  
In 2006, the party received 11.7% votes, enough to secure a position in the Smer-led 
coalition government but nonetheless a dramatic decline over HZDS’s previous 
election results (37.3% in 1992, 27% in 1998, 19.5% in 2002). Even though Meciar’s 
HZDS formally presents itself as a centrist party, committed to three pillars – 
Christian, national and social, it remains a highly personalistic party.  Due to M ciar’s 
strong formal (institutional) and informal standing within the party, efforts t  change 
                                                




the leadership of the party have repeatedly failed.  HZDS thus remains closely linked 
to the figure of its founder.279   
From early 1990s, Slovak National Party (SNS) represents one of the most 
radical mainstream parties on the Slovak political scene.  Although SNS formally 
claims continuity with the Slovak national party of 1871-1938 (the oldest historical 
party in Slovakia led during the interwar period by a Slovak writer Martin Razus), 
there are in fact no historical links between the current SNS leadership and the 
historical SNS.  Instead, the party can be more appropriately characterized as a catch 
all party of the nationalist type.  It was established after 1989 by previously unknown 
political entrepreneurs, many of whom, by their own admission, joined the party 
because they saw in the nationalist platform a promising niche to launch their post-
communist political careers.280  SNS played an especially active role during the 1990 
“hyphen war” over the name of Czechoslovakia and in subsequent protests and 
petitions for Slovak autonomy.  Since then the party has championed a number of 
exclusionary policies directed against the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, most 
recently, a proposal that would mandate the use of Slovak national symbols in 
classrooms in public schools and the playing of the national anthem at the beginning 
of classes on Monday mornings.  The party maintains close ties with the radical
nationalist organization, Matica Slovenska, as well as Slovak nationalist émigrés with 
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links to Tiso’s wartime regime who have been actively advocating rehabilitation of 
the Slovak wartime state and the figure of its president, Jozef Tiso.   
The Slovak democratic camp, currently in opposition, constitutes an 
ideologically diverse group of center-right parties.  As mentioned, the present SDKU 
was established in 2000 by a group of leading politicians from the anti-Meciar Slovak 
Democratic Coalition (est. 1998).  The original core of SDKU included the KDH 
group around Mikulas Dzurinda and Ivan Simka and most of the leadership from the 
Democratic Union (DU).  Programmatically, SDKU defined itself as a union of 
political parties belonging to center right, strongly orientated toward Christian-
democratic, conservative and liberal values.  It has also been a strong supporter of 
Slovakia’s entry into the EU.281   
The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) was established by former 
Catholic dissidents, Jan Carnogursky, Frantisek Miklosko and several others in 1990.  
Its ideology and political program derive from two sources: Western-European 
Christian democratic tradition and the pre-war Slovak political Catholicism of Andrej 
Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (HSLS).282  KDH’s political program emphasizes 
Christian, Conservative and national values, especially the role of the family, soc al 
market economy, and protection of Slovak national identity and national interests.   
Since its establishment in 1998, Slovak Hungarian Coalition (SMK) has been 
the most important representative of the Slovak Hungarian minority.  The party 
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comprises members of several different ideological families (the conservativ  
Hungarian Christian-democratic movement, the nationalistic Coexistence and the 
liberal Hungarian Civic Party) and officially presents itself as a right-left party 
espousing Christian, conservative and liberal values.  It promotes decentralization and 
minimal role of the state.  In 2009, protracted personal and ideological frictions 
within the party led to the split of the group around SMK’s leader Jan Buday and 
establishment of a new party named, Hid, Most (Bridge) which strives for 
cooperation between Slovak ethnic Hungarians and Slovak parties.  The original 
SMK, now under a new leadership of Pal Csaky, has adopted a more exclusionary, 
ethnic language. 
The left end of the Slovak political spectrum is represented by the Party of the 
Slovak Democratic Left (SDL) a reformed successor party to the pre-November KSS, 
a neo-communist Slovak Communist Party (KSS) and a radical-leftist Union of 
Slovak Workers (ZRS).  In contrast to communist successor parties in Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech republic, none of the Slovak communist successors succeeded 
in establishing themselves as major post-communist political players.  SDL,the 
largest of the three leftist formations, represents a reformed communist succes or 
party which denounced the deformations of its predecessor and began reform process 
in the early 1990s.  The party’s failure to attract voters in the first post-indepence 
elections significantly weakened the position of its reform-oriented leadership and led 
to a deep inter-party crisis which in 1996 culminated with a replacement of the 
reformist party boss Peter Weiss with a radical socialist leader Jozef Migas.283  KSS 
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and ZRS represent radical neo-communist streams that split from the SDL in the early 
1990s.  Much like KSCM in the Czech republic, KSS represents the far end of the 
Slovak left political spectrum.  Even though the party distanced itself from some of 
KSC’s gravest pre-November deformations, it remains committed to Marxist-Leninist 
socialist internationalism and for this reason remains politically isolated by both the 
Meciar and the anti-Meciar camp.284  Ideologically similar to KSS, ZRS is a small 
radical leftist party which split from SDL in the early 1990s and was part of Vladimir 
Meciar’s coalition during the 1994-1998 period.  Participation in Vladimir Meciar’s 
cabinet, however, damaged ZRS’s reputation among its voters and in all subsequent 
elections, the party failed to pass the 5 percent threshold necessary to enter the 
parliament.   
To summarize, two decades since the fall of communism, the Czech and the 
Slovak post-1993 political scene continue to be marked by legacies of Czechoslovak 
bureaucratic authoritarian rule.  Both are characterized by strong presence of 
ideologically diverse political formations of the “catch all” style, usually dominated 
by strong charismatic leaders (Vaclav Klaus, Vladimir Meciar, Mikulas Dzurinda, 
Robert Fico), which tend to form ideologically mixed coalitions, producing 
considerable political instability, which, in the case of Slovakia, was further deepen d 
by the polarizing effect of the figure of Vladimir Meciar.  Having briefly introduced 
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the main post-communist actors, I now turn to the discussion of their political uses of 
the past in the post-1993 political context.   
 
Goodbye Lenin  
As miraculous and exhilarating as the 1989 East Central European anti-
communist revolutions were, they represented only the beginning of what was to 
become a long and complicated goodbye to communism.  Unlike in Poland or 
Hungary where power transitions were negotiated and meant that the new post-
communist parliaments were still dominated by former communists, the sudden 
collapse of Czechoslovakia’s bureaucratic-authoritarian rule put the country at a clear 
advantage with regard to its prospects for shedding its communist legacy.  In 
addition, the Czechs and the Slovaks experienced massive purges after 1948 and 1968 
and so personal changes after the collapse of communism in 1989 were perceived by 
many as the element of minimal justice.  It is not surprising then that Czechoslovakia 
was one of the last countries in the region to overthrow communism yet the first one 
to enact a lustration law.   
Decommunization, however, has been a process far more complex than the 
mere act of purging previously compromised persons from politics.  It has  entailed 
complicated and often contradictory moral, political and technical considerations as 
well as a mix of strategies, including symbolic rejection of the past, political 
rehabilitation of victims, material restitution, punishment of perpetrators of past 
crimes, history lessons, etc.  In Czechoslovakia, as elsewhere in the region, the first




plagues, busts and other symbols of the communist era.  Unlike in the Baltic states for 
instance, where symbols of communism were often violently destroyed by exuberated 
masses riding tractors and pulling the despised communist statues down from their 
pedestals, the Czechs and the Slovaks removed their Lenins, Gottwalds, sickles, 
hammers and numerous other symbols of communism largely peacefully and quietly.  
In part this was because non-violence constituted one of the key ideals of the 
Czechoslovak Velvet revolution but also because the Czechs and the Slovaks were 
almost immediately after communism’s sudden collapse thrust into a symbolic battle 
of a different kind – the infamous hyphen debate over the new name of their federal 
state.285   
The first memorials to depart were statues of Lenin and Gottwald.  Unlike in 
Hungary, proposals to establish a special communist statue park did not bear fruit in 
Czechoslovakia, though they were suggested.  A humorous initiative involved a 
proposal by the “Society for a merrier present” to establish a Museum of lawlessness 
in a small Czech village named Lawlessness, situated near Chocen.286  In the end, the 
majority of the removed statues and symbols of the old regime found their final 
refuge in storage areas of local museums.  A few were sold abroad.  Some remained 
in their original spots but had their tablets with celebratory socialist inscriptions either 
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removed completely or replaced with more balanced texts.  Still others were melted 
down and the material thus obtained was used to build new memorials, such as the 
one by Marie Uchytilova, commemorating the tragic mass murder of the Lidice 
children by the Nazis during WWII.287      
 
 
Picture 20: Fates of communist memorials (1).  The Lidice Children Memorial by academic sculptor 
Marie Uchytilova was made of bronze which was obtained from communist statues melted down after 
1989.  The sculpture depicting 82 figures of children commemorates the martyrdom of Lidice children 
by the Nazis during WWII. 
 
 
Of course, there were a few deviations from the otherwise peaceful and 
orderly exit of communist symbols in post-November Czechoslovakia.  One such 
instance was the destruction of the Gottwald statue in Bratislava where a group of 
                                                




exhilarated revolutionaries colored Gottwald’s hands in red paint and attached a sign 
“murderer” on the statue.  When the authorities attempted to protect the statue from 
further destruction by surrounding it with a wooden wall, the crowd set the statue on 
fire and later demolished it.288  A similar desacralization took place in Blansko where 
another statue of Gottwald had its hands painted in a red color.  The four meter high 
statue was then removed and spent the next eighteen years in storage before it was 
renovated and exhibited as an example of artistic qualities and craftsmanship of 
Blansko sculptors.289 
Without doubt, however, the most debated case of post-communist statue 
transformation in Czechoslovakia was the case of Prague’s “Pink Tank number 23”.  
On April 28 1991, the tank – monument to Soviet tank troops and symbol of 
liberation from fascism which after the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia came to symbolize Soviet occupation and normalization – was 
painted in a candy pink color by a 23-year old sculpture student David Cerny (the 
same artist whose work Entropa created to mark the Czech presidency of the 
European Union Council in 2009 generated heated international controversy).290  A 
few days later, just in time for the 46th anniversary of the Liberation, the “vandalized 
pink tank”, which in the meantime inspired a petition entitled “Pink is prettier”, 
signed by several thousand Prague residents, was restored to its originalm litary 
green color by Prague’s authorities.  Cerny was charged with disturbance of public 
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order and arrested.  Consequently a group of fifteen deputies of the Federal Assembly 
voiced their open protest against Cerny’s arrest and, in an act of solidarity (and in 
becoming work uniforms), re-painted the tank in pink once again while a group of 
Prague residents spontaneously removed stones from the five-point star shaped flower 
bed near the monument and built an improvised memorial to General Vlasov, the 
Soviet General who defected from Stalin’s Red Army, briefly joined the Nazis in 
order to defeat Stalin, and during the May Prague uprising at the end of the war 
fought against Hitler and contributed to Prague’s liberation – a piece of WWII history 
which had been silenced by the Czechoslovak communists.  Eventually, after a heated 
parliamentary debate, Cerny was released, Tank 23 was officially crossed ut from 
the list of national cultural monuments and the tank was eventually moved to the 
military museum in Kbelice.291   
                                                











Picture 22: Fates of Czechoslovak communist memorials (part 2).  Top: The Blansko statue of 
Klement Gottwald with red-painted hands.  Bottom: Klement Gottwald statue in front of a pub in  





Removal of communist statues and symbols, however, was only the beginning 
of a long road to decommunization, which even today, twenty years after 
communism’s collapse, remains incomplete – in the Czech republic, in Slovakia, as 
elsewhere in the region.  Timothy Garton Ash has usefully grouped strategies of 
transitional justice into three broad categories of trials, purges and history lessons.292  
The fundamental question preceding each of these different approaches, however, is 
whether judgment on the past ought to be passed at all or whether the “forgive and 
forget” strategy of drawing a thick line behind the painful past may not be a better, 
more constructive and morally superior way to deal with the dark communist legacy.  
In post-communist Czechoslovakia, the dilemma was exemplified by the symbolic 
battle between Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus.  As mentioned, Vaclav Havel, like 
Adam Michnik in Poland, took the position of universal complicity, arguing that since 
every person, by participating in small compromises and rituals of obedience to the 
regime, helped perpetuate the communist system, everyone was guilty.  Therefore, 
the morally appropriate response was to confess and let bygons be bygons – draw a 
thick line behind the past and focus on the future.  Vaclav Klaus, on the other hand, 
explicitly rejected the dissident thesis of universal guilt and argued that concrete 
individuals, not society as a whole, were guilty: “It was not ‘we’ who did this … 
Behind every arrogant attempt to draw up completely new social institutions, there is 
the intellectual and sometimes physical violence of a handful of self-important 
intellectuals,” explained Klaus in one of his interviews in 1990, turning the debate 
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against the dissidents (in particular the former reform communists within the OF and 
VPN), portraying them as people who were responsible for having supported the 
system and whose reasons for opposing lustration stemmed not from their moral 
conviction but out of a fear that their past complicity with the regime would be made 
public.293  
In addition to the philosophical question of who was to be held responsible for 
the crimes of the previous regime, there were many technical problems involved in 
the lustration process, which in turn raised new moral dilemmas.  In particular, the 
meaning of collaboration was contested since to collaborate meant very different 
things under Gottwald during the 1950s than for instance during Husak’s 
normalization.  Moreover, lists of Secret police (STB) collaborators included several 
different categories of people who collaborated under very different circumstance .  
There was a difference between “potential collaborators”, i.e., those listed a  
candidates for future collaboration and “real collaborators”, i.e., people who actually 
did inform on their co-workers, neighbors, spouses and family members.  There was 
also a significant difference between those who signed collaboration documents under 
pressure and the opportunists who willingly and enthusiastically offered their serv ces 
to the Secret Police.  These were clearly very different circumstances d categories 
of people, which, so the critics of lustration argued, required different treatment.   
Secondly, the reliability of the Secret Police files was questionable.  The 
information was located in several places and was often false, distorted or 
inconclusive.  After all, as mentioned, the files were produced by individuals who 
                                                




were either forced to cooperate or by careerists who were eager to plase their 
supervisors.  There was also a justified concern that the information contained in the 
files could potentially be manipulated and abused for political purposes in post-
communist political battles.  At least a third of the active files disappeared in the
interim period between November and December 1989 when the Interior Ministry 
was still in control of the old security staff with unlimited access to the secr t files.  
There were also allegations that Richard Sacher, the interim Interior Minister from 
the communist statellite Czech People’s Party, protected officials of the old order and 
leaked information about dissidents.294  Similarly in Slovakia, Vladimir Meciar, who 
headed the Slovak Interior Ministry in 1990, frequently used the secret files as a 
means to blackmail his political opponents.  Several times, he publically mentioned 
that he had just found the secret police files of various people on his table.  
Compromising information from Meciar’s own files, on the other hand, went 
mysteriously missing.295   
Questions were also raised (initially by foreign observers, though the 
argument was later picked up by domestic opponents against lustration) regarding 
infringement on individual rights that lustration potentially constituted since 
individuals were prevented from holding certain positions based on the logic that they 
belonged to a specific category (“informers”) without being given proper 
                                                
294 The allegations against Sacher were that he protected General Alojz Lorenz, a pre-November 
deputy internal affairs minister and the fact that after dismissing STB officers he continued to keep 
them on payroll for another six months.  See for insta ce Whipple, T. D., Ed. (1991). After the Velvet 
Revolution. New York, Freedom House: 49-51.  Also (1995). Report of Parliamentary Commission of 
November 17, 1991. Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. 
N. J. Kritz. Washington D.C, U.S. Institute of Peac. 3: 307-11.  Spurny, J. (1990). "Sef (The Boss)." 
Respekt(27): 3. 
295 Cohen, S. J. (1999). Politics without a Past:  TheAbsence of History in Postcommunist 




consideration to individual circumstances which led to their inclusion in STB files or 
to their actual collaboration.  The law was criticized, for instance, by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) in 1992, the Council of Europe in 1996, as well as a 
number of human rights organizations.296   
In addition, there were doubts about the law’s effectiveness since some high 
positioned public officials were never screened or were able to obtain false clearing 
licenses.  Members of Parliament, for instance, were not covered by the lustration 
law.  The issue of clearing license fraud became the topic of public controversy in 
2001when the Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross announced that negative 
lustration certificates were illegally issued to many former members of the army 
intelligence.  The subsequent check found that 117 lustration certificates issued 
mostly in 1992 were issued as a result of “incorrect analysis” of STB documents.297  
Particularly damaging to public trust was also the 2007 scandal at the Czech Interior 
Ministry which revealed that the Ministry employed about 150 former Secret Police 
agents, including high ranking STB officials.298   
The Czech Parliament extended lustration’s life-span twice –in 1995 during 
the period of center-right ODS domination and in 2000 when power was more 
balanced between ODS and CSSD.  Both times, President Havel vetoed the proposals 
but his veto was overridden by the Parliament.  The Lustration law expired in 2007 
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when new civil service and security laws were passed.299  In Slovakia, by contrast, the 
Federal Lustration law was hardly employed before 1993.  It was completely ignored 
during Vladimir Meciar’s tenure as the Slovak Prime Minister and formally expir d 
in 1996.  During Meciar’s time in power, the Slovak Information Service (SIS) was 
alleged to employ a large number of former secret police agents and actively 
participated in violations of basic democratic principles, including monitoring of 
members of the opposition parties, churches, trade unions as well as journalists 
critical of Meciar, organizing kidnapping of the son of the then Slovak President 
Michal Kovac, sabotaging public meetings and blowing up cars of journalists.300   
Yet, significantly, there have been no attempts to revive the lustration debate 
since Meciar’s defeat in 1998.  As a result, personal continuity with the previous 
regime has remained one of the defining characteristics of Slovak politics even in th  
post-Meciar era.  Indicative of a relatively high degree of Slovak tolerance for 
politicians with communist past is also for instance the fact that all post-1989 Slovak 
presidents had been members of KSC prior to November 1989.  Rudolf Schuster, the 
second Slovak president, in fact had to leave the post of the Czechoslovak 
ambassador to Canada because of his lustration report.  This did not prevent him, 
however, from winning the Slovak Presidential elections in 1999.301  All this confirms 
the point made earlier – unlike most Czechs who remain highly critical of the
communist era, many Slovaks saw and still continue to see the communist past, and 
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especially the period of Husak’s normalization, in positive light, as the times of 
enhancing national autonomy and not as something to be purged or erased 
completely.  Herein, in the divergent attitude toward the communist past (exemplifi d 
by the Klaus vs. Meciar conflict during 1991-1992), lie some of the seeds of the 
Czechoslovak breakup.   
Moving to the second strategy of overcoming totalitarian past, discussed by 
T.G. Ash – the trials – here, the outcomes have been even more discouraging.  The 
numbers of the pre-November Communist Party functionaries who were tried and 
sentenced in the Czech and Slovak republics remain very low.  In part, the low 
figures stem from the fact that post-communist Czechoslovakia assumed legal 
continuity with the pre-November regime.  This means that actions taken in the past 
are to be judged by the laws that were applicable at the time when those actins took 
place, not by current laws.  In effect, this meant that gross violations of human rights 
perpetrated during the communist era are considered crimes only if their perpetrators 
broke communist laws while carrying out their duties.  For instance, if a particul  
official used especially brutal tactics in the process of the interrogation, his or her 
conduct can be investigated.  Otherwise, the action, even though unlawful, is 
considered legal.302   
Complicating issues further is the factor of elapsed time.  As discussed, the 
most gruesome of crimes committed by the Czechoslovak communist regime took 
place in the 1950s, i.e., almost forty years before the 1989 regime change.  In the 
meantime, memories have faded, witnesses have died and material documents may 
                                                




have gotten lost and/or destroyed (not to mention the fact that the most important 
orders during the communist era, regarding executions for instance, were given orally 
so there were no material traces left behind to investigate).  All of this introduces 
enormous difficulty and inconclusiveness into the investigation and prosecution of 
communist crimes – not to speak of the fact that both the Czech and the Slovak post-
communist judicial sectors exhibit great degree of personal continuity with the pre-
November regime.  Prosecution of communist officials is therefore often delaye and 
obstructed.   
Finally, mass rehabilitation of communist victims in the early 1990s 
represents one more reason why the number of sentences against communist 
perpetrators remains very low.  On the positive side, compared to rehabilitation on a 
case by case basis, as in the 1960s, for instance, mass rehabilitation to all victims of 
communist repression represented an efficient and expedient way of providing some 
minimum sense of moral justice and financial compensation to those unlawfully 
prosecuted by the previous regime.  Logistically speaking, it would have been simply
impossible to individually rehabilitate all of the 270,000 victims of the communist 
regime.  At the same time, however, the approach of mass rehabilitations precluded 
any meaningful prosecution of the perpetrators of the communist crimes and resulted 
in a paradoxical situation where more communist crimes went punished in 
Czechoslovakia in the 1960s than in the 1990s.303   
Attempts at critical re-evaluation of history, or “History lessons” as Timothy 
Garton Ash labels the third strategy of coming to terms with totalitarian past, have 





also been the source of considerable controversy and debate in both countries.  As of 
May 2010, both the Czech republic and Slovakia have functioning institutes of 
national memory, set up to implement and popularize new research on the period of 
Czechoslovak communist dictatorship.  The road to their establishment, however, was 
a rocky one in each case.  The first pre-requisite for any kind of research of the 
communist era was open access to Secret Police files.  As mentioned, only a fraction
of the actual files, which the Czechoslovak Secret Police had kept on some 600,000 
people, have been preserved.  Very large quantities of files (up to one third) were 
destroyed under General Lorenc and there were allegations of potential wrongdoing 
in both the Czech and the Slovak Interior Ministry.  Though calls for declassification 
of the files came early on, it was not until 1996 in the Czech republic and much later, 
in 2002 in Slovakia, that citizens were allowed to examine their own files.   
The Czech Act 140/1996 from April 26 1996 allowed individuals to access 
their own files, with private information about the third parties blacked out (this was 
in order to alleviate concerns about human rights violations voiced by many 
dissidents whose private information frequently appeared in the files).  Six years later, 
in 2002, a new law (Act 107/2002) was proposed by ODS that would allow a much 
broader access, making available to citizens not only their own files but also files f 
STB collaborators and STB personnel files.  The law was approved by an 
overwhelming majority both in the Parliament and in Senate.  The Communists and a 
majority of CSSD members voted against.  Criticism came also from the dissident , 
who warned that the files were full of fabrications and lies and would reveal more 




collaborators.  President Vaclav Havel voiced some concerns about the discord that 
opening of the files was bound to generate in the society, but in the end signed the 
bill, saying it was a necessary step toward reclaiming the value of truth in 
Czechoslovak society.304  The next year, electronic version of the files was published 
on the internet.  Access to materials of the STB was opened one step further with the 
passage of the new archival law in 2004 (Archive Act 499/2004).  The law exempts 
communist era documents from restrictions on personal information concerning third 
individuals who are still alive.  Private information is therefore no longer blacked 
out.305       
The opening of the Secret Police files in Slovakia took much longer than in 
the Czech republic or in most of Eastern Europe for that matter.  Though the Slovak 
debate on file access started immediately after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia 
(initiated by dissident Jan Langos), it had no chance of success during the Meciar
tenure.  After Meciar’s defeat in the 1998 parliamentary elections, the discuss on was 
re-opened by Jan Carnogursky, the new Minister of Justice, but met with strong 
opposition, not least from the then President Schuster who argued that opening of the 
secret files and study of the communist repressive methods represented an 
“unwelcome return to the past”.306  It was not until the fall of 2001 that the Slovak 
debate really took off, spurred by a special issue of the journal Kritika&Kontext on 
the “Phenomenon of STB”.  In it, leading Slovak intellectuals attempted to diagnose 
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the causes of a relatively low interest in the topic of decommunization (not only 
among the general public but also, somewhat surprisingly, among researchers and 
historians) as well as what appears to be a fairly large public tolerance of continued 
STB presence in the Slovak public life, attributing them to the relatively milder 
repression levels, increased standards of living and the resulting weakness of Slovak 
dissent during Husak’s normalization in Slovakia.307   
The bill which opened Secret Police files to the general public was finally 
passed in the Slovak Parliament in 2002.  It’s passage was opposed by Meciar’s 
HZDS and the SDL as well as President Schuster who vetoed the bill but was 
overridden by the Parliament.  In addition to opening access to Secret Police files, the 
bill also set up an Institute of National Memory (Ustav Pamate Naroda, UPN), under 
Jan Langos’s leadership, and charged it with responsibility for the investigation of the 
1939-1989 period.  An important difference between the Czech and the Slovak laws 
regulating access to communist Secret Police files is that the 2004 Czech law 
complements the lustration law and thus carries legal repercussions which the 2002 
Slovak law does not.  As a result, the Slovak approach has been referred to as 
“lustration without legal consequences”, even though the internet publication of the 
files has led to some scandals and a few cases of self-lustration in Slovakia.308  In the 
Czech republic, an institute similar to the Slovak UPN was established in 2007, under 
the name Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes 1938-89 (Ustav pro stadium 
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totalitarnich rezimu, USTR).  The Institute also contains Archive of security Services 
which, for the first time, gathers and administers all of the Secret Police archival 
materials in one place.  USTR complements another institute, Bureau for 
Documentation and Investigation of Crimes of Communism (Ustav dokumentace a 
vysetrovani zlocinu komunismu, UDV) which was established in 1995 and carries 
also investigatory powers.   
Both the Czech and Slovak institutes of memory remain subject of 
considerable controversy.  In 2010, after months of intensive public criticism coming 
both from the right and the left, Pavel Zacek, the key initiator and head of the Czech
USTR was voted out.  USTR under Zacek’s leadership was charged with lack of 
professionalism, selectivity and politicization of its research.  Especially d maging 
were public scandals concerning the sensational manner in which the institute 
released information about the alleged STB collaboration of the Czech writer living in 
France, Milan Kundera, and the dissident artist and a close friend of Vaclav Havel, 
Joska Skalnik.309  In both cases, the information was leaked to the media without 
giving the accused an opportunity to explain their side of the story.  In Spring 2010, 
Pavel Zacek was replaced by historian Jiri Pernes who himself became the victim of 
the Czech election struggle between CSSD and ODS and was forced to leave the 
institute less than a month after his arrival, after questions about his communist past 
and his expert research were raised in the media.310   
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In Slovakia, UPN became the object of controversy when, following the tragic 
death of its founder and director Jan Langos in 2006, the new governing coalition 
(Smer, SNS, HZDS) in cooperation with Matica Slovenska appointed to the post of 
the head of the institute a young Slovak historian, Ivan Petransky, known for his 
sympathies for the Slovak fascist wartime regime.  Since Petransky’s appointment, 
UPN has uncritically sponsored several controversial publications related to 
Slovakia’s WWII history, most recently a book of memoires of Karol Sidor, a 
prominent member of Tiso’s HSLS, chief editor of the strongly anti-Semitic HSLS 
newspaper Slovak who spent the wartime years in Vatican as a Slovak ambassador.311   
 
Goodbye Czechoslovakia  
Goodbye to communism was not the only goodbye the Czechs and the 
Slovaks said after the fall of communism in 1989, however.  With the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia on January 1 1993, the entire history of Czechoslovakia’s existence 
was in need of re-evaluation.  Naturally, the impetus was much stronger in Slovakia 
where the new post-communist elite headed by Vladimir Meciar rejected the 
Czechoslovak past and, finding themselves in a desperate need of new founding 
myths to legitimate Slovakia’s new independence, embarked upon a brave project of 
constructing the Slovak identity anew.  In the Czech republic, on the contrary, there 
was considerably less need for such a thorough revision.  After all, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the Czechoslovak national imagery invented by Czechoslovakia’s founders 
in the 1920s, was distinctly Czech in outlook.  And since the majority of Czechs 
                                                




identified with the Czechoslovak state and its national mythology, no major revision 
of the Czech national character after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was needed.  
October 28, the date of Czechoslovakia’s establishment in 1918, for instance, still 
remains on the list of Czech national holidays as one of the key milestones in the 
Czech national history, as do all of the other state holidays and memorial dates 
celebrated during the interwar period.312   
Simplifying the Czech post-independence position even more was the 
structural shift that took place following the Czechoslovak breakup.  After the 
Czechoslovak split, the Czech republic became one of the most homogeneous nation-
states in Europe.  After centuries of sharing borders with multiple ethnic “others” and 
defining one’s identity in relation to these “others” – whether they were the Germans, 
the Jews, the Slovaks, the Poles, etc. – there was suddenly no “other” to differentiate 
oneself from.  In words of Petr Pithart, a leading Charta 77 signatory and post-
November politician, all of a sudden, there were no important questions to ask, no 
challenges to overcome.  In this “homogeneous, isolated, and therefore uninteresting” 
new Czech world, Pithart observed, the need for great historical images and narratives 
had suddenly dramatically decreased.313  In fact, it is precisely the absence of grand 
historical debates (save the traditional squabble between the Catholic and the 
Protestant vision of Czech identity, as exemplified in the struggle between the 
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proponents of Jan Hus vs. St. Vaclav myth), 314 which represents one of the most 
striking features of the Czech post-communist political discourse.   
Instead of battles over the meaning of the past, it was the struggle between 
two starkly different visions of the present, epitomized by the Havel vs. Klaus 
controversy, that has dominated the Czech post-1993 public discourse.  In a nutshell, 
Vaclav Havel’s position is a moral, apolitical vision of the world which places 
premium on morality and humanism, promotion of civil society as a pre-requisite of a 
healthy democracy, and the concept of common good, rather than individual profit.315  
In contrast, Vaclav Klaus’ is an infinitely pragmatic technocratic view which 
celebrates individualism and the logic of the free market and rejects the idea of civil 
society as unnatural and “aberrant”, deriding its proponents as “dreamers” and “social 
engineers”.316  As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, it was Vaclav Klaus’ 
skillful political maneuvering of the lustration issue which proved successful in 
stripping the dissidents and their ideals of the symbolic power they possessed during 
the initial weeks and months following the 1989 Velvet revolution.  After the early 
1990s lustration scandals, the dissident group was labeled as impractical naïve 
dreamers or people who had something to hide and became increasingly 
marginalized.   
                                                
314 Essentially, this is the exact reproduction (albeit with new actors) of the interwar battle between the 
Protestant proponents of the Hussite tradition and the Catholic defenders of St. Vaclav.   
315 See Havel, V., V. Klaus, et al. (1996). "Civil Society After Communism: Rival Visions." Journal of 
Democracy 7(1 (January 1996)).  Also : Havel, V. (1993). Summer M ditations. New York, Vintage 
Books. 





There has been one important exception to the general absence of historical 
themes in the Czech post-1993 public debate, however.  It is the so called Benes 
decrees controversy.  As discussed in chapter 4, “Benes decrees” refer to a st of l ws 
issued by Czechoslovakia’s postwar President Eduard Benes between 1945 and 1946.  
Approved at the Potsdam conference by the four powers, the decrees required 
immediate confiscation of property and expulsion from Czechoslovakia of all 
Germans and Hungarians who had identified themselves as German or Magyar in any 
census since 1929.  The majority of the expelled Sudeten Germans settled across the 
border in Bavaria and a smaller number settled in Austria.  Exemption was given to 
those who could prove that they had remained loyal to Czechoslovakia during the 
Nazi occupation.   
Briefly, the Benes decrees controversy began in December 1989.  At that 
time, the Bavarian Prime Minister Max Streibl asked the new Czechoslovak leaders 
to apologize to the Sudeten Germans for the post-war expulsion the same way as 
Germany apologized for the crimes perpetrated by the Nazis during the war.  (During 
the Cold war, the Czechoslovak government steadfastly ignored statements by FRG 
governments which repeatedly condemned the decrees as illegal.)  Formal apologies 
from the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Dienstbier and Czechoslovak President 
Vaclav Havel were followed, two years later, in 1992, by a “German-Czechoslovak 
Friendship Treaty” and in 1997 by “German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations 
and their Development”.  None of these steps, however, were sufficient in resolving 
the most fundamental dispute between Bonn and Prague.  Sudeten Germans 




confiscated from them after the war, while the Czech side continued to vehemently 
oppose any such demands.317   
The position of the European Union on the Benes decrees controversy has 
been inconsistent – wavering between detached statements which argued that the 
issue was a purely bilateral matter between Germany and the Czech republic and was 
unrelated to the Czech EU membership prospects and strong statements of 
condemnation which explicitly emphasized respect for fundamental human and 
minority rights as a precondition of future Czech membership in the EU.  The Czech-
German conflict over the decrees spiraled in the early 2002 when the Czech Premier 
Milos Zeman (CSSD) and Vaclav Klaus (ODS), independently of each other, used the 
rising frustration among the Czech population over what was perceived as constant 
German and Austrian attacks on the postwar order to increase their prospects in the 
upcoming June parliamentary elections.  In a January 2002 interview to the Austrian 
magazine Profil, Zeman completely negated Havel’s and Dienstbier’s previous 
apologies for the expulsions when he called the Sudeten Germans “Hitler’s fifth 
column” that destroyed Czechoslovakia in 1938.  For his part, Vaclav Klaus 
demanded that the EU inserts a separate clause in the future EU accession tr aty with 
the Czech republic which would explicitly guarantee that the Benes decrees would 
never be revised or annulled.  In April that year, 179 Czech parliamentary deputies 
unanimously passed a resolution rejecting any attempts to reopen the Benes decre. 
The EU expressed concerns over the statements but did not reprimand the Czech 
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leaders and refused to block the Czech access to the Union.318  The latest episode of 
the decrees controversy, which is likely to animate Czech politics for some time to 
come, was president Klaus’ 2010 threat to veto the European Union Lisbon Treaty 
unless a special clause was added exempting the Czech republic from the EU Bill of 
Fundamental Rights (this, in order to prevent possible future property demands by 
Sudeten Germans).  After weeks of heated debates and negotiations between Prague 
and Brussels, the Czech Constitutional court ruled the Lisbon treaty was not in 
conflict with the Czech Constitutional Law and President Klaus grudgingly signed the 
treaty.319   
If the Czech post-independence debate has mostly avoided historical topics, in 
Slovakia, by contrast, 1993 marked the beginning of a frantic search for a new set of 
legitimizing mythologies.  Unlike the Czechs who did not even begin to seriously 
discuss their national holiday legislation until 2000, the Slovak political leadership 
was immediately thrown into a passionate battle over the meaning of Slovak identity. 
Less than three months after the Czechoslovak split, the Slovak parliament adopted a 
brand new National Holiday bill.  In comparison to the Czech holiday legislation, 
which, as mentioned, maintains historical continuity with the Czechoslovak interwar 
holiday order, the Slovak bill is overwhelmingly national in character.  Out of the 
total number of twenty two historical dates included in the 1993 Holiday Bill and its 
subsequent modifications,320 twelve refer to various milestones on the Slovak road to 
independence (mostly drawn from the 19th and the early 20th century Slovak 
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history).321  Only seven of the newly adopted holidays refer to events symbolizing 
universal values: four to antifascism322 and three to anti-communism323.  For 
comparison, the 2000 Czech holiday law, includes 17 non-religious holidays and 
memorial days, five of which are identical to the interwar Czechoslovak holiday 
order,324 four commemorate events related to WWII and Czech anti-fascist 
struggle,325 two commemorate Czech anti-communist resistance,326 four refer to 
universal values,327 one commemorates the establishment of the Czech republic in 
1993 and one refers to the date of Czech entry into the NATO in 1998.   
Among the first victims of the Slovak post-1993 efforts to nationalize Slovak 
history (and Slovakia’s new holiday law) was October 28, the date of the 
establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918.  In 1993, the date was removed from the 
“State holidays” category and temporarily placed in the category of “Other non-
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working holidays”.328  The anniversary’s annual celebrations grew more and more 
modest by the year and the 90th anniversary of Czechoslovakia’s establishment in 
1918 went without official commemoration in Slovakia (save a very modest military 
ceremony in front of the Memorial of Czechoslovak stateness in Bratislava and 
Premier Fico’s brief visit of the Czech embassy in Hanoi where he was on official 
state trip).  Instead, the official celebrations of Czechoslovakia’s 90th birthday took 
place on October 30, the date of the Martin Declaration of 1918.329   
Having discarded their most immediate, Czechoslovak, history as 
insufficiently Slovak and therefore unusable for their nationalist project, Slovak post-
1993 political elites looked to more distant pasts for sources of symbolic capital.  
Historians and archeologists literally dug for evidence which would demonstrate the 
longevity of the Slovak presence in the region and specifically show that the Slovaks 
were there “first” – before the Magyars and before the Czechs.  Archaeological 
evidence was discovered suggesting that the remains of 5th and 6th century Slavic 
settlements were identical with the Slovak settlements mentioned in historical sources 
from the 11th century.  This was meant to stretch the existence of Slovaks as a nation 
by several centuries and show that they were not merely some undifferentiated Slavic 
tribe but that they were indeed the first state-bearing nation in the area.330   
Enormous efforts were also put into re-discovering Great Moravia as “the first 
Slovak state” and the Moravian population as the first Slovak nation.  Matica 
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Slovenska published a number of publications on the topic, mostly written by Slovak 
nationalist émigrés, some of which became compulsory reading materials in 
elementary schools.  In 1996, for instance a controversial textbook Dejiny Slovenska 
a Slovakov written by Milan S. Durica, a Slovak émigré Catholic priest, was 
distributed to elementary schools as a required reading by the Slovak Cultural 
Minister, a close ally of the Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, Eva Slavkovsa.  The 
textbook which referred to the ancient Slavs living in the Danube basin as Slovaks 
spurred a lively debate both in Slovakia and at the EU level due to its many factual 
mistakes, including its skewed interpretation of the Slovak wartime history which ill 
be discussed in a moment.   As a result of strong domestic and international criticism, 
the book was eventually withdrawn from the elementary school curricula in June 
1997.331   
 That same year, another heated historical debate arose in connection to a 
book Veľký omyl Veľká Morava (Great Mistake Great Moravia) written by another 
Slovak émigré, Dominik Hudec who situated the origins of the Slovak nation to “the 
2nd century AD or maybe even earlier”,332 and in the language and style of the 19th 
century national awakeners, urged his readers to “liberate themselves” from the 
“Czechoslovakist” and Hungarian “lies and myths” and present the “true story” of the 
9th century Great Moravian state:  
“Now is the time! We cannot let these lies take root in the heads of our young 
students, journalists, politicians… He, who is not willing to fight for his truth 
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and even sacrifice his life for it, is not worthy of freedom.  He, who is 
interested only in material possessions and servitude to a foreign master, will 
forever remain a political and a cultural slave”333 
Similar to Durica’s textbook, Hudec’s book was heavily promoted by the nationalist 
circles around Matica Slovenska.334   
After the 2006 elections, the language of Great Moravia as the first Slovak 
state was picked up by Premier Robert Fico who, in an effort to revive the dormant 
Slovak patriotism, has persistently ignored heavy criticism and even ridicule from 
Slovak historians and cultural elites and referred to Great Moravia as the firs state of 
“old Slovaks”.335  His most recent effort to inspire Slovak national pride and promote 
societal understanding of Slovak ancient history is the construction of an extravagant 
8 meter tall bronze equestrian statue of the Great Moravian Duke Svatopluk, 
according to Robert Fico, the first Slovak king, which is due to be unveiled in the 
courtyard of the newly renovated Bratislava castle later this year.  According to Pavol 
Paska, current head of the Slovak Parliament and member of Robert Fico’s SMER, 
new archaeological findings indicate that Svatopluk’s seat was not in Nitra but in 
Bratislava.  Historians vehemently oppose such claims.  
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Picture 23: Searching for new Founding Myths:  Svatopluk the first Slovak king?  The bronze statue 
of the Great Moravian Duke Svatopluk, an initiative of Premier Robert Fico, President Ivan 
Gasparovic and Head of the Parliament Pavol Paska is scheduled to be unveiled in the courtyard of the 
Bratislava castle. 
 
Despite great political efforts to revive the memory of Great Moravia, however, the 
Great Moravian history is simply too distant of an era to generate strong national feelings in 
contemporary Slovak society – not to mention the large volume of historical evidence that 
contradicts such claims.  This leaves the Slovak wartime state, led by monsignor Tiso, as the 
other potential source of continuity and legitimacy.  Although historically closer (thus more 
likely to achieve popular resonance) than the distant 9th century Great Moravian history, 
Slovakia’s wartime past is far from unproblematic, however.  If, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
Tiso’s wartime state was merely a puppet regime of the Nazi Germany, there is little reason 




mere temporary consolation before Hitler’s grand plan of wiping out all Slavs could be fully 
achieved.  On the other hand, if the Slovak state was not a puppet regime but an autonomous 
achievement of its leaders, then its leaders ought to be held responsible for the crimes that 
were perpetrated in the name of this state (i.e., deportations of the Jews and Roma, forced 
expulsion of Czechs, enlisting German help in order to contain the anti-fascist Slovak 
National Uprising, etc.).  Either way arguments that the wartime Slovak state represents a 
piece of the Slovak past which is worthy of admiration are difficult to sustain.   
Much like the Great Moravian debate, the debate about the wartime Slovak 
state was inserted into Slovak post-communist political discourse by Slovak émigré 
nationalist historians, supported by a handful of political elites of the Slovak National 
Party (SNS), Matica Slovenska (MS), and some members of the Christian Democratic 
Movement (KDH) in the early 1990s.  First calls for rehabilitation of the wartime 
period as a usable part of Slovak history came in the spring of 1990 with the 
publication of an interview in Literarny tyzdennik with an exiled historian Frantisek 
Vnuk.336  In it, Vnuk called for rehabilitation of the Slovak wartime state and its 
leaders and urged Slovak historians to accept historical research of Slovak émigré 
historians.  The debate was joined by Milan S. Durica, whose already mentioned 
Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov337 generated an avalanche of critical responses from a 
number of prominent Slovak historians, artists, intellectuals, representatives of th  
Jewish religious community, the Lutheran Church as well as representative of the 
European Union after the book was made a r quired reading for elementary school 
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history courses in 1996.  Criticisms against Durica’s book included objections that it 
glorified the personality of Jozef Tiso, belittled the significance of Holocaust, 
misrepresented the significance of the Slovak National Uprising and incited ha red 
against Czechs and Hungarians.338  
Other highly publicized efforts to revive the memory of the wartime Slovak 
and make it a useable part of Slovak national past include the controversial unveiling 
of a plaque of Jozef Tiso in Banovce nad Bebravou in 1990, followed by similar 
ceremonies in Zilina in 2000 and Bytca in 2010 and controversial media glorifications 
of Tiso’s wartime regime as an economic paradise by the Slovak Catholic Cardinal 
Sokol.  Slovak Catholic church has kept official silence on the issue of the Slovak 
wartime state for 60 years.339  
Since the early 1990s, the number of supporters of Tiso and the Slovak 
wartime regime has steadily declined.  Annual commemorations of Jozef Tiso’s
execution on April 18 1947 and the establishment of the Slovak state on March 14 
1939 attract typically no more than 200 participants, mostly from the Slovak fringe 
nationalist party, Slovenska Pospolitost.340  Similarly, public opinion polls indicate a 
downward trend in Tiso’s popularity.  According to the 2005 sociological research 
study undertaken by MVK, highly positive evaluations of president Tiso declined 
from about 8 percent in 1992 to about 4.8% in 2005.  Most of Tiso’s supporters are 
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retirees, workers and people with low education.  Approximately half of the 
respondents believed president Tiso was responsible for the deportations of the 
Slovak Jews, yet only some of them approved of Tiso’s execution.  More than 20 
percent of respondents thought Tiso was not responsible for the deportations.341   
With the defeat of the democrats by SMER in the 2006 parliamentary 
elections, efforts to relativize the responsibility of the Slovak wartime regime for 
wartime crimes and rehabilitate it as a useable element of Slovak history have 
intensified again.  Although Premier Fico (as well as his one coalition partner 
Vladimir Meciar) publically condemned the wartime fascist state, his coalition 
partner Jan Slota of SNS has been Tiso’s outspoken defender, describing the Slovak 
wartime president as a “Slovak national martyr”, “defender of the Slovak nation and 
Christianity from Bolshevism and Liberalism” and calling the 1939-45 period a bright 
era of the Slovak history.342  Most recently, controversial appointment of an SNS 
nominee for the post of the head of the Slovak Institute of National Memory spurred 
another wave of public criticism.  Twenty years after the collapse of communis  
arguments about the character and role of the Slovak wartime state and its lea er hip, 
as well as other aspects of the Slovak past thus continue.  The battle over the meaning
and character of Slovak identity is far from over.   
 
                                                
341 Cited in Kernova, M. (2005). Obdivovatelov Tisa a jeho statu ubuda. SME. 
342 SME-sp (1997). SNS vyzyva na spoluuctenie si pamiatky Jozefa TisuIbid.  See also: pamätná 
tabuľa Jozefovi Tisovi  Another SNS parliamentarian, Jozef Rydlo, referred to Tiso as the greatest 




Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
In this final section I return to the main research puzzle of the divergence between the 
Czech and Slovak post-communist discourses and rituals of collective memory and to some 
broader theoretical issues raised in the Introduction.   
Given the fact that Czechs and Slovaks lived together in a common state and w re 
citizens of the same regimes for nearly seven decades, the difference between the post-
communist discourses and rituals of collective memory in the two countries is indeed 
striking.  I discussed three different aspects in which the Czech and the Slovak post-1993 
narratives diverged: (1) de-communization, (2) attitude toward the Czechoslovak past, and (3) 
the overall style and content of the memory discourses employed in the two countries.   
With regard to the first area, de-communization, the Czech republic was the first 
post-communist country to pursue a thorough de-communization policy via lustration and 
open access to communist Secret police files.  Slovakia, on the other hand, never really 
implemented the lustration law, was much slower in opening public access to the STB files, 
and in general continues to exhibit a much greater tolerance toward the communist period, 
demonstrated not least in the relatively strong continuity of pre-November elites in the Slovak 
political life.   
The divergence between the Czech and the Slovak post-1993 trajectories is also 
evident in the way the two nations approached their common, Czechoslovak, past.  While the 
Czechs maintain continuity with interwar Czechoslovakia and its legitimiz ng mythology, the 
Slovak post-1993 nationalist elites rejected the Czechoslovak past and launched a wid -
ranging, 19th century-like, nationalist project of constructing a new Slovak identity.   
Finally, in terms of the overall style and content of the memory discour es that 




relative lack of grand historical themes343 and instead focused on two different visions of the 
present – Vaclav Havel’s morally-oriented discourse of civil society and the pragmatic, 
technocratic vision of Vaclav Klaus.  The Slovak debate, on the other hand, has been heavily 
nation-focused.  In short, it is as though these two countries had two very diffent needs – 
one to construct myths about the present and the other to construct myths about the past.   
Why the divergence?  I argued that the puzzle of the divergent attitudes between the 
Czechs and Slovaks toward their communist past can be found in the different communist 
regime types that existed in the Czech and Slovak republics in the 1970s and 1980s.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, there was a noticeable difference between the ways in hich 
normalization proceeded in the two parts of the Czechoslovak joint state.  No  only were the 
numbers of those purged from the Party much higher in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, 
normalization in Slovakia was also gentler in terms of its repression tactics.  While the 
majority of the Czech reform activists from 1968 were purged from the Partyand usually had 
no other choice but to become manual laborers and stokers, Slovak reformers fro  1968 were 
more often demoted from their professional fields, rather than purged.  Thus, even though 
Czechoslovakia as a whole represented a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime type, Slovakia can 
be more appropriately characterized as a mixture of bureaucratic-authoritarianism with some 
consensual and paternalistic features.  This in turn translated into slightly different views and 
evaluations of the communist experience in the two republics, with Slovaks exhibiting a more 
benevolent attitude toward the continued presence of pre-November elites in the Slovak 
public life as well as a generally more positive view of the communist era while the Czechs 
opted for Lustration and more stringent measures to break with the communist past.   
  Concerning the gap between the Czech and Slovak post-1993 attitudes toward their 
common Czechoslovak past, the argument of the dissertation has been that seeds of the 
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different Czech and Slovak post-1993 choices can be located in the failure of the First 
Czechoslovak regime to create a common national narrative that would incorporate 
Czechoslovakia’s diverse population and promote among them a sense of belonging to the 
new state.  As discussed in Chapter 3, despite the rhetoric of Czecho-Slovak fraternity which 
permeated the official language of the First Republic, the national narr tive constructed by 
Czechoslovakia’s founders was distinctly Czech in substance and did not speak o the Slovak 
historical experience – not to mention Czechoslovakia’s other minorities.  As a result, despite 
sincere efforts by the Czechoslovak interwar leadership to guarantee minority protection to 
Czechoslovakia’s minority populations and diffuse the existing religious tensions, the 
strongly Czech-centric language and imagery invented and promoted by the Czecoslovak 
Founding fathers could not but alienate the country’s non-Czech speakers.  From the 
perspective of Slovaks, who, for over thousand years, had been an integral part of the 
Hungarian state, official promotion of St. Vaclav and Jan Hus could hardly evoke feelings of 
belonging and national identification.   As for Czechoslovakia’s Germans and Hungarians, 
they were afforded absolutely no place in the new narrative of the Czechoslovak identity.  
Eventually, national grievances which had been accumulating in interwar Czechoslovakia 
since its establishment contributed to Czechoslovakia’s demise in 1938.  
 Following the collapse of communism and dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech
and Slovak political elites therefore found themselves in different position .  Since the 
majority of Czechs identified with Czechoslovakia as their national state, there was little 
reason to discard memories of interwar Czechoslovakia from the post-1993 Czech national 
discourse.  After all, in a region noticeable by its lack of pre-communist democratic 
traditions, Czechoslovakia’s interwar democratic period was a highly coveted piece of 
history.   
Finally, the puzzle of the different salience of historical themes in the Czech and 




discourse) can be explained by the different needs experienced by the Czec  and Slovak post-
communist elites.   On the Czech side, as discussed in Chapter 5, the impetusfor a re-
evaluation of the Czech national character after 1993 was significantly weakened by the 
structural shift that took place in the Czech republic.  Following the 1993 split, the Czech 
republic became one of the most homogeneous nation-states in Europe.  In the absenc of a 
significant internal “other” against whom to differentiate oneself, grand historical images and 
narratives virtually lost their reason d’etre in the post-1993 discourse.  In t ad, the dominant 
Czech debate in the 1990s became polarized between two different visions of the present– 
Vaclav Havel’s moral discourse of civil society and the pragmatic neo-Liberal language of 
Vaclav Klaus.   
In the post-1993 Slovakia, by contrast, reasons for a major revision of national 
identity did exist – and manifested themselves with full force.  The Slovak post-1993 elite 
headed by Vladimir Meciar rejected the Czechoslovak past as un-useable for the new Slovak 
national project and therefore found itself in desperate need of new founding myths to 
legitimate Slovakia’s new independence.  As a result, the Slovak post 1993 public discourse 
has been heavily focused on historical and national themes, while the Czech discourse 
centered largely around non-historical themes.   
 The prominence of nationalist discourse in post-1993 Slovakia on the one hand and 
the relative absence of national themes in the Czech post-1993 discourse on the other can be 
also viewed as a legacy of Czechoslovak bureaucratic authoritarian communist regime which, 
by weakening pre-communist political identities, contributed to the emergence of the so-
called catch-all parties.  As discussed in Chapter 5, both Vaclav Klaus’ ODS and Vladimir 
Meciar’s HZDS were parties characteristic by their lack of identifiable links to pre-
communist legacies or social cleavages.  As Abby Innes suggested, political identities of 
ODS and HZDS, similar to many other post-communist actors, were constructed in response 




populist/nationalist and Klaus’ ODS became a technocratic party, as mentioned, was 
primarily due to different levels of economic development and consequently different 
prospects of success of a radical economic transformation in the two parts of the federal 
Czechoslovakia – not to nationalist impulses.  Since the costs associated with rapid economic 
reform were considerably higher in Slovakia due to the country’s relatively lower level of 
economic development, Vladimir Meciar’s HZDS opted for the populist/nationalist strategy 
of emphasizing Slovakia’s economic vulnerability and calling for more gradualist economic 
policies that would better reflect Slovak conditions while Vaclav Klaus opted for rapid 
economic transformation. 
In addition to analyzing the Czech and Slovak post-communist transformation, the 
dissertation has broader theoretical implications as well, speaking to several important 
debates in the fields of nationalism and memory studies.  Understandably, it presents a strong 
critique of primordialist theories of national identity.  But it also offers a critique of extreme 
constructivist theories of nationalism, specifically, their underlying assumption that identity 
construction knows no limits, that elites are practically free to construct or invent nations as 
they wish.  As the discussion of the Czechoslovak communist practice of organized forg tting 
in Chapter 3 showed, despite extreme repressive methods employed by the Czechoslovak 
communist regime in its effort to achieve the grand socialist project f building a new 
socialist man, the project ended in a complete disaster.  The Czechoslovak communist 
regime, despite its repressiveness and ideological rigidity, proved unable to fully control the 
space of public memory.  While it was quite successful at erasing previous modes of 
identification, it was unable to instill a new version of history.  Counter-narratives did emerge 
in socialist Czechoslovakia as soon as the most brutal form of Stalinist repression subsided.   
By discussing the transformation of the Czech and Slovak national mythscapes, the 
dissertation also highlights the dynamic character of narratives, identit es, and political 




identity construction, including such important works as Hobsbawm and Ranger’s Invention 
of Tradition or Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities.  By focusing on the dynamic 
transformations of the Czech and Slovak national mythscape, the dissertation shows that 
nations are not simply invented or imagined but are continuously constructed and 
reconstructed.  They have histories of their own.  The work of national imagination, in other 
words, is an ongoing project.   
 The dissertation also points out some serious limitations of instrumentalist theories of 
identity construction, specifically the assumption that political elites act based on clearly 
constituted identities and interests.  My discussion of the Czech and Slovak post-communist 
ODS and HZDS illustrates limits to such arguments.  Elites may not initially have a clear idea 
of what their identities and interests are as these may develop, as was the c e of ODS and 
HZDS, in response to immediate challenges faced by actors.  This highlights the sense-
making aspect of narrative construction – as opposed to purely instrumental uses of the past.   
Finally, and most broadly, the dissertation presents a culturalist critique of the 
dominant institutionalist literature on democratization and an argument on how to think of 
post-communist transitions outside of the strictly institutional framework.  Drawing on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s definition of political culture as an ongoing work of symbolic representation in 
which various actors struggle to legitimize themselves by maintainig or subverting the 
words and categories through which the reality is perceived and expressed,344 th  dissertation 
defines democratization as a dynamic process of meaning creation and highlights t e special 
role of political myths in this process.  Instead of a straightforward adoption of some ready-
made institutions and processes, democratization is understood here as an activity of 
sensemaking – of searching for useable pasts and new legitimizing mythologies.  This is not 
to argue that institutional analyses ought to be replaced by studies of political culture, rather, 
                                                




it is an argument on how , by looking at the less palpable, symbolic, aspects of politics, we 
might valuably enrich our understanding of democratic transitions and politics more generally 
and move beyond the highly popular but nonetheless conceptually inadequate “return of the 
past” paradigm of post-communist nationalism and investigate what pasts ex c ly are 
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